The plaintiffs allege that the Monument is physically over-inclusive.
See Pls.' Opp'n at 1. According to the plaintiffs, the "Giant Sequoia
groves constitute only about 20,000 acres or 6% of Monument area." See
id. Also, the plaintiffs charge that the Forest Service's current
management of the Monument area significantly decreases timber sales,
recreational uses, and rights of access to the Monument. See Compl.
On March 23, 2001, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss under both
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of jurisdiction, and Rule
12(b)(6), failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See
Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Mot. to Dismiss") at 1.
A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must accept all the
complaint's well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See, e.g., Pitney Bowes v. United
States Postal Serv., 27 F. Supp.2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 1998) (Urbina, J.). On
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction. See District of
Columbia Retirement Rd. v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 428, 431 (D.D.C.
1987). In evaluating whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, the
court must accept all uncontroverted, well-pleaded facts as true and
attribute all reasonable inferences to the plaintiffs. See Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974),
overturned on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102
S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The Court is not required, however, to
accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions
that are cast as factual allegations. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dunbar,
919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
Moreover, the court need not limit itself to the allegations of the
complaint. See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.
1986), vacated on other grounds by 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96
L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Rather, the court may consider such materials outside
the pleadings as it deems appropriate to determine whether it has
jurisdiction in the case. See Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences,
974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir. 1992).
For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it need
only provide a short and plain statement of the claim and the grounds on
which it rests. See FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). A motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) tests not whether the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, but
instead whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See
FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683. The
plaintiff need not plead the elements of a primafacie case in the
complaint. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1114
(D.C.Cir. 2000). Thus, the court may dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under
any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.
See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81
L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 422
(D.C.Cir. 1996). Moreover, the court should draw all reasonable
inferences in the nonmovant's favor. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1995).
B. The Court Dismisses Counts One Through Four Because the Proclamation
Does Not Violate the Antiquities Act
In Counts One through Four, the plaintiffs allege that the Proclamation
violates the Antiquities Act in various ways. See Compl. ¶¶ 131-60.
Reviewing the Proclamation on its face, this court determines that there
is no set of facts on which the plaintiffs could demonstrate that the
Proclamation violates the Antiquities Act. Consequently, the court
dismisses Counts One through Four pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
1. The Antiquities Act
The Antiquities Act authorizes the President of the United States:
in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation
historic landmarks . . . and other objects of historic
and scientific interest that are situated upon lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United
States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a
part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in
all cases shall be confined to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the
objects to be protected.
16 U.S.C. § 431. The Antiquities Act sets forth no means for
reviewing a President's proclamation other than specifying that a
President has discretion in his or her use of the Act. See id.