for injunctive relief. In both the factual history and the procedural
history sections that follow, the court will describe first the
underlying action and then the action related to the motion at issue.
A. Factual History
The underlying action involves LeBoeufs challenge to DOE's decision to
award a contract to the law firm of Winston & Strawn ("Winston"), the
intervenor-defendant, rather than to LeBoeuf. DOE's decision stems from a
Request for Proposals and Solicitation that DOE issued on May 27, 1999.
See First Am.Compl. ¶ 26. This request stated that DOE was seeking
"professional legal advice and assistance to DOE's Office of General
Counsel, involving legal matters related to the licensing activities of
DOE's OCRWM [Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management] for Yucca
Mountain," (the "Yucca Mountain contract"). Id. After receiving bids from
LeBoeuf, Winston, and others, DOE decided to award the contract to
Winston. See id. ¶ 36. DOE explained to LeBoeuf that although LeBoeuf
and Winston had equal scores, DOE awarded the contract to Winston because
Winston submitted the lowest bid. Id. As a result, on March 27, 2000,
LeBoeuf filed a complaint against DOE in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada. The District of Nevada transferred the case to this
court on January 3, 2001.
In contrast to the underlying dispute over the Yucca Mountain
contract, the present dispute involves a contract for legal services with
West Valley Nuclear Services Company ("West Valley"), a different DOE
contractor. This dispute originated on June 7, 2001, with Michael
McBride, a partner at LeBoeuf. See Second McBride Aff. at 4. Mr. McBride
learned that West Valley was interested in retaining LeBoeuf for work
related to a DOE radioactive waste cleanup contract. See id. This
contract for legal services (the "West Valley contract") required
approval by DOE. See id. According to the plaintiff, DOE refused to
approve West Valley's retention of LeBoeuf solely because of LeBoeuf's
pending lawsuit against DOE. See Pl's Mot. at 1.
The plaintiff bases this conclusion on the following facts: On June 7,
2001, Mr. McBride sent a letter to West Valley's legal counsel setting
forth LeBoeuf's qualifications, billing rates, and a summary of LeBoeuf's
lawsuit against DOE regarding the Yucca Mountain contract. See Second
McBride Aff., Ex. A. A few days later, West Valley informed Mr. McBride
that it intended to hire LeBoeuf, subject to a few terms and DOE's
approval. See id. On June 13 and 15, 2001, representatives from West
Valley told John Lawrence, a senior counsel at LeBoeuf, that DOE was
reviewing the possible "issue" posed by LeBoeuf's litigation with DOE.
See Lawrence Aff. at 3-4. Later on June 15, 2001, Mr. Lawrence received a
call from West Valley's legal counsel who, according to Mr. Lawrence,*fn1
explained that "DOE had reached its final decision regarding [LeBoeuf's]
disclosure, and . . . the decision was made by DOE not to authorize West
Valley to engage our services." Id. at 4. According to Mr. McBride,
LeBoeuf partner, Brian O'Neill, left two messages with DOE's general
counsel, but the general counsel did not return the calls. See Second
McBride Aff. at 8.
Subsequently, on June 21, 2001, West
Valley retained a law firm*fn2 other than the plaintiff for the West
Valley contract. See Third McBride Aff. at 2; Order Denying T.R.O., June
22, 2001 (Hogan, C.J., as Motions Judge) ("Order") at 2.
Anticipating future injury, Mr. McBride argues that many of his former
clients will also need DOE approval if they wish to retain LeBoeuf in the
future. See Third McBride Aff. at 3. Mr. McBride contends that DOE's
"decision to retaliate against LeBoeuf for bringing this civil action"
will hinder LeBoeuf's transportation-law practice. See Third McBride
Aff. at 3. Finally, Mr. McBride also states that DOE's action is harming
his reputation and stigmatizing him and LeBoeuf. See id. at 3-4.
B. Procedural History
In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiff filed a complaint on March
27, 2000, and then a first amended complaint on February 6, 2001. The
plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted in an arbitrary, capricious,
and illegal manner by awarding the Yucca Mountain contract to the law
firm of Winston & Strawn. See First Am.Compl. ¶¶ 58-84. In the
first amended complaint, LeBoeuf explains that Winston's representation
of two DOE contractors created an impermissible conflict of interest that
should have disqualified Winston from the bidding. See id. ¶ 73.
More recently, on June 22, 2001, the plaintiff filed the present
action: a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction. In its motion, the plaintiff asks the court, first, to enjoin
DOE from permitting West Valley to retain a law firm in place of LeBoeuf
and, second, to enjoin DOE from preventing its contractors and
subcontractors from hiring LeBoeuf. See Pl.'s Proposed Order for T.R.O.;
Pl.'s Mot. According to the plaintiff, DOE debarred the plaintiff from
all contracts involving DOE, in violation of the Constitution and various
federal regulations. See Pl.'s Mot. at 6. LeBoeuf predicates its motion
for injunctive relief on its first amended complaint, which pertains to
the Yucca Mountain contract. See Pl.'s Mot.; Pl.'s Reply; First
Responding to the plaintiff's initial request for a temporary
restraining order to preserve the status quo, the court ruled that the
plaintiff's request was moot because West Valley had already retained a
new firm for its waste-cleanup contract with DOE. See Order. The court
also stated that it may not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
claim. See id. Shortly thereafter, the intervenor-defendant of the
underlying action, Winston, filed an opposition to LeBoeuf's motion,
arguing that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), does not give
this court jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. See Interv.'s Opp'n.
