The opinion of the court was delivered by: Walton, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Having considered defendant's motion, plaintiff's opposition,
and the record in this case, the Court will deny the motion.
On or about September 8, 1996, Lillie Teneyck, a 61-year old
African-American woman, applied for a position as a
housekeeper at the
Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C. Omni Shoreham Hotel's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment
("Defendant's Motion"), Ex. A ("Teneyck Deposition"), pp. 23, 31.
Plaintiff sought a part-time housekeeping position at the hotel because
she was scheduled to retire from the United States Department of the
Treasury.*fn1 Teneyck Deposition, p. 23. At that time there was a
part-time housekeeping position open. Teneyck Deposition, p. 31.
Plaintiff filled out an application, and had a preliminary interview with
Paula Nesmith, an administrative assistant whose duties included the
screening of applicants for housekeeping positions. Defendant's Motion,
Ex. B (Nesmith Affidavit), ¶¶ 1-3.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was referred to Freweini Kahasay, the
hotel's Executive Housekeeper, for an interview. Teneyck Deposition, p.
39; Lillie Teneyck's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Teneyck
Opposition"), Ex. A (Teneyck Affidavit), ¶ 4; Nesmith Affidavit,
¶ 3; Defendant's Motion, Ex. C (Kahasay Affidavit), ¶ 3. Ms.
Kahasay discussed the job with plaintiff, and told plaintiff to call back
the next day. Teneyck Deposition, pp. 40-42, 47. When plaintiff called
as instructed, she alleges that Ms. Kahasay refused to speak with her, as
was the case when plaintiff called a second time on that same day.
Teneyck Deposition, pp. 53-58. Plaintiff was not hired, and did not
return to the hotel. Teneyck Deposition, p. 59.
In this action, plaintiff alleges that "defendant has discriminated
against her based on her age, in violation of the [Age Discrimination in
Employment Act]." Amended Complaint, ¶ 16. Further, she alleges that
the "defendant failed to select plaintiff for a housekeeping position on
the basis of her race (African-American) and national origin (U.S. born)"
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id., ¶
Summary judgment should be granted to the movant if it has shown, when
the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one "that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When evaluating a summary
judgment motion the Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. at 255. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge." Id.; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The party opposing a motion
for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. at 248; see also Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
& Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
It is plaintiff's burden in a Title VII action to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In McDonnell
Douglas, the Supreme Court set forth a model for how a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case. The model requires a plaintiff to show:
(i) that [s]he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that [s]he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer ...