by," followed by the name and address of the importer, and the
words "Product of" followed by the country of origin. See id.
With regard to the numerous comments suggesting that the
proposed name would violate Plaintiffs trademark rights under
the Lanham Trademark Act, the ATF stated that "these issues are
matters of private dispute that do not restrict [the] ATF's
authority to establish a viticultural area under the [FAA]."
In response to the ATF's approval of the Santa Rita Hills AVA,
Plaintiff filed suit on July 19, 2001, and simultaneously
requested that this Court grant preliminary injunctive relief by
ordering the ATF to suspend the effective date of the final
rule. In its Amended Complaint and motion, Plaintiff asserts
that the ATF's approval of the final rule amounts to arbitrary
and capricious conduct in violation of section 706(2)(A) of the
Administrative Procedures Act, that the approval infringes on
Plaintiffs trademark in the name "Santa Rita," and that it
dilutes the value of that trademark. On July 26, 2001, the ATF
filed the Administrative Record and an opposition to Plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunctive relief. After Plaintiff filed
its reply on August 2, 2001, the Court issued an Order
requesting additional information from the parties regarding the
scope of the ATF's consideration (or lack of consideration) of
alternative names proposed by the commenters and, more
importantly, by one of the petitioners. Each of the parties
submitted a supplemental memorandum on August 6, 2001. Plaintiff
filed a second supplemental memorandum on August 9, 2001.
A. Injunctive Relief Standard
In assessing whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief,
which is considered an extraordinary remedy in this circuit,
see Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C.Cir. 1969);
Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Henney, 94 F. Supp.2d 36, 58 (D.C. 2000),
a court must balance four factors: (1) whether the movant is
substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the
movant would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were
not granted; (3) whether an injunction would substantially
injure other interested parties; and (4) whether the public
interest would be furthered by the injunction. See Mova Pharm.
Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1066 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (citing
CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
58 F.3d 738, 746 (D.C.Cir. 1995)).
In applying this four-factored standard, district courts
employ a sliding scale under which a particularly strong showing
in one area can compensate for weakness in another. See CityFed
Fin., 58 F.3d at 747. Thus, "[a]n injunction may be justified,
for example, where there is a particularly strong likelihood of
success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight
showing of irreparable injury." Id. Notwithstanding the fluid
nature of this familiar four-part inquiry, "it is particularly
important for the [movant] to demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits." Barton v. Dist. of
Columbia, 131 F. Supp.2d 236, 242 (D.C. 2001) (citing Benten v.
Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084, 1085, 112 S.Ct. 2929, 120 L.Ed.2d 926
(1992)). If the movant fails to do so, "it would take a very
strong showing with respect to the other preliminary injunction
factors to turn the tide in plaintiff['s] favor." Davenport v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 366 (D.C.Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief
must demonstrate at least some irreparable injury because "the
basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always
been irreparable harm." CityFed Fin., 58 F.3d at 747 (quoting
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d
(alterations omitted). Thus, if the movant makes no showing of
irreparable injury, "that alone is sufficient" for a district
court to refuse to grant preliminary injunctive relief. Id.;
see also Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C.Cir.
1985) ("We believe that analysis of [irreparable harm] disposes
of these motions and, therefore, address only whether the
petitioners have demonstrated that in the absence of a stay,
they will suffer irreparable harm.").
In this circuit, injury is irreparable only if it is "both
certain and great." Wisconsin Gas, 758 F.2d at 674. This
two-part definition requires first that the alleged harm "be
actual and not theoretical" and "`of such imminence that there
is a `clear and present' need for equitable relief to prevent
irreparable harm.'" Id. (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC,
409 F. Supp. 297, 307 (D.C.), aff'd, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C.Cir.
1976)) (emphasis in original). Second, financial harm alone
cannot constitute irreparable injury unless it threatens the
very existence of the movant's business. See Wisconsin Gas,
758 F.2d at 674 (citing Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n
v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.
1977)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has explained,
The key word in this consideration is irreparable.
Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of
money, time and energy necessarily expended in the
absence of a stay are not enough. The possibility
that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief
will be available at a later date, in the ordinary
course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim
of irreparable harm.
Wisconsin Gas, 758 F.2d at 674 (quoting Virginia Petroleum
Jobbers Ass'n v. Fed. Power Comm'n,