The opinion of the court was delivered by: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Judicial Watch, Inc. and Sierra Club filed these now-consolidated lawsuits against Vice President Richard Cheney, the National Energy Policy Development Group ("NEPDG"), various other federal officials, *fn1 and private individuals *fn2 to enforce the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"), 5 U.S.C. App. 2, the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. §552, the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §701 et seq, and the federal mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. While the claims raised by each plaintiff differ in relevant and important ways, there is substantial overlap between the two complaints. Both plaintiffs seek information concerning the activities of the NEPDG and its members in developing and recommending to President George W. Bush a national energy policy. Both plaintiffs allege that private individuals were given a significant role in developing this energy policy, and as a result, the confidentiality under which the NEPDG operated violated the requirements of FACA. Defendants have moved to dismiss both complaints, raising a number of jurisdictional, statutory, and constitutional objections to these suits.
This case comes before the Court on federal defendants' motions to dismiss the Judicial Watch and Sierra Club complaints, as well as three private defendants' motions to dismiss the Judicial Watch complaint. Upon consideration of these motions, the responses and replies thereto, the oral argument of counsel, the applicable statutory and case law, the Court grants in part and denies in part the federal defendants' motions, and grants the private defendants' motions.
I. The National Energy Policy Development Group
On January 29, 2001, President George W. Bush issued a Memorandum establishing the National Energy Policy Development Group. See Sierra Club Compl. at ¶16; Defs.' Mem. of Points & Authorities in Support of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss filed on 3/8/2002, Attach. A ("Bush Mem."). The Presidential Memorandum mandated that the NEPDG was to be established within the Executive Office of the President and was tasked with developing a national energy plan. Id. The mission of the NEPDG was to "develop a national energy policy designed to help the private sector, and as necessary and appropriate Federal, State, and local governments, promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy." Id. The expressly delineated functions of the NEPDG were to gather information, deliberate, and make policy recommendations to the President. Id. The President assigned the NEDPG the task of submitting reports to the President on the difficulties in ensuring the country's energy needs and setting forth a recommended national energy policy consistent with the group's mission. Id. The NEPDG was given a limited duration and was authorized to act only through the end of the 2001 fiscal year. Id.
Vice President Cheney was tasked with directing the group, presiding at meetings, and establishing any subordinate groups to assist the NEPDG in its work. Id. The memorandum appointed the following individuals as members of the group: Vice President Cheney, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs. Id. The memorandum also stated that the Vice President could also invite, when appropriate, the Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to participate, as well as the Secretary of State, and "other officers of the Federal Government." Id. Funding and support staff were to be provided by the Department of Energy ("DOE"), and if necessary, by the National Economic Council and other appropriations available to the President.
On May 16, 2001 the NEPDG issued a public report that recommended a set of policies in the form of administrative actions and proposed legislation. See "Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future," Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, available at www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf. That report was approved by the President as the National Energy Policy. Id. The authority for the NEPDG terminated at the end of the 2001 fiscal year, September 30, 2001. See Bush Mem. at 2.
As alleged in Judicial Watch's Complaint, from the start, the NEDPG gained the attention of the national media. In particular, the public demand for information about the energy policy development process and identity of the participants in that process has been great. That attention has only intensified with the recent controversy over the highly publicized bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation and allegations of contacts between former Enron Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lay and the NEDPG. Both plaintiffs allege that private individuals and corporations had access to the NEPDG and participated as members of the NEPDG. Sierra Club also alleges that Sub-Groups of the NEPDG were created, which also had private individual members. Both plaintiffs made requests on behalf of their members for information about the NEPDG and had those requests denied by defendants.
II. Procedural History of the Judicial Watch and Sierra Club Lawsuits
On June 25, 2001, plaintiff Judicial Watch wrote to Vice President Cheney expressing its opinion that the NEDPG was required to comply with FACA, asking to attend all future NEPDG meetings, and requesting copies of minutes and other documents under FACA and FOIA. Judicial Watch is a self-described non-profit public interest law firm the mission of which includes promoting open government. The Office of the Vice President responded by letter on July 5, 2001 denying Judicial Watch's request and informing Judicial Watch that the NEPDG was not subject to either FACA or FOIA.
