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JUNG v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES

February 11, 2004.

PAUL JUNG, M.D., et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, et al., Defendants



The opinion of the court was delivered by: PAUL FRIEDMAN, District Judge

OPINION

Plaintiffs in this putative class action are medical school graduates currently or formerly enrolled in resident physician "residency" programs. The defendants can be categorized into two groups: the organizational defendants (organizations and associations that participate in the administration of graduate medical education in the United States) and the institutional defendants (universities, medical schools, foundations, hospitals, health systems and medical centers that sponsor medical residency programs). The defendants have filed three types of motions to dismiss: (1) motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to compel arbitration; and (3) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

  Plaintiffs filed suit charging that the defendants have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants have contracted, combined and Page 2 conspired among themselves to "displace competition in the recruitment, hiring, employment and compensation of resident physicians, and to impose a scheme of restraints which have the purpose and effect of fixing, artificially depressing, standardizing and stabilizing resident physician compensation and other terms of employment." Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 2. Plaintiffs assert that there are three intertwining prongs to the antitrust conspiracy.

  The first prong of the alleged conspiracy concerns the annual assignment of fourth-year medical students to the institutional defendants' residency programs by the National Resident Matching Program ("NRMP"). The NRMP, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, is managed and operated by defendant American Association of Medical Colleges ("AAMC") from AAMC's principal office in Washington, D.C. See Compl. ¶ 15. The AAMC also is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, whose membership includes all 125 accredited medical schools, including those medical schools named in the complaint, and approximately 375 major teaching hospitals and health systems, some of which also are named in the complaint. These hospitals and health systems are member hospitals of a subsection of the AAMC, the Council of Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems ("COTH") Section. See id. ¶ 17.

  Plaintiffs allege that in order to effectuate the assignment, or the "Match," as it is commonly called, prospective medical residents enter into contracts with and submit to the NRMP a ranked list of desired medical resident positions with various institutions ("Student Match Contract"). The institutions themselves also enter into contracts with the NRMP and submit ranked lists of the medical students whom they are interested in hiring ("Institutional Match Contract"). On a date certain, the NRMP through an algorithm "matches" the students' lists against the institutions' rankings, resulting in the assignment of each prospective medical Page 3 resident to one residency program. See Compl. ¶¶ 15, 83-86. Plaintiffs allege that this system eliminates a free and competitive market and substitutes a centralized, anticompetitive allocation system that assigns prospective resident physicians to a single, specific and mandatory residency program. Plaintiffs further allege that defendants designed and implemented this system and collectively agree to comply with it in violation of the antitrust laws. See id. ¶ 83.

  Several specific features of this assignment system allegedly serve to impose anticompetitive restraints on medical residency hiring. Plaintiffs allege that a medical student is required to enter into the Match if he or she wishes to gain employment in a residency program accredited by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education ("ACGME"). See Compl. ¶ 71. An individual's participation in an ACGME-accredited residency program in turn is allegedly a prerequisite for specialty certification upon completion of the residency by a member board of defendant American Board of Medical Specialties ("ABMS"), an Illinois not-for-profit corporation consisting of 24 recognized medical specialty certification boards. See id. ¶¶ 20, 69. Plaintiffs allege that eventual specialty certification by an ABMS board is considered critical to prospective residents inasmuch as they desire to be "certified" to practice within a specialty following the completion of their residencies. The practical effect of this structure, plaintiffs charge, is that the vast majority of medical students are compelled to participate in the Match, which is a substitute for all aspects of competitive individual negotiations and requires applicants to commit contractually to any assigned position as a condition of enrolling in the Match Program. See id. ¶¶ 69, 86. Furthermore, certain implementing policing mechanisms of the Match allegedly compel compliance with the foregoing restraints. These alleged mechanisms include the requirement that program participants immediately report suspected policy violations Page 4 to the NRMP and advise the relevant organizational authorities of institution or resident physician violations. See id. ¶ 86(c).

  In the second prong of the conspiracy, plaintiffs assert that certain aspects of the aforementioned ACGME accreditation standards, with which the institutional defendants allegedly voluntarily comply, function to further restrict residency employment. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the ACGME (1) has the authority to regulate the number of employment positions in a residency program; (2) imposes substantial obstacles to the ability of a resident to transfer employment from one employer to another during the period of a residency, thereby effectively making NRMP assignments permanent for the duration of a residency; (3) encourages and/or requires participation in the Match by an institution as a condition of accreditation; and (4) directly reviews compensation and other terms of employment with the purposes of fixing and depressing them. See Compl. ¶ 88.

