Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


April 24, 2003


The opinion of the court was delivered by: John D. Bates, United States District Judge.


Before the Court is the motion of Verizon Internet Services ("Verizon") to quash the February 4, 2003 subpoena served on it by the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. § 512. On behalf of copyright owners, RIAA seeks the identity of an anonymous user of the conduit functions of Verizon's Internet service who is alleged to have infringed copyrights by offering hundreds of songs for downloading over the Internet.*fn1 In an earlier action, this Court rejected Verizon's statutory challenges to a similar subpoena, holding that Verizon's conduit functions were within the scope of the subpoena authority of § 512(h) of the DMCA. See In re: Verizon Internet Services, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 240 F. Supp.2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Verizon now claims that § 512(h) violates Article III of the Constitution because it authorizes federal courts to issue binding process in the absence of a pending case or controversy, and that § 512(h) violates the First Amendment rights of Internet users. If the merits of Verizon's constitutional challenges are rejected by this Court, Verizon seeks a stay pending appeal of that ruling, and of the earlier statutory ruling by this Court.

Having considered the parties' several memoranda, three hearings, the brief of the United States as intervenor defending the constitutionality of § 512(h), a number of amicus briefs, and the entire record herein, the Court denies Verizon's motion to quash RIAA's February 4, 2003 subpoena. The subpoena power authorized under § 512(h) of the DMCA does not violate the case or controversy requirement of Article III and does not abridge the First Amendment rights of Internet users. Moreover, because Verizon is unable to show irreparable harm or that it is likely to succeed on an appeal of its constitutional or statutory challenges, the Court also denies Verizon's request for a stay pending appeal.*fn2


This case has followed a somewhat circuitous procedural path. To begin with, this is the second subpoena RIAA has served on Verizon pursuant to the DMCA seeking the identity of an anonymous Internet user alleged to have infringed protected copyrights. On July 24, 2002, RIAA served its first subpoena to obtain the identity of a Verizon subscriber alleged to have made more than 600 copyrighted songs available for downloading over the Internet through peer-to-peer file transfer software provided by KaZaA. Verizon claimed that because RIAA's subpoena related to material transmitted over Verizon's network — rather than stored on it — it fell outside the scope of the subpoena power authorized by § 512(h). Verizon read § 512(h) as applying only in those situations where the infringing material is physically stored on the service provider's network. RIAA contended that the subpoena authority under § 512(h) applied to all service providers under the DMCA, including Verizon. The parties framed the issue as one of statutory construction, although Verizon noted that if § 512(h)'s subpoena authority were construed as applying to all service providers, the statute "raises substantial questions" under Article III and the First Amendment.

The Court construed the subpoena power in § 512(h) as applying to all service providers under the DMCA, and granted RIAA's motion to enforce the subpoena. See In re: Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F. Supp.2d 24 (hereinafter "First Subpoena Decision"). The Court did not reach the constitutional arguments, instead deciding the question strictly on statutory grounds by construing the DMCA's language, structure, purpose, and legislative history. As a result, the Court found the subpoena valid and ordered Verizon expeditiously to provide RIAA with the identity of the subscriber alleged to be infringing copyrighted songs.

Verizon appealed that decision, and moved to stay the Court's order pending resolution of its appeal.*fn3 In its motion for a stay, Verizon asserted constitutional challenges as the primary basis for a stay, claiming that the Court's construction of § 512(h) raised serious questions regarding the First Amendment rights of Internet users and presented a critical issue whether a subpoena could issue under Article III without an actual "case or controversy" pending in federal court. RIAA contended that because Verizon had not raised these issues earlier, it had waived them on appeal.

The Court held a hearing on Verizon's stay motion. Meanwhile, however, RIAA served a second subpoena on Verizon on February 4, 2003. Shortly after the hearing on its motion to stay the first subpoena, Verizon moved to quash RIAA's second subpoena, directly presenting the constitutional challenges.*fn4 In an effort to resolve both the motion to stay on the first subpoena and the constitutional challenges to the second subpoena, the Court ordered another round of expedited briefing. Verizon proposed notifying the two subscribers whose conduct is at issue of the commencement and status of these actions, and the nature of RIAA's allegations of copyright infringement, which was then done at the Court's urging. A third hearing to address Verizon's constitutional challenges to § 512(h) was held on April 1, 2003. Subsequently, the United States has moved, and been permitted, to intervene and has submitted a brief defending the constitutionality of the DMCA.