On July 16, 2001, Judicial Watch filed this lawsuit. Judicial Watch initially sued only the NEDPG, alleging violations of FACA and FOIA. After receiving several extensions of time to file a responsive pleading from this Court, on October 17, 2001, defendant NEPDG moved to dismiss. Defendant NEPDG originally argued that Judicial Watch's complaint failed to state a claim under FACA because the NEPDG consisted solely of federal officials, and that it would violate Article II of the Constitution to apply FACA to this group.
On January 31, 2002, this Court issued an Order setting forth constitutional issues to be briefed in advance of a hearing on the NEPDG's motion to dismiss. That briefing was completed on February 11, 2002. On February 12, 2002, this Court held a hearing at which the Court discussed with government's counsel several problems with the briefs filed by the government in this case. First, although moving to dismiss the complaint, the government had attached and relied on evidence outside the Complaint to support its arguments. This Court inquired why it should not convert the government's motion to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 12 and 56 and proceed immediately to discovery. Furthermore, the Court discussed several serious deficiencies in the legal arguments raised by the government, particularly the government's failure to cite controlling adverse authority from the D.C. Circuit on the issue of mootness, despite government's counsel having also been counsel in those cases. In addition, the Court discussed what appeared to be government counsel's mischaracterization of Supreme Court precedent on the constitutional separation of powers issue. Defense counsel conceded that it had argued for the application of a constitutional standard that did not reflect controlling law without informing the Court that it was doing so. See Tr. 2/12/2002 at 33:17 - 34:1; 35:8 - 35:23; 36:15 - 38:7; 38:20 - 39:1; 39:9 - 40:16.
At that hearing, government's counsel admitted to this Court that the briefs submitted did not represent the government's best efforts, and requested further opportunity to research and brief the important issues raised by this case. Plaintiff also requested the opportunity to amend its complaint to include additional defendants, in light of arguments made by the government with respect to the termination of the sole defendant NEPDG. Despite the serious inadequacies in the government's briefing to date, the Court found that it was in the interest of justice to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint and the defendant to re-brief its motion to dismiss.
Judicial Watch filed its First Amended Complaint on February 15, 2002, naming Vice President Cheney, the NEPDG, several Cabinet members, and several private individuals as defendants. The federal defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Defs.' Mot. of 3/8/02. For the first time, the federal defendants argued, among other things, that Judicial Watch's complaint should be dismissed because FACA affords no private cause of action. Three of the private defendants also moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the grounds that neither FACA or FOIA apply to private individuals.
On January 25, 2002, Sierra Club filed suit against Vice President Cheney, the NEPDG, and various agency officials pursuant to the APA, the federal mandamus statute, and FACA in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The government moved to transfer that case to this Court. While awaiting the decision of the Northern District of California on the transfer motion, Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") were granted leave to file amicus briefs in the Judicial Watch case. On March 21, 2002, the Northern District of California transferred the Sierra Club case to this Court, where it was filed as a related case to the Judicial Watch case. This Court ordered the two cases consolidated under one case number and set forth an expedited briefing schedule.
On April 5, 2002, the federal defendants moved to dismiss the Sierra Club complaint, raising many of the same issues as in their motion to dismiss Judicial Watch's First Amended Complaint. Defs.' Mot. of 4/5/02. In addition, the federal defendants also argued for the dismissal of Sierra Club's claims pursuant to the APA and the federal mandamus statute. Briefing in both cases was completed on April 29, 2002.
This Court held oral argument on the federal defendants' motions to dismiss on May 23, 2002. After hearing argument from both plaintiffs, amicus NRDC, and the federal government, the Court made several rulings by Order issued that same day. First, the Court granted plaintiff Judicial Watch leave to file a second amended complaint to include claims under the APA and the federal mandamus statute that were in substance identical to Sierra Club's claims under those statutes. Second, this Court ordered that it would consider federal defendants' motion to dismiss the Sierra Club complaint and the motion to dismiss Judicial Watch's Second Amended Complaint, along with any supplemental arguments the government would add in the time allotted. Third, the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the APA claims against Vice President Cheney and the NEPDG. Fourth, the Court denied all other aspects of the motions to dismiss at that time. Fifth, the Court ordered that this Memorandum Opinion, explaining the Court's decision on the motions to dismiss, would be issued promptly. Finally, the Court ordered the parties to begin to develop a proposed discovery plan, which would be filed soon after this Memorandum Opinion was issued.