On June 29, 2001, LeBoeuf replied to Winston's opposition, requesting
different injunctive relief. In its reply, LeBoeuf requests that DOE be
enjoined from debarring LeBoeuf from the contract with West Valley and
from any other DOE contractor or subcontractor, that DOE express to West
Valley that LeBoeuf has no conflict that would prevent LeBoeuf from
providing legal services to West Valley, and that West Valley again
consider retaining LeBoeuf. See Pl.'s Reply; Pl.'s Proposed Order for
In response, DOE filed a motion to dismiss and to strike the
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and related submissions on
July 9, 2001. DOE bases its motion to dismiss on LeBoeuf's lack of
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. See id. The defendant asserts that because the plaintiff did not
base its motion for a preliminary
injunction on "an allegation of fact or law contained in a complaint
filed with this Court, the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim."
See Def's Mot. to Dismiss (Def.'s Mot.) at 5.
A. The Court Denies the Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
Because the Court Lacks Jurisdiction
Rather than filing its motion for injunctive relief with a new
complaint, the plaintiff predicates its motion on its first amended
complaint. The plaintiff argues that the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), gives the court jurisdiction to hear the motion
for injunctive relief. The court determines, however, that because the
facts, parties, and legal issues presented by the motion and by the first
amended complaint are not closely related, the court does not have
jurisdiction over the motion. As a result, the court denies the
1. Legal Standard for Jurisdiction
to Entertain a Motion for
A party commences a civil action by filing a complaint. See
FED.R.CIV.P. 3. When no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction
to entertain the plaintiff's petition for injunctive relief. See P.K.
Family Restaurant v. Internal Revenue Serv., 535 F. Supp. 1223, 1224
(N.D.Ohio 1982) (dismissing the case when the plaintiff filed no
complaint but sought injunctive relief to delay the collection of
taxes); In the Matter of the Tax Indebtedness of Boyle, 1996 WL 806190
(C.D.Cal. 1996). In addition, this court's local rules require that "[a]n
application for preliminary injunction shall be made in a document
separate from the complaint." LCvR 65.1.
Even when a motion for a preliminary injunction is predicated on a
complaint, if the motion raises issues different from those presented in
the complaint, the court has no jurisdiction over the motion. See Devose
v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994); Stewart v. U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 193, 198-199 (2d Cir.
1985). When the motion is based on facts closely related to the facts in
the complaint, however, the court may have jurisdiction to review a
motion for preliminary relief pursuant to the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Locals 14 and 15, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 438 F. Supp. 876,
879-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). While a court can use the All Writs Act to issue
process in aid of its jurisdiction, it cannot use the Act to enlarge its
jurisdiction. See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534-35, 119 S.Ct.
1538, 143 L.Ed.2d 720 (1999); Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United
States Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43, 106 S.Ct. 355, 88 L.Ed.2d 189
(1985); Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 750 F.2d 70, 78 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (stating that the
All Writs Act does not independently grant jurisdiction to a court);
2. Analysis of the Court's Jurisdiction
to Entertain a Motion for
The court denies the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief because
the court does not have jurisdiction over the motion. While the complaint
pertains to the Yucca Mountain contract awarded by DOE to Winston in
1999, the motion relates to a distinct set of facts, namely the 2001 West
Valley contract that LeBoeuf lost. See id. Specifically, the complaint
involves neither West Valley nor the firm West Valley subsequently hired
instead of LeBoeuf, and the instant motion involves West Valley
but has no relevance to Winston. See id. In short, the complaint involves
facts, legal issues, and parties different from those presented in the
pending motion. See id.
Similarly, in Devose v. Herrington, a district court denied the
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction that was filed without a
closely related complaint. See 42 F.3d at 471. The plaintiff's complaint
alleged that the defendant prison officials had denied him adequate
medical treatment for injuries he received while being transported
between prison units, while the motion for a preliminary injunction
involved disciplinary charges that the defendants allegedly filed against
the plaintiff in retaliation for the underlying civil action. See id. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed, explaining that "[a]lthough these new assertions
might support additional claims against the same prison officials, they
cannot provide the basis for a preliminary injunction in this lawsuit."
Id. (citing Stewart, 762 F.2d at 198-99) (finding that since the incident
relating to the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief presented issues
entirely different from those alleged in the complaint, the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the motion).
In the case at bar, the court reiterates that for jurisdiction to exist
over the present motion for injunctive relief, the motion would have to
be closely related to the facts, legal issues, and parties addressed in
the plaintiff's first amended complaint. See Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. at 880. In this case, however, as in Devose and
Stewart, the only connections between the underlying lawsuit and the
motion for a preliminary injunction are that both involve the plaintiff
and the defendant, and that the plaintiff believes the defendant is
retaliating against it because of the underlying lawsuit. See Devose, 42
F.3d at 471; Stewart, 762 F.2d at 198-199. As the Second and Eighth
Circuits have held in similar situations, this connection to the
complaint is insufficient. Id. Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction
over the motion for a preliminary injunction and thus denies the
B. Alternatively, the Court Denies the
Plaintiff's Motion based on an
Even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff did have jurisdiction, the
court would deny its motion because the plaintiff fails to make the
necessary showing for injunctive relief.