The gravamen of Verizon's statutory challenge to the first subpoena was that the subpoena power under § 512(h) should be construed as limited to situations within § 512(c) where allegedly infringing material is stored on the Internet service provider's network. This Court firmly rejected that view in First Subpoena Decision, 240 F. Supp.2d 24. The constitutional challenges now asserted by Verizon in response to the second RIAA subpoena are, although substantive and in apparent good faith, somewhat in tension with the earlier statutory challenge. If Verizon were correct that § 512(h) should be construed to permit subpoenas only for subsection (c) service providers — which it is not — Verizon's Article III challenge would nonetheless retain its full force because such subpoenas would still, under Verizon's view, be unconnected to a pending case or controversy, and the asserted First Amendment concerns would also remain, albeit focused on the more limited subset of subscribers of subsection (c) service providers. Given this tension, one might ask why the constitutional challenges were not more fully pressed by Verizon in the first subpoena litigation. Be that as it may, those issues are now squarely before the Court in this case.*fn5


Verizon contends that § 512(h) violates Article III of the Constitution because it authorizes federal courts to issue subpoenas in the absence of a pending case or controversy. Citing cases from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Verizon argues that federal judges can neither exercise authority outside the context of an actual case or controversy nor undertake non-judicial functions. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40 (1851). Relying on United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization. Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988), and Houston Business Journal, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996), Verizon also argues more specifically that "the power to issue subpoenas exists only in the context of a case that is properly pending before a federal court." Verizon's Br. Supp. Mot. Quash Feb. 4, 2003 Subpoena at 12.*fn6

Verizon's arguments, although intriguing, are ultimately not persuasive. No doubt the justices of the Supreme Court have indicated that the federal courts are properly confined to the exercise of "judicial power." See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 410 n. *; Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 48. *fn7 And, more recently, the Supreme Court has noted that "[f]ederal judicial power itself extends only to adjudication of cases and controversies and it is natural that its investigative powers should be jealously confined to these ends." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641-642 (1950). But upon examination, it is clear that the § 512(h) subpoena authorization does not represent an innovation that is inconsistent with the limited role of the judiciary as it has traditionally been understood in our constitutional regime.

As an initial matter, the clerk's issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena does not involve either the exercise of judicial power or the exercise by federal judges of Article I or Article II-type investigatory power. Indeed, the issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena cannot properly be considered an act of "the court." Subsection (h)(4) provides that "[i]f the notification [of claimed infringement] filed satisfies the provisions of subsection (c)(3)(A), the proposed subpoena is in proper form, and the accompanying declaration is properly executed, the clerk shall expeditiously issue and sign the proposed subpoena and return it to the requested for delivery to the service provider." 17 U.S.C. § 512 (h)(4) (emphasis added). Under this subsection, the clerk exercises no discretion; if the requirements are met, the subpoena must be issued. The clerk, in other words, executes a quintessentially ministerial duty. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 498 (1866) ("A ministerial duty . . . is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law."); Nealon v. Davis, 18 F.2d 175, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1927) ("A ministerial act is one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In fact, the legislative history of § 512(h) indicates that Congress specifically intended the issuance of the subpoena to "be a ministerial function." S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 51 (1998).

Stretching back to the days of Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished between actions that are ministerial in nature and those that constitute an exercise of judicial, legislative, or discretionary executive power. See e.g, Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co., 10 U.S. 233, 237 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (clerk's act of recording an inquisition signed by marshal and jurymen is a "ministerial act which the law directs the clerk to perform . . . and requires no exercise of judicial functions"); Ellot v. Lessee of William Peirsol, 26 U.S. 328, 341 (1828) (in making and recording a certificate of acknowledgment of a deed, clerk of court "acted ministerially, and not judicially"); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879) (selection of jurors "surely is not a judicial act" but "is merely a ministerial act"); Central Loan & Trust Co. v. Campbell Comm'n Co., 173 U.S. 84, 95 (1899) (probate judge's grant of an order for attachment did "not involve the discharge of a judicial function but merely the performance of a ministerial duty"); ICC v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 108, 117-18 (1908) (positing distinction between duties that are "ministerial, and therefore such as may legally be imposed upon a ministerial body" and those that are "legislative, and therefore, under the Federal Constitution, a matter for congressional action"); Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335, 338 (1918) (decision by Postmaster General and his deputy to cancel contract "was executive in character, not ministerial, and required an exercise of official discretion"); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 479 (1983) (District of Columbia Court of Appeals acted judicially, not ministerially, in considering petitions for waiver of bar admission requirements).*fn8 Chief Justice Marshall specifically noted in Custiss that "the legislature may direct the clerk of a court to perform a specified service, without making his act the act of the court." 10 U.S. at 236.