On May 28, 2002, Judicial Watch filed a Second Amended Complaint, incorporating the language of Sierra Club's APA and mandamus claims. *fn3 On June 3, 2002 the federal defendants moved to dismiss, incorporating by reference the arguments made in their motions to dismiss of March 8, 2002 and April 5, 2002. Judicial Watch filed an opposition to that motion, similarly incorporating arguments made in previous filings.
III. Other NEPDG-related Cases Before this Court
In addition to the two consolidated suits before this Court, the activities of the NEPDG are the subject of several other lawsuits and congressional inquiries. Several other FOIA cases are pending before this Court. See, e.g, Judicial Watch v. Department of Energy, Civ. Action No. 01-981 (PLF); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Department of Energy, Civ. Action No. 01-2545 (PLF). The agency defendants in those FOIA cases have been ordered by this Court to produce responsive documents, and have begun to do so, thereby revealing more information about the operations of the NEPDG than was available at the outset of either of these consolidated cases.
In addition, the General Accounting Office (GAO), on behalf of Congress, filed suit in this Court challenging the White House's refusal to turn over information about NEPDG to GAO pursuant to GAO's investigatory authority. See Walker v. Cheney, Civ. Action No. 02-0340 (JDB). Information released as a result of these cases may potentially impact the statutory and constitutional issues raised by this case.
This Court will not grant the defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). "Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
Furthermore, a motion to dismiss is intended to test the sufficiency of the complaint and the complaint alone. *fn4 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974); Tele-Communications of Key West v. USA, 757 F.2d 1330, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("a Rule 12(b)(6) disposition must be made on the face of the complaint alone"). Accordingly, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court must accept as true all of the complaints' factual allegations. See Doe v. United States Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs are entitled to "the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276.
II. Federal Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
The federal defendants have moved to dismiss both complaints as moot because the NEPDG terminated pursuant to the terms of the Presidential Memorandum on September 30, 2001. Because at least two forms of relief, an injunction requiring the disclosure of records and a declaration that the government violated FACA, are available, these case are not moot. See Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Furthermore, because Judicial Watch has alleged in its Second Amended Complaint that on information and belief the NEPDG is continuing to operate despite the termination of its mandate in the Presidential Memorandum, Judicial Watch's claims are not moot.
It is well settled that the exercise of judicial power authorized by Article III of the U.S. Constitution depends on the existence of a case or controversy. See, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975). A case is moot when it "has lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if [the court] is to avoid advisory opinions on abstract questions of law." Schering Corp. v. Shalala, 995 F.2d 1103, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Article III is satisfied when, as here, the existence of a "partial remedy" is "sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot." Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S. Ct. 2066 (1996).
1. Judicial Watch's Allegations of the Ongoing Existence of the NEPDG
Judicial Watch's Second Amended Complaint alleges that "[o]n information and belief, the NEPDG is still in existence." Jud. Watch Sec. Amend. Compl. at ¶ 38. The Complaint then alleges that NEPDG members and staff continue to meet to discuss and formulate energy policy. Id. However unlikely, this Court can not determine at this stage of the case whether or not this allegation is true, but rather must accept it as true for purposes of deciding this motion to dismiss. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. The federal defendants argue in response that "[t]here can be no question that, as a matter of law, the NEPDG no longer exists." Defs.' Mot. of 3/8/2002 at 9. This argument misses the mark. Plaintiff Judicial Watch is not arguing that the legal authority for the NEPDG continues, but that the NEPDG has continued to meet despite the termination of its legal authority. The continued existence of the NEPDG is not, as defendants contend, a question of law, but is a question of fact that is clearly in dispute.
In the alternative, the federal defendants argue that even if the ongoing existence of the NEPDG is a question of fact, this Court should not accept this fact as true because it is not "well-pled." Defs.' Mot. of 3/8/2002 at 9 n.4. Defendants argue that where there is a disparity between facts alleged in a complaint, and exhibits submitted by the plaintiff in support of the complaint, the exhibit trumps the allegation. Id. (citing cases). Defendants point out that the letter attached to Judicial Watch's Second Amended Complaint and cited by Judicial Watch to support its allegation of an October 2001 meeting between NEPDG staff and Enron representatives actually states that the meeting occurred "after the termination of the Group." Jud. Watch Sec. Amend. Compl. Ex. 11, at 2. Defendants are correct that this letter clearly states that this meeting occurred after the NEPDG's termination. Regardless, defendants' argument that Judicial Watch's Second Amended Complaint is not well-pled fails to acknowledge that the Amended Complaint does not simply allege that this one meeting occurred, but that "[o]n information and belief, other meetings between both federal and non-federal members of the allegedly defunct NEPDG have occurred and are still occurring to this day to continue discussions on forumalting a national energy policy." Jud. Watch Sec. Amend. Compl. at ¶38. At this stage of the proceedings, prior to any discovery, this Court must accept these facts as true, no matter how vigorously defendants contest the truthfulness of these allegations.
If the NEPDG does continue to exist and meet to formulate energy policy, this Court can still award the relief requested by Judicial Watch. Therefore, because Judicial Watch has alleged the ongoing existence of this group, none of Judicial Watch's claims are moot.
2. Even if the NEPDG no Longer Exists, These Claims are Not Moot.
Unlike Judicial Watch, Sierra Club does not allege that the NEPDG continues to exist, but concedes that the NEPDG terminated on September 30, 2001. However, even if in fact the NEPDG ceased to exist on September 30, 2001, Judicial Watch and Sierra Club's requests for documents and declaratory relief are not moot.
Both plaintiffs have requested that this Court order the release of documents related to the NEPDG's activities as relief for the alleged violations of FACA. Jud. Watch Sec. Amend. Compl. at 22, ¶5,6; Sierra Club Compl. at ¶36. FACA mandates public access to some records of advisory committees:
Subject to [the requirements of FOIA] the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents, which were made available to or prepared for or by each advisory committee shall be available for public inspection and copying... 5. U.S.C. App. 2 § 10(b).
This provision "affirmatively obligates the Government to provide access to the identified materials." Food Chem. News v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 980 F.2d 1468, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Furthermore, this public access provision applies even where there has been no specific request made, unless "the agency reasonably claims [the materials] to be exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA." Food Chem. News, 980 F.2d at 1469; see also Cummock, 180 F.3d. at 289. However, this provision does have a time limitation: the documents, "shall be available for public inspection and copying ... until the advisory committee ceases to exist." 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 10(b) (emphasis added).
The federal government's statutory duty under FACA to allow the public to inspect and copy documents may be limited in time by the statute, but the ability of a court to award access to the documents as relief for previous violations of that duty is limited only by the existence of the documents. The terms of the statute create the substantive requirements to which the government must adhere - the government must make documents available only while an advisory committee exists. Here, both plaintiffs have properly alleged that the government failed to make documents available during the life of the NEPDG. Whether or not plaintiffs sued before or after the group terminated does not alter the allegation that the government failed to meet the substantive requirements of the statute during the relevant time-frame. Assuming the facts in the complaints to be true, the government violated the public access provisions of the statute. Contrary to the federal defendants' argument here, the terms of the statute limit the scope of liability, not the availability of a remedy.
The Court is free to exercise its discretion to craft equitable relief addressing statutory violations. Indeed, if after discovery this Court determines that a statutory violation has occurred, the Court must provide some form of relief. See, e.g., Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 483, 121 S. Ct. 1711 (2001). Here, one alleged violation is a failure to provide access to documents during the lifetime of the NEPDG. This Court, in its discretion, could determine at some later date that ordering defendants to provide whatever relevant documents still exist is an appropriate remedy for that violation.
Thus, whether the relief is available is contingent not on the continued existence of the group, but on the continued existence of the records and information. *fn5 In other cases, plaintiffs' claims for documents pursuant to § 10(b) were eventually rendered moot not by the termination of the advisory group but only when the defendants released the documents. See, e.g., Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Physicians Comm. for Responsible Medicine v. Glickman, 117 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000); Ass'n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 879 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1994).
The D.C. Circuit has held that a request for documents pursuant to FACA is not rendered moot by the termination of the advisory committee in question. Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In Cummock, the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court opinion that in part dismissed the plaintiff's claim because her request for documents was untimely. The Court held that Cummock had an enforceable right to the documents that were denied to her during the committee's existence and remanded for the District Court to determine precisely what information Cummock was entitled. 180 F.3d at 292-93. The primary argument by the government in Cummock was that the plaintiff, as a member of the advisory committee in question, had no cause of action under FACA for access to records. The Court rejected the government's argument, holding that a member of an advisory committee has an even greater right of access than does the public under § 10(b), but in so holding discussed the parameters of the public's right. The Court explained:
In any event, the Government does not dispute that committee members have at least the same rights under FACA as the public. Although we disagree with the Government's position that the rights of a committee member extend no further than the rights of a non-member, even taking only this limited view, the Government's concession is significant. Because there is no question under our precedent that members of the public possess enforceable rights to obtain information under FACA, see Food Chem. News, 980 F.2d at 1472, it follows a fortiori that committee members have at least these same rights. And we have also made it clear that FACA rights are enforceable even after an advisory committee has been disbanded. See, e.g., Byrd, 174 F.3d 239, 243-44 (rejecting argument that plaintiff's injury was not redressable where panel had already completed its work and been disbanded). 180 F.3d at 292 (emphasis added).
The holding of the D.C. Circuit in Cummock is clear: "Cummock clearly possesses an enforceable right to information under FACA, because any member of the public possesses such a right. Moreover, Cummock possesses an even greater right than a member of the public, because, as a Commission member, she is entitled to fully participate...." Id. at 292. In so holding, the D.C. Circuit was attempting to be faithful to legislative intent. With respect to the public access provision, § 10(b), the legislative history explains:
This provision has the effect of assuring openness in the operations of advisory committees. This provision coupled with the requirement that complete and accurate minutes of committee meetings be kept serves to prevent the surreptitious use of advisory committees to further the interests of any special interest group. Along with the provisions for balanced representation contained in Sec. 4 of the bill, this requirement of openness is a strong safeguard of the public interest. H.R. Rep. 92-1017, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3491. The surreptitious use of advisory committees by special interest groups could necessarily result in a lack of knowledge about the group's activities, as exemplified by the allegations in this case. It is entirely conceivable that only after the fact would the public become aware of a group's existence and activities, and only after the fact could the public then claim its right of access to documents. In addition, mandating that a court's ability to enforce the FACA record-keeping requirement ends with the termination of the advisory committee would create an odd incentive for the government to terminate any problematic advisory group to avoid shedding light on its activities. Defendants try to distinguish Cummock by arguing that Cummock applies only to suits by members of an advisory committee. See Defs.' Mot. of 3/8/2002 at 10. But the passage cited above clearly assumes for sake of argument that "that the rights of a committee member extend no further than the rights of a non-member," and then states that "members of the public possess enforceable rights to obtain information under FACA" and that "FACA rights are enforceable even after an advisory committee has been disbanded." 180 F.3d at 292. Furthermore, the Court held that "Cummock clearly possesses an enforceable right to information under FACA, because any member of the public possesses such a right." Id. Contrary to defendants' argument, these conclusions are not dicta, but are central to the D.C. Circuit's reasoning and holding. In order to determine what rights Cummock possessed, the Court reasoned that Cummock must have at least as many rights as the public, which include the right to documents after the committee has been disbanded.
Finally, defendants argue that Cummock cites only one case, Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1999), to support the conclusion that a claim for documents is not moot beyond the life of the committee, and therefore is limited to the scope of Byrd. Byrd held that a request for declaratory relief under FACA was not mooted by the dissolution of the advisory committee at issue. Id. at 244. Thus, defendants argue that Cummock's citation to Byrd "can only be understood to be a reference to the limited declaratory relief at issue in Byrd." Defs.' Mot. of 3/8/02 at 11 n.7. Defendants fail to recognize that the D.C. Circuit in Cummock extended the general proposition in Byrd that relief can exist beyond the life of the committee to claims for other relief. Insofar as Cummock is an extension of the holding in Byrd, it is an extension that is binding on this Court.
Defendants also argue that after the termination of an advisory committee, FOIA provides the only statutory right of access to documents. In the absence of a FACA violation, this may be an accurate statement. If the government complies with FACA, and provides documents in a reading room until the committee ceases to exist, and a citizen wants to access those documents at some time after the termination of the committee, that citizen would have to file a FOIA request to a proper agency defendant for those documents. But that scenario is not what plaintiffs have alleged here. When the government violates FACA, the question is not what other statutes could also provide a right of access, but what options are available to this Court to remedy that statutory violation.
Finally, defendants also argue that plaintiffs' claims are moot because they did not request a preliminary injunction to preserve the records at issue here. Indeed, plaintiffs could have moved for a preliminary injunction to require defendants to maintain the relevant documents. However, plaintiffs were in no way required to request such preliminary relief in order to maintain the controversy. Relief is available as long as relevant documents exist.
Defendants also argue that plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment that defendants violated FACA is moot. Defendants argue that, because all other claims for relief are moot, the claim for declaratory relief cannot survive alone, citing City of Houston v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As explained above, the claims for injunctive relief regarding the documents are not moot in this case, so this argument by defendants fails. However, even if all the other claims for relief were moot, this Court would follow the D.C. Circuit's holding in Byrd that a claim for declaratory relief is not mooted by the termination of the committee. 174 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
In conclusion, Judicial Watch's claims are not moot because it has alleged the ongoing existence of the NEPDG. Regardless of the likelihood of the truth of these allegations, this Court must accept them as true for purposes of deciding these motions. In addition, Sierra Club's claims are not moot because this Court can remedy any alleged violations of FACA, the APA, and the mandamus statute with injunctive and declaratory relief.
1. FACA Provides No Private Cause of Action
Both Judicial Watch and Sierra Club allege that the activities of the NEPDG are subject to FACA because the group was established by the President to provide advice on energy policy, and had members who were not full-time federal employees. Both Judicial Watch and Sierra Club further allege that the activities of the NEPDG violated all the procedural requirements of FACA by failing, for example, to provide public notice of meetings, public access to meetings, and public access to minutes and documents generated by the NEPDG. Sierra Club also alleges that in addition to the NEPDG, defendants established and utilized "Sub-Groups" of the NEPDG, which also had private members and which also were subject to and violated FACA's requirements.
In response to these allegations, defendants argue that Judicial Watch and Sierra Club's claims pursuant to FACA should be dismissed because there is no private right of action under FACA. *fn6 While both Sierra Club and amicus NRDC concede that there is no private cause of action under FACA, Judicial Watch contends that there is. However, in the event that this Court should be convinced by the government's argument with respect to FACA, at oral argument Judicial Watch requested and was granted leave to amend its complaint to include claims under the APA and federal mandamus statute.
Notwithstanding the many previous cases in which courts have implicitly recognized a private right of action pursuant to FACA, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001), this Court has no choice but to hold that FACA creates no private right of action. Sandoval makes very clear that courts can not read into statutes a cause of action that has no basis in the statutory text. 532 U.S. at 286-87 ("Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative.... Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.") (internal citations omitted). The Sandoval Court rejected any attempt to "revert in this case to the understanding of private causes of action that held sway 40 years ago" that would allow courts to imply a cause of action where consistent with the purpose of the statute at issue. Id. Regardless of how allowing such a private cause of action may further the purposes of FACA, nothing in the text of FACA supports a private right to sue. The statutory language may create rights and duties that have been recognized by courts in the past. See, e.g., Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1999). However, language that creates a right is insufficient to create a right to sue. The Sandoval Court made clear that the statute must provide not only a private right but also a private remedy. 532 U.S. at 286-87.
Nothing in the language of FACA evidences any intent to create such a remedy. Precedent does not require this Court to hold otherwise. It is true that several cases have been brought pursuant to FACA apparently without incorporating the FACA violation into a corresponding APA claim. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989); Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Ass'n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Apparently, in all of these cases, the courts assumed that FACA provided a cause of action. None of the cases addressed the issue of whether Congress created a private right to sue under FACA. This Court cannot rely on an implicit assumption, even an assumption made by the Supreme Court, when a later Supreme Court decision makes clear that the requisite statutory language is lacking here.
However, defendants overstate the amount of precedent that supports their position that a plaintiff must sue under the APA to enforce FACA. Defendants cite cases from the D.C. Circuit, Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 908-09 (D.C. Cir. 1997), Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1997), Washington Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and one case from this Court, Fertilizer Institute v. EPA, 938 F. Supp. 52, 54 (D.D.C. 1996), for the proposition that "judicial review of FACA claims is available only through the APA." Defs.' Reply of 4/26/02 at 5. Yet none of the D.C. Circuit cases cited by defendants hold this. *fn7
The Fertilizer Institute case does clearly hold that "[s]ince FACA contains no provision for judicial review, the availability if such review must derive from the APA." 938 F. Supp. at 54. However, one other case from this Court, cited by plaintiff Judicial Watch, holds the opposite: that FACA does create a private cause of action. Washington Legal Found. v. ...