The opinion of the court was delivered by: Urbina, District Judge.
GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
This matter comes before the court on the defendant's motion
to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer this case to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. The pro se plaintiff, William W. Spencer, Jr. ("the
plaintiff" or "Mr. Spencer"), brings this action against Donald
H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense ("the
defendant" or "Mr. Rumsfeld"), named in his official capacity.
Mr. Spencer, an employee at the Defense Information Systems
Agency ("DISA") of the Department of Defense ("DoD"), claims
that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of
race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). The
plaintiff seeks a promotion and retroactive pay. For the reasons
that follow, the court will grant the defendant's motion to
On February 10, 1988, Mr. Spencer filed a formal
discrimination complaint with the Director of Equal Employment
Opportunity at the Defense Communication Agency, now known as
DISA.*fn1 See Compl. at 2. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") decided the case in DISA's favor on
September 22, 1999 and denied Mr. Spencer's request for
reconsideration on August 15, 2000. See Compl. Ex. 1-2.
Because the EEOC decision was final, Mr. Spencer could file a
civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
On November 20, 2000, Mr. Spencer, proceeding pro se, filed
his complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. He alleges employment discrimination on
the basis of race in violation of Title VII. See Compl. at 1.
On May 18, 2001, DoD moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to
transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). DoD argues that venue is improper in
this district under the Title VII venue statute,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The court agrees with the defendant and will
transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), a Title VII action may be
brought in any one of four judicial districts. The statute
Such an action may be brought in  any judicial
district in the State in which the unlawful
employment practice is alleged to have been
committed,  in the judicial district in which the
employment records relevant to such practice are
maintained and administered, or  in the judicial
district in which the aggrieved person would have
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment
practice,  but if the respondent is not found
within any such district, such an action may be
brought within the judicial district in which the
respondent has his principal office.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). In Title VII cases, Congress intended
to limit venue to those jurisdictions concerned with the alleged
discrimination. See Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102 (D.C.Cir. 1969).
If the plaintiff brings suit in a jurisdiction that does not
satisfy one of the venue requirements listed in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3), venue is improper. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); Washington v. General Electric Corp.,
686 F. Supp. 361 (D.C. 1988). When a plaintiff files an action in the
wrong venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) directs courts to "dismiss, or
if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case" to the
proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Generally, the
"interest of justice" instructs courts to transfer cases to the
appropriate judicial district, rather than dismiss them. See
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8
L.Ed.2d 39 (1962).
B. The Court Transfers this Case to the Eastern District of