Here, the fact that Congress has directed an employee of the judicial branch to carry out a specific non-discretionary function neither implicates Article III judicial power nor involves federal judges in an investigation of the sort properly relegated to one of the other branches. In a real-world sense, no Article III judge takes any action with respect to a § 512(h) subpoena until the copyright holder moves to enforce the subpoena or the service provider moves to quash it — at which time there is a concrete controversy sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.

Verizon objects to this line of analysis, arguing that a § 512(h) subpoena is issued in the name of the district court and thus should be treated as an act of the court. And, indeed, it is true that because the procedures in Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 governing enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum are applicable to a § 512(h) subpoena see 17 U.S.C. § 512 (h)(6), a service provider's failure to comply with a § 512(h) subpoena could, like a failure to comply with a Rule 45 subpoena, be construed as a violation of a court order, providing a basis for contempt sanctions. See Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ), Inc., 893 F.2d 605, 608 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc) (assuming "for purposes of this appeal," that failure to comply with a Rule 45 subpoena for testimony could subject a person to criminal contempt); Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1975) ("A subpoena is a lawfully issued mandate of the court issued by the clerk thereof."); Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 advisory committee notes for 1991 amendment ("Although the subpoena is in a sense the command of the attorney who completes the form, defiance of a subpoena is nevertheless an act in defiance of a court order and exposes the defiant witness to contempt sanctions."). But even in the Rule 45 context, courts recognize that a subpoena issued upon express order of a judge and a subpoena issued by the clerk of the court are not equivalent. See Waste Conversion, 893 F.2d at 608 ("A subpoena, obtainable as of course from the Clerk of the Court, is not of the same order as one issued by a judicial officer in the resolution of a specific dispute."); Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1364 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 advisory committee notes for 1991 amendment ("But, because the command of the subpoena is not in fact one uttered by a judicial officer, contempt should be very sparingly applied when the nonparty witness has been overborne by a party or attorney."); see also Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (grand jury subpoena is not an "order of a court" unless specifically approved by a court). The better view here is that because the issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena is a ministerial task accomplished without judicial involvement, it does not implicate Article III judicial power or improperly place federal judges in an investigatory role.

In any event, assuming that the issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena can be conceptualized as a judicial act, Verizon's challenge still fails. In the first place, § 512(h) is by no means as unique as Verizon claims. Congress has enacted several provisions that specifically authorize the clerk of the district court to issue subpoenas despite the absence of a pending case or controversy in the federal courts See e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 388 (subpoenas for depositions in connection with proceedings in the House of Representatives); 35 U.S.C. § 24 (subpoenas for evidence to be used in connection with proceedings in Patent and Trademark Office); 45 U.S.C. § 157 (h) (subpoenas at the request of arbitrators under the Railway Labor Act); 7 U.S.C. § 2354 (a) (subpoenas for evidence to be used in connection with proceedings in Plant Variety Protection Office). Moreover, these provisions are not recent innovations but rather were firmly established by the time that § 512(h) was enacted in 1998. See Dornan, 978 F. Supp. at 1319 (noting that precursor to 2 U.S.C. § 388 was enacted in 1798); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 44, 16 Stat. 204 (original source of 35 U.S.C. § 24); Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 7, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (original source of 45 U.S.C. § 157 (h)); Pub. L. 91-577, tit. I, § 24, 84 Stat. 1544 (1970) (original source of 7 U.S.C. § 2354 (a)).