  The third prong of the conspiracy concerns the exchange by defendants of information on resident compensation and other terms of employment through surveys and databases that plaintiffs allege has the purpose and effect of standardizing and stabilizing compensation and other terms of employment. See Compl. ¶¶ 73-82. This exchange allegedly occurs in two ways. First, the AAMC annually surveys members of its COTH Section seeking compensation levels for the employment year, aggregates the results into various categories and distributes its findings in an annual report (the "COTH Survey" or "Survey"). See id. ¶¶. 74-79. Second, hospitals and health systems access similar information through an electronic database known as the Fellowship and Residency Electronic Interactive Database ("FREIDA"), which is maintained by defendant American Medical Association ("AMA"). See id. ¶ 80. Plaintiffs Page 5 allege that this exchange of information allows institutional defendants to fix resident salaries and benefits each year at depressed, anticompetitive levels.

  Plaintiffs charge that the execution of the Match program, the enforcement of the ACGME-accreditation standards, and the coordinated collection and distribution of residency program compensation information together produce a significant depression of residents' salaries and working conditions by removing residents' ability to achieve enhanced salaries and working conditions through competition. See Compl. ¶¶ 92-96. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by contracting, combining and conspiring to unreasonably restrain trade and commerce. Plaintiffs filed this antitrust action as a proposed class action and have moved to certify both plaintiff and defendant classes. See Motion for Class Certification, filed November 3, 2003.

 
II. DEFENDANTS' RULE 12(b)(2) MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Rule 12(b)(2) Motions to Dismiss
  Sixteen institutional defendants and two organizational defendants, the ABMS and the Council of Medical Specialty Societies ("CMSS"), filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.*fn1 Plaintiffs argue that the Court has jurisdiction over these non-resident defendants on three separate bases: Page 6

  (1) jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long-arm statute; (2) jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22; and (3) jurisdiction pursuant to the long-arm statute under the "conspiracy jurisdiction" doctrine.

  It is undisputed that plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over each individual defendant and that in order to meet their burden, plaintiffs cannot rely on conclusory allegations. See GTE New Media Services Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp.2d 27, 36 (D.D.C. 1998), remanded on other grounds sub nom, GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Nor can plaintiffs aggregate factual allegations concerning multiple defendants in order to demonstrate personal jurisdiction over any individual defendant. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1980) (rejecting aggregation of co-defendants' forum contacts in determining personal jurisdiction because "the requirements of International Shoe must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction"). In evaluating whether plaintiffs have established personal jurisdiction, the Court need not treat all of plaintiffs' allegations as true but instead "may receive and weigh affidavits and other relevant matter to assist in determining the jurisdictional facts." United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp.2d 116, 120 n.4 (D.D.C. 2000).

  In this instance, plaintiffs bear a special, higher burden in order to demonstrate jurisdiction because the parties have engaged in jurisdictional discovery. "[A]lthough ordinarily a plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction exists to survive a motion to dismiss, . . . in situations where the parties are permitted to conduct discovery on the jurisdictional issue a plaintiff must prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Shapiro Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp.2d 66, 69 (D.D.C. 1998). Page 7 See also In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 270 F. Supp.2d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Misc. No. 99-0197, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073, at *22 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2001)) ("Because plaintiffs have conducted jurisdictional discovery, they must establish personal jurisdiction over defendants by a preponderance of the evidence.").

 
B. Section 13-423(a): The District of Columbia Long-Arm Statute
  Plaintiffs assert that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants under three separate subsections of the District of Columbia long-arm statute, Sections 13-423(a)(1), (3) and (4). While the long-arm statute is interpreted broadly and factual disputes are resolved in favor of plaintiffs, plaintiffs must allege some specific facts evidencing purposeful activity by the defendants in the District of Columbia by which they invoked the benefits and protections of the District's laws. See Edmond v. United States Postal Service General Counsel, 949 F.2d 415. 428 (D.C. Cir. 1991): First Chicago Int'l v. United Exchange Co. Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp.2d at 121. In addition, because a court in the District of Columbia may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant "only [for] a claim for relief arising from the specific acts enumerated in [the statute]. . .," D.C. CODE § 13-423(b), plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations must arise from the same conduct of which they complain. See Willis v. Willis, 655 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 71 (D.D.C. 1992); LaBrier v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 53, 55 (D.D.C. 1982). Page 8

  1. "Transacting Business" under Section 13-423(a)(1)

  Section 13-423(a)(1) of the long-arm statute provides that "a District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's — transacting any business in the District of Columbia." D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(1). To establish personal jurisdiction under this subsection, plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) the defendant transacted business in the District; (2) the claim arose from the business transacted in the District; (3) the defendant had minimum contacts with the District; and (4) the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Dooley v. United Technologies, 786 F. Supp. at 71; see also Novak-Canzeri v. Saud, 864 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D.D.C. 1994) (because of the "arising from" requirement of Section 13-423(b), "[t]he claim itself must have arisen from business transacted in the District or there is no jurisdiction"). Section 13-423(a)(1) of the long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See First Chicago Int'l v. United Exchange Co. Ltd., 836 F.2d at 1377; Environmental Research Int'l. Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'r, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 810-11 (D.C. 1976) (en banc).

