bring the class claims alleged. This Court finds that plaintiff
has exhausted her administrative remedies, yet fails to state
any claims for relief. As such, she lacks standing to bring the
class claims asserted.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendant contends that plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies with respect to certain claims because
she did not cite to these allegations in her original EEO
complaint. A Title VII plaintiff must exhaust administrative
remedies before pursuing his or her claims in federal court.
See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-833,
96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976); Artis v. Greenspan,
158 F.3d 1301 (D.C.Cir. 1998). A Title VII suit following an EEOC
charge "is limited in scope to claims that are like or
reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and grow out
of such allegations." Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907
(D.C.Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). While, "the
requirement of some specificity in charge is not a mere
technicality," courts must not construe the administrative
charge requirement to place a heavy technical burden on
potential plaintiffs. Id.
The record supports plaintiffs position, to an extent.
Plaintiffs original formal administrative complaint did not
detail all the allegations in the Complaint. However, in a
response to a question by an EEO counselor to verify that the
allegations of discrimination only include the incidents on
September 8, 1998, plaintiff responded that her allegations did
not. Her response indicated that she wished to clarify and
expand on her allegations. In her expansion she includes all the
allegations that she now states in her Complaint, except the
allegation that her performance ratings and resulting salary
were discriminatory. Accordingly, plaintiff exhausted her
administrative remedies, with respect to all claims except those
relating to her performance ratings and salary.
B. Individual Claims
In Count I, plaintiff alleges she was qualified for higher
ratings and permanent status. Specifically she states that 1)
she was qualified for a permanent position and that as a result
of her allegedly discriminatory demotion to a temporary
position, she suffered damages then and later by reason of
delays in promotions; 2) she was qualified for higher ratings
and larger salary than she received in her new position; 3)
defendant consistently down-rated her since the filing of her
complaint; 4) when she complained about her work assignments,
proper confidential procedures were not followed; and 5)
defendant failed to follow federal law in the processing of her
EEO complaint. She also states that defendant favored equally or
lesser qualified, non-protected employees at the workplace which
resulted in an adverse impact on her earnings and advancement.
Defendant asserts that it is entitled to dismissal of the
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for
summary judgment under Rule 56. In considering a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept plaintiff's factual
allegations as true, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and draw all
inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Kowal v.
MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir. 1994).
To prevail, defendant must show "beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of [plaintiff's] claim
which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Sparrow v.
Lines, 216 F.3d 1111 (D.C.Cir. 2000). In contrast, the Court
will review the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party in deciding a Rule 56 motion. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). Summary judgment should be granted only if the moving
party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Aka
v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 879 (D.C.Cir. 1997),
aff'd on reh'g, 156 F.3d 1284, 1287 (1998).
1. Delay in Promotion Claim
Plaintiff alleges that she was qualified for a permanent
position and had been a permanent employee prior to her transfer
from her previous position as a counselor in the EEO department.
She claims that by reason of a discriminatory act, the reduction
in status to "temporary," she suffered damages both then and
later by reason of the delays in promotion caused by her
demotion. Plaintiffs allegations withstand a motion to dismiss.
Despite plaintiffs characterizations, there is no dispute that
this situation occurred as a result of the Settlement
Agreement.*fn1 The Settlement Agreement states that
the Board shall place [plaintiff] on a two year
detail to the [DCCA] as a Consumer Complaints
Analyst at the FR 26 level. [plaintiff] shall
receive a salary increase commensurate with the FR
26 level. . . .
If during the detail management of DCCA desires
to retain [plaintiff], [plaintiff] shall be offered
the opportunity to join DCCA as a regular employee,
and the detail shall be terminated. If [plaintiff]
joins DCCA as a regular employee, she shall do so
at the FR 26 level.
At the conclusion of the first or second year
of the detail either plaintiff or management or
DCCA may terminate the detail for any reason. If
the detail is terminated pursuant to this
provision, the Board will make best efforts in good
faith to place [plaintiff] in another position for
which she is qualified at the FR 26 level. . . .
Plaintiff's transfer from her position as an EEO counselor to
the DCCA detail was pursuant to the Settlement Agreement between
plaintiff and defendant. As defendant correctly argues, any
claims resulting from action taken pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement are barred by that Agreement.