But even setting aside these particular provisions, it is clear that "federal courts and judges have long performed a variety of functions that . . . do not necessarily or directly involve adversarial proceedings within a trial or appellate court." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 n. 20; see also United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 173 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1971) ("The invocation of judicial power prior to formal charges being made or before filing suit is indeed a common practice in our jurisprudence."). In the criminal context, for example, courts issue warrants see Fed.R.Crim.P. 41, and review applications for wire taps, see 18 U.S.C. § 2516, 2518, "both of which may require a court to consider the nature and scope of criminal investigations on the basis of evidence submitted in an ex parte proceeding." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 n. 20. Courts also assist grand juries in their investigative function by compelling the testimony of witnesses, despite the absence of a traditional adversarial proceeding. See id.*fn9 And Congress has authorized district courts to require testimony or other evidence for use in a foreign tribunal, even where no proceeding is yet pending in that forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (a); In re: Letter Rogatory, 42 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Congress abrogated the requirement that the foreign litigation actually be pending before relief could be had under § 1782.").*fn10

In the civil context, perhaps the most deeply rooted analogue to § 512(h) is Fed.R.Civ.P. 27(a). That provision reflects the traditional powers of the courts at equity dating from even before the adoption of the Constitution, see Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 347 (1934), and allows a federal court to authorize a person to perpetuate testimony by deposition before an action is filed where doing so would "prevent a failure or delay of justice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 27(a)(3). In order to obtain a Rule 27(a) order, the petitioner seeking testimony must show

1, that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of the United States but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought, 2, the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner's interest therein, 3, the facts which the petitioner desires to establish by the proposed testimony and the reasons for desiring to perpetuate it, 4, the names or a description of the persons the petitioner expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far as known, and 5, the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which the petitioner expects to elicit from each.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 27(a)(1).

Notably, the requirements for obtaining a § 512(h) subpoena are similarly rigorous. A copyright owner (or a person authorized to act on the owner's behalf) must present to the clerk a proposed subpoena, "a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under [Title 17]," and a copy of the notification of claimed infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (h)(1), (2). This notification, in turn, must include "substantially the following":

(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
Id. § 512(c)(3). Thus, under both Rule 27(a) and § 512(h), private parties may avail themselves of judicial machinery to obtain information prior to the filing of a complaint — but only if they satisfy a specific set of criteria and identify with particularity the information they seek to compel.

For its part, Verizon argues vigorously that Rule 27(a) is not sufficiently analogous to § 512(h) to be instructive. Primarily, Verizon contends that Rule 27(a) is distinguished by its requirement for a clear allegation of intent to file a lawsuit. See 8 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2072 (2d ed. 1994). Under § 512(h), Verizon points out, the subpoena application need not even come from the copyright holder — the real party-in-interest with standing to bring a lawsuit. In addition, Verizon argues, Rule 27(a) does not allow actual discovery but only the preservation of evidence where necessary, see Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and allows the adverse party the opportunity to contest the petition to perpetuate testimony, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 27(a)(2).

These differences, however, are neither as substantial nor as consequential as Verizon contends. First, although an entity seeking a subpoena under § 512(h) need not state that it expects to be a party to an action cognizable in federal court, it does have to make a sworn statement of good faith belief that a copyright is being used in an unauthorized manner — a statement largely to the effect that a copyright action cognizable in federal court could be asserted (if not by the party seeking the subpoena then by its principal, the copyright holder). Thus, § 512(h), like Rule 27(a), requires as a prerequisite to court action a significant showing as to the existence of a breach or violation into which the court could ultimately be drawn. Moreover, in neither the Rule 27(a) nor the § 512(h) setting can the court be certain that a judicial action will ever be filed. See Penn Mut., 68 F.3d at 1374 ("[A] party need not demonstrate that litigation is an absolute certainty in order to perpetuate testimony pursuant to Rule 27(a).").

With respect to Verizon's distinction between discovery and preservation of evidence under Rule 27(a), it is undisputed that some service providers (although not Verizon) might log only temporarily the identifying information sought on a § 512(h) subpoena. See Tr. of April 1, 2003, Hearing at 14-15; Declaration of Frank Creighton ¶ 16. Hence, § 512(h), like Rule 27(a), provides a method for preserving, not merely discovering, information essential to a potential lawsuit. Also lacking in merit is Verizon's argument that Rule 27(a) is distinguished by the possibility of adversarial proceedings contesting the petition. The alleged infringer may receive no notice of a § 512(h) subpoena before his identity is released, but the entity subpoenaed (the service provider) does have the opportunity to contest the subpoena in federal court before it is enforced. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001) (action addressing service provider's resistance to DMCA subpoena). In other words, § 512(h) does not authorize an entirely ex parte form of judicial compulsion.

