January 22, 2004
LUIS RAMOS, APPELLANT,
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (M1273-01) (Hon. Harold L. Cushenberry, Jr., Trial Judge)
Before Schwelb and Reid, Associate Judges, and Ferren, Senior Judge.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Schwelb, Associate Judge
Submitted January 13, 2004
Luis Ramos appeals from an order denying without a hearing his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110 (2001). Ramos claims that his student attorney and the student's supervisor were constitutionally ineffective by not advising him, in relation to his plea of guilty to a simple assault on his girlfriend, that his probation in a separate case in Maryland could be revoked on account of his plea and conviction. We conclude that Ramos' contention is without merit.
"In general, neither the trial judge nor defense counsel is required to explain the 'collateral consequences' of a guilty plea to the defendant." [Carlos] Goodall v. United States, 759 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C. 2000). "The consequences of a plea are direct when they have a definite and immediate impact on the range of defendant's punishment." Id. (citation omitted). Unless a consequence of a guilty plea is "absolutely part and parcel to the sentence itself," it is collate ral. Id. "[R]evocation of probation is not an immediate and automatic consequence of pleading guilty." Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. King, 618 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1980) (revocation of parole). Accordingly, Ramos' attorneys' alleged failure to advise Ramos of the possibility that his Maryland probation would be revoked did not amount to constitutionally deficient representation, see generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and there was no "manifest injustice."*fn1