  The constitutional touchstone of the due process determination is "whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state." Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987) (internal citations and emphasis omitted). On the other hand, as the Supreme Court recognized in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (emphasis in original), in today's commercial world business is often transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines and jurisdiction may Page 9 sometimes exist even if a defendant "did not physically enter the forum state." The Court explained that in such cases it is necessary to determine whether the commercial actor that is the subject of the lawsuit "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state," and whether the defendant's conduct in connection with that state is such that it "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. at 474-75 (internal citation and quotation omitted). When the "transacting business" analysis concerns a contractual relationship, factors that inform the analysis include the nature of the prior negotiations between the parties, the agreement's contemplated future consequences, the terms of the contract, the parties' actual course of dealing and how each party manifested a connection to the forum. See id. at 479; Schwartz v. CDI Japan, Ltd., 938 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1996)

  a. The Institutional Defendants

  Plaintiffs generally allege that "each of the named Defendants and members of the Defendant Class illegally contract, combine and conspire with persons and entities that have committed, and continue to commit, overt acts within the District of Columbia in furtherance of the contract, combination and conspiracy alleged in this Complaint." Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs then make the same generic claim with respect to each moving institutional defendant, alleging that the "[institutional defendant] is a [non-District of Columbia] not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business [outside the District of Columbia]. [The institutional defendant] sponsors medical residency programs, employing members of the Plaintiff Class. [The institutional defendant] has contracted, combined and conspired with the named Defendants to restrain competition as alleged in this Complaint. Certain conspiratorial acts in which this Page 10 Defendant participated took place in Washington, D.C." Id. ¶¶ 25-28, 30-32, 34, 40-43, 45-47, 49. The Court concludes that these generalized conclusory allegations alone are facially insufficient to meet plaintiffs' jurisdictional burden. See GTE New Media Services Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp.2d at 36.

  In their opposition to defendants' motions to dismiss, plaintiffs attempt to re-sculpt and refine these generalized allegations, asserting that the institutional defendants, "through the intensely interactive NRMP web-site, [enter] into contracts in the District of Columbia to secure employment of a significant and important portion of their work force, provide a steady stream of information to the NRMP in order to effectuate the Match, and obtain Match Results," thereby transacting business in the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs' Corrected Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Omnibus Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) ("Pls.' (b)(2) Opp.") at 36. It is undisputed that Barnes Jewish-Hospital, Baylor College of Medicine, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc., Boston Medical Center Corp., Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Emory University, Rhode Island Hospital, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, St. Louis University, Stanford Hospital & Clinics, Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Inc., Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, University Hospitals of Cleveland, Inc. and Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. each annually participates in the Match by contracting to participate in the program, submitting its preference list to the NRMP, which Page 11 operates from the AAMC's office in the District of Columbia, and receiving the results of the Match upon its completion.*fn2

  Six of these institutional defendants admit that they have "sporadic" contacts with the NRMP in connection with the Match in addition to the annual submission of the institution's Match list.*fn3 The remaining institutional defendants that participate in the Match assert that they interact with the NRMP only once a year when they transmit their preference lists to the organization. These assertions are contradicted, however, by plaintiffs' documentation of certain contacts with the NRMP in connection with the Match during 1999-2001. These additional Page 12 contacts include the submission of quota change forms, updates of institutional information, information and association data forms and/or "reversion" of unfilled position forms. Plaintiffs concede that no one institution submitted more than ten of these communications to the NRMP in any given year. See Pls.' (b)(2) Opp., Ex. 11, Defendant NRMP's Objections and Answers to Plaintiff Paul lung's First Set of Interrogatories on Jurisdiction; Schedule II.B., "Communications from Institutions/Programs to the NRMP — 2001 Residency Match;" Schedule III.B, "Communications from Institutions/Programs to the NRMP — 2000 Residency Match;" and Schedule IV.B, "Communications from Institutions/Programs to the NRMP — 1999 Residency Match." It is these additional contacts on which plaintiffs base their assertion that in providing a steady stream of information into the District of Columbia in order to effectuate the Match, the moving institutional defendants "transacted business" to an extent sufficient to provide jurisdiction under Section 13-423(a)(1) of the long-arm statute.

  The Court concludes that the fact that the moving institutional defendants entered into the Institutional Match Contract and communicated information concerning their individual programs to the NRMP up to ten times a year in order to effectuate an accurate Match does not by itself form a basis for personal jurisdiction. See Far West Capital. Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (10th Cir. 1995) (non-forum defendant's phone calls and ten to twenty faxes to in-forum plaintiff during course of contract negotiation were insufficient to establish minimum contacts under transacting business prong of state long-arm); see also Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 1999) (defendant's numerous communications into forum Page 13 cannot serve as basis of jurisdiction if they do not themselves form basis of complaint).