Overall then, despite Verizon's objections, Rule 27(a) provides a compelling precedent for judicial compulsion of information outside the context of a pending case or controversy. Furthermore, taking Rule 27(a) together with the other analogues discussed above, there is ample basis for the Court to conclude that the role assigned to the clerk of the court in § 512(h) is countenanced by the Constitution.

Notwithstanding Verizon's contentions, United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988), and Houston Business Journal, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996), do not undermine this conclusion. In Catholic Conference, the Supreme Court held that where a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action, it also lacks power to issue a contempt citation for failure to comply with a subpoena issued in connection with that action. 487 U.S. at 80. In Houston Business Journal, the D.C. Circuit held that a district court lacks power to issue a subpoena when the underlying action is asserted in state, not federal, court. 86 F.3d at 1213.

Importantly, in both Catholic Conference and Houston Business Journal, the only conceivable source for the district court's jurisdiction to issue a subpoena was a pending case or controversy; it was the absence of a sound federal case or controversy that was thus fatal to the validity of the subpoenas in question. Here, in contrast, Congress has expressly provided the clerk of the court with the authority to issue § 512(h) subpoenas; thus the clerk need not draw upon the powers arising from jurisdiction over a pending case or controversy. Section 512(h) accordingly presents a situation neither expressly contemplated nor ruled out by the holdings in Catholic Conference and Houston Business Journal. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit implicitly recognized in Houston Business Journal that in settings such as Rule 27(a) the federal courts' subpoena power may properly be asserted in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction over an underlying action. See 86 F.3d at 1213.

Verizon seeks to bolster its position by arguing that § 512(h) offends the policy concerns that underlie the case-or-controversy requirement. According to Verizon, this requirement "ensures both that the judiciary does not take on non-adjudicatory tasks and that neither Congress nor the Executive attempts to foist non-judicial duties on the Article III courts." Verizon's Br. Supp. Mot. Quash at 5 (emphasis omitted). Duties that are inconsistent with the judicial function, Verizon contends, "undermine public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and take the courts' resources away from their primary role." Id. By putting the judiciary in the role of the copyright holder's "investigator," Verizon maintains, § 512(h) implicates both of these concerns.

The Court does not agree. In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court identified two principal concerns underlying the general rule, derived from the case-or-controversy requirement, that "`executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.'" 487 U.S. at 677 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)). First, the rule "help[s] ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch"; second, it "prevent[s] the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for other branches." Id. at 678.

Neither of these concerns is implicated here. Verizon does not appear to be arguing that the second of these concerns is threatened and, in fact, it is clear enough that the activity under § 512(h) poses no danger of encroachment or aggrandizement. Under § 512(h), the clerk carries out a nondiscretionary duty that allows one private party to retrieve information from another private party. This rather passive, ministerial function by court personnel in no way resembles or impedes upon the authority of the Executive and Legislative Branches to pursue active investigation of possible civil or criminal wrongdoing. As the Supreme Court has noted, the "separation of powers `left to each [Branch] power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial.'" Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Here, the minimal role of court personnel in issuing a § 512(h) subpoena "does not pose a sufficient threat of judicial intrusion into matters that are more properly within the Executive's [or Legislature's] authority to require that the Act be invalidated as inconsistent with Article III." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 683.*fn11

With respect to the first concern elucidated in Morrison, there is simply no basis to conclude that § 512(h) undermines the independence or institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch. Under § 512(h), the district court does not take sides in the copyright holder's request for the alleged infringer's name, but rather, through the clerk, serves as a passive, neutral instrument facilitating the attempt to retrieve the name. Furthermore, an Article III judge does not by virtue of the clerk's action become in any way invested in either the request for the alleged infringer's name or the potential copyright infringement case. The judge will still be able to approach any dispute over the information retrieval or the underlying copyright infringement in an entirely objective, unbiased fashion.

In short, given that the clerk only, and not a federal judge, issues a subpoena, § 512(h) does not "pose[] any threat to the `impartial and independent federal adjudication of claims within the judicial power of the United States.'" Id. at 683 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986)). Any possible public perception that federal judges are being enlisted by copyright holders ex parte to investigate possible infringement would be based upon a ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.