The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ricardo M. Urbina, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Pro se*fn1 plaintiff Zena D. Crenshaw ("the plaintiff") brings this
action alleging violations of the United States Constitution and of
federal civil conspiracy and civil rights statutes. Ms. Crenshaw names 25
defendants, who appear*fn2 to consist of ten private-sector lawyers,
three law firms, a financial institution, a pharmaceutical company, and
the executive secretary and nine members of the Disciplinary Commission
for the Supreme Court of Indiana (collectively, "the defendants").
Simultaneously, the plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order preventing the defendants associated with the Disciplinary
Commission (collectively, "the Commission defendants") from proceeding
with a disciplinary hearing against her, and a motion for a preliminary
injunction barring the same defendants from initiating any course of
action to injure the plaintiff. At the behest of the court, the
Commission defendants filed a responsive pleading. The Commission
defendants move to dismiss the underlying complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of service of process, and
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The Commission
defendants also raise various defenses premised on immunity and
federal-state comity.
For the reasons that follow, the court denies the plaintiff's motions
for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction.
From the plaintiff's 85-page complaint, the court with considerable
difficulty gleans the following factual allegations,
which outline a
complicated and interlocking series of events and lawsuits: The plaintiff
is an African-American woman who was admitted to the practice of law in
Indiana. Compl. ¶ 1. In 1993, on behalf of minor client Sylvia
Sanchez, the plaintiff brought suit in Indiana state court against
Hoffmann-LaRoche, a pharmacy, and three individuals. Id. ¶ 2. The
Sanchez complaint alleged a civil conspiracy that resulted in injury to
the plaintiff's client from an adverse drug reaction. Id. ¶¶ 3,
16-19, 26. In that litigation, attorneys Ralph Cohen, Bonnie Gallivan,
and Anita Hodgson of Ice Miller Donadio & Miller ("Ice Miller")
represented Hoffmann-LaRoche. Id. ¶¶ 6, 27.
The trial judge granted Hoffman-LaRoche's motion to dismiss. Id.
¶¶ 20, 22. Subsequently, the plaintiff successfully moved to amend
her client's complaint. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. After some discussions between
the plaintiff and attorney Hodgson, Hoffmann-LaRoche moved to dismiss the
plaintiff's amended complaint and requested attorney's fees based on the
plaintiff's "frivolous" action. Id. ¶¶ 36, 39-49, 50, 77. The trial
judge again granted Hoffmann-LaRoche's motion to dismiss but reserved
ruling on attorney's fees until the plaintiff's appeal of the dismissal
was resolved. Id. ¶¶ 73, 77. The state court of appeals affirmed the
trial judge's dismissal, and the Indiana Supreme Court refused review.
Id. ¶¶ 79, 85, 89, 94. Hoffman-LaRoche promptly renewed its request
for attorney's fees, which the trial judge granted in 1997. Id. ¶¶
95, 104, 131-35. The state court of appeals later reversed the trial
judge on the issue of attorney's fees, however, with the Indiana Supreme
Court again declining review. Id. at ¶¶ 136, 140.
Not satisfied with the state appellate process, the plaintiff took two
additional steps. ¶ 141. First, she expressed her dissatisfaction by
filing a complaint in state court (later removed to federal court)
against the Sanchez trial judge alleging violations of the United States
Constitution, federal civil rights law, state conspiracy and declaratory
judgment law. Id. ¶ 233; see Crenshaw v. Dywan, 34 F. Supp.2d 707
(N.D.Ind. 1999). The federal judge presiding over her case recused
himself in the interests of justice after the plaintiff, citing alleged
improper conduct by that judge in a previous case, twice moved to
disqualify him. Compl. ¶¶ 234-35; see also Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at
3. Because the judge found her allegations to be categorically false,
however, he referred the matter to the Disciplinary Commission for the
Supreme Court of Indiana ("Commission"). Id. This grievance became one of
the bases for the imminent disciplinary proceeding. Id. ¶¶ 234, 276;
see also Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3.
Second, the plaintiff met with several African-American attorneys in
Lake County, Indiana and concluded that her treatment by the Sanchez
trial judge was typical for minority attorneys prosecuting complex
personal injury claims. Id. ¶¶ 142-43. At a June 1997 press conference
held by a coalition of politicians, activists, churches, and citizens,
she stated that the trial judge had taken action against her based on her
race, and announced that she would be forwarding charges to the Indiana
civil rights and judicial qualifications authorities, a step she took
within a few days. Id. ¶¶ 143-45, 160. In response to a query from
the judicial qualifications commission, the plaintiff wrote a letter
stating that the trial judge's ruling was consistent with the pattern of
bias emanating from the state's courts of general jurisdiction. Id.
¶¶ 162-63. The plaintiff later sent a copy of the letter to the state
civil rights commission and circulated among members of the primarily
African-American
James Kimbrough Bar Association ("JKBA") and the Lake
County Bar Association ("LCBA"). Id. ¶¶ 164-66.
Within a few weeks, both the judicial qualifications commission and the
civil rights commission dismissed the matter. Id. ¶¶ 168-69. Shortly
thereafter, the LCBA board considered but eventually decided against
filing a disciplinary complaint against the plaintiff. Id. ¶¶
170-74. Notwithstanding the LCBA board's decision, in December 1997 LCBA
member Robert F. Parker filed a grievance with the Commission against the
plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 176-177, 190. This grievance forms an additional
basis for the upcoming disciplinary proceeding. Id. ¶¶ 257, 259; see
also Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 2.
Meanwhile, the plaintiff received notice in May 1997 that the former
personal representative of her mother's estate (the "Crenshaw estate") had
filed a separate grievance questioning the plaintiff's use of certain
cash assets of the estate. Id. ¶¶ 193, 196. The attorney for the
estate, James Martin, then petitioned the plaintiff for authority to hire
an attorney to recover estate assets. Id. ¶¶ 199-200. In July 1997,
after receiving a copy of the Martin petition, the Commission subpoenaed
the plaintiff for information about the estate. Id. ¶ 202. Believing
she was facing heightened Commission scrutiny prompted by her charges
against the Sanchez trial judge, the plaintiff "forwarded a complaint"*fn3
to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana. Id. ¶¶ 210-11. In April 1999, after Commission executive
secretary Donald R. Lundberg indicated that the plaintiff would be
disciplined, the Commission suspended the plaintiff from the practice of
law. Id. ¶¶ 213-14, 245. Two years later, in May 2001, the Commission
dismissed the grievance stemming from the Crenshaw estate for lack of
reasonable cause for misconduct. Id. ¶ 227.
The complaint goes on to reference a convoluted tangle of state and
federal lawsuits stemming from the Sanchez litigation, the Crenshaw
estate, Commission actions, and various other matters. For example, at
some point the plaintiff and her brother sued the former personal
representative of their mother's estate for breach of duty and
defamation. Id. ¶ 219. The plaintiff also appears to have sued
defendant Lundberg and another Commission official in state court for
unlawful retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 229, 232. At another point, the
plaintiff apparently took legal action against ...