The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ricardo M. Urbina United States District Judge
Document Nos.: 1, 7 Document No.: 1
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER THE PENDING ACTIONS TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
In these twin actions pro se plaintiff Ollie Darby ("the plaintiff") brings claims of employment discrimination based on race and reprisal pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In response to the second complaint, the Department of Energy ("DOE") and Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham (collectively, "the defendants") move this court to consolidate the two actions, and then either dismiss the consolidated action for improper venue or transfer the consolidated action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. For the reasons that follow, the court grants the defendants' motion to transfer the two cases to the Southern District of Ohio.
The plaintiff is a GS-14 *fn1 employee in the Office of the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of DOE. Compl. (02-1140) ¶ 4; Compl. (02-1143) ¶ 4. On June 10, 2002, she filed two complaints against the defendants alleging employment discrimination under Title VII.
In her first complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in intentional discrimination by effectively failing to promote her to a GS-15 position. Compl. (02-1140) ¶¶ 5-7, 10. The plaintiff states that as a result of the defendants' discriminatory conduct, she was reassigned to a new and hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 8. Moreover, the plaintiff alleges that because the defendants were aware of equal employment opportunity ("EEO") complaints filed by the plaintiff, she suffered retaliation and reprisal. Id. at iv. She requests relief in the form of promotion, with front and back pay, to a GS-15 position retroactive to August 1994; compensation for emotional distress and anguish; punitive damages; compensation for pain, suffering, and humiliation; and compensation for lost annual and sick leave. Id. at iv.
In virtually identical terms, Ms. Darby's second complaint alleges that the defendants engaged in intentional discrimination by refusing to select her for a newly-created GS-15 position, and by preventing the personnel office from using certain ranking and interviewing tools during the selection process for the GS-15 position. Compl. (02-1143) ¶ 5-7. As a result, the plaintiff states that she was never promoted. Id. ¶ 8. As in her first complaint, she alleges that because the defendants were aware of EEO complaints filed by the plaintiff, she suffered retaliation and reprisal. Id. at iii. Finally, she requests the same relief prayed for in her first complaint. Id.
On August 29, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to consolidate the two actions and to dismiss the consolidated action for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the consolidated action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Defs.' Mot. to Consolidate and Dismiss or Transfer ("Defs.' Mot.") at 1. The defendants argue that consolidation of the two cases is warranted under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because they involve common questions of law and fact. Id. at 3-5. In addition, the defendants state that according to the Title VII venue statute, venue is not proper in the District of Columbia. Id. at 5-7. They urge the court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaints or transfer them to the Southern District of Ohio. Id. at 7.
A. Legal Standard for Venue in Title VII Cases
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) states that the court will dismiss or transfer a case if venue is improper or inconvenient in the plaintiff's chosen forum. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3). In considering a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations regarding venue as true, draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor, and resolves any factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor. 2215 Fifth St. Assocs. v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2001). The court, however, need not accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Id. To prevail on a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the defendant must present facts that will defeat the plaintiff's assertion of venue. Id.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), a plaintiff may bring a Title VII action in any one of four judicial districts. The statute provides that:
[s]uch an action may be brought in  any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,  in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or  in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice,  but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action ...