The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ricardo M. Urbina, United States District Judge
DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
These cases come before the court on the plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment of two aspects of the court's January 10, 2002 Memorandum Opinion ("Memorandum Opinion") denying in part and granting in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. *fn1 The plaintiffs, current and former Navy chaplains and an ecclesiastical endorsing agency for military chaplains, bring these suits alleging that the Navy's policies and practices favor one religion over another in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs charge that the hiring, retention, and promotion policies of the Navy Chaplain Corps demonstrate an unconstitutional endorsement of liturgical Christian sects over non-liturgical Christian sects. *fn2 For the reasons that follow, the court denies the plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment and for partial summary judgment.
Although the above-captioned cases are not consolidated for all purposes, the court has consolidated them for purposes of all pretrial pending motions. *fn3 In the Chaplaincy case, the plaintiffs are an endorsing agency for military chaplains and seven of its individual members. In the Adair case, the plaintiffs are 17 current and former non-liturgical chaplains in the Department of the Navy ("the defendants," "Navy," or "DON"). In both cases, the plaintiffs allege that the Navy has established and maintained an unconstitutional religious quota system for promotion, assignments, and retention of Navy chaplains, in violation of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the Navy's policies and practices favor liturgical Christian chaplains over non-liturgical Christian chaplains. *fn4
On January 10, 2002, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. Adair v. England, 183 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2002). The court held: that strict scrutiny applies to the plaintiffs' First Amendment and equal protection claims; that the plaintiffs did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court; that the plaintiffs had stated a claim that the Navy's hiring and retention policies violate the Establishment Clause; that the Navy's practices of allowing chaplains to rate other chaplains for promotions and of allowing multiple chaplains to serve on promotion boards do not violate the Establishment Clause; that the plaintiffs had stated a claim that the Navy's practice of displaying the religious identity of chaplains up for promotion violates the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause; that the Navy's practice of having only "General Protestant" religious services could violate the Establishment Clause; and that the plaintiffs had stated a free speech claim. Id.
On January 28, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from two aspects of its Memorandum Opinion. Specifically, the plaintiffs ask the court to reassess its decisions to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims that having chaplains sit on chaplain promotion boards and allowing chaplains to rate other chaplains are practices that violate the First Amendment. Pls.' Mot. for Recons. and Partial Summ. J. ("Pls.' Mot.") at 1. The court now turns to the plaintiffs' motion.
A. The Court Treats the Plaintiffs' Motion as a Rule 60(b) Motion
Before setting forth the appropriate legal standard for the resolution of the plaintiffs' motion, the court must address which procedural rule the plaintiffs' motion falls under since the plaintiffs fail to point to a specific rule. The court issued its Memorandum Opinion on January 10, 2002. Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d 31. The plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration and for partial summary judgment on January 28, 2002. Accordingly, the plaintiffs did not file their motion within 10 business days of the issuance of the court's Memorandum Opinion. Parties must file Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motions to alter or amend a judgment within 10 business days of the entry of the judgment at issue. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), 6(a); Derrington-Bey v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections, 39 F.3d 1224, 1224-26 (D.C. Cir. 1994); W.C. & A.N. Miller Cos. v. United States, 173 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997) (citations omitted). In addition, the D.C. Circuit has clarified that for Rule 59(e) motions, three days are not added to the time requirement when service is by mail, and district courts do not have the discretion to enlarge the 10-day period. Derrington-Bey, 39 F.3d at 1225; FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b), (e). "The period is to be kept short presumably because a timely Rule 59(e) motion deprives the judgment of finality." Derrington-Bey, 39 F.3d at 1225. Consequently, the court must treat the plaintiffs' instant motion as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
B. Legal Standard for Motion for Relief from Judgment
In its discretion, the district court may relieve a party from an otherwise final judgment, order or proceeding under six circumstances as set forth in Rule 60(b). *fn5 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); Lepkowski v. Dep't of Treasury, 804 F.2d 1310, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1986). According to the first factor in Rule 60(b), relief from a judgment may be granted for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Such relief under Rule 60(b) turns on equitable factors, notably, whether any neglect was excusable. Pioneer Investment Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993). Second, the court may relieve a party from an otherwise final judgment or order where there is "newly discovered evidence" which the moving party could not have discovered even by the exercise of due diligence. FED. R. CIV. 60(b). Third, the court may set aside a judgment or order for fraud, misrepresentation, or other conduct of an adverse party. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); Mayfair Extension, Inc. v. Magee, 241 F.2d 453, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Specifically, "the movant must show (1) that such 'fraud' prevented him or her from fully and fairly presenting his or her case, and (2) that the fraud is attributable to the party or, at least, to ...