The opinion of the court was delivered by: Emmet Sullivan, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Bobbie G. De Leon, a former Program Manager at the Naval Sea Systems Command ("NAVSEA"), an organization within defendant agency, brings this suit alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and race. In her complaint, plaintiff maintains that defendant violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. ("Equal Pay Act") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq. ("Title VII"). Pending before the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Transfer of the Equal Pay Act Claim to the Court of Federal Claims and the Title VII Claims to the Eastern District of Virginia.
The Court has considered the parties' motions, oppositions, and replies, as well as the statutory and case law governing the issues. For the reasons outlined herein, the Court concludes that defendant's motion to transfer the Equal Pay Act claim to the Court of Federal Claims and the Title VII claims to the Eastern District of Virginia is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is an African-American woman who was employed at the Naval Sea Systems Command from March 1998 until November 2000. Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff complains that she performed as the Program Manager for the General Purpose Electronic Test Equipment ("GPETE") at the GS-13 level while her predecessor, a Caucasian male, performed in that capacity at the GS-14 level. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
In Count I of her complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant willfully violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963 when it refused to pay her the same wages paid to her predecessor for performing the same duties. Id. ¶¶ 11-14. In Counts II and III, plaintiff contends that defendant violated Title VII by paying her less compensation, and providing her fewer benefits, for managing the same responsibilities as those handled by her predecessor. Id. ¶¶ 15-23.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief and damages. On June 21, 2002, defendant filed the present motion.
The venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, provides that:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all
parties, any action, suit or proceeding of a civil
nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be
transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the
division in which pending to any other division in
the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem
brought by or on behalf of the United States may be
transferred under this section without the consent of
the United States where all other parties request
(c) A district court may order any civil action to
be tried at any place within the division in which it
(d) As used in this section, the term "district
court" includes the District Court of Guam, the
District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the
term "district" includes the territorial jurisdiction
of each such court.
28 U.S.C. § 1404.
Transfers of venue to cure want of jurisdiction are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1631 The provision holds as follows:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined
in section 610 of this title or an appeal, including a
petition for review of administrative action, is
noticed for or filed with such a court and that court
finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court
shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer
such action or appeal to any other such court in which
the action or appeal could have been brought at the
time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal
shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed
for the court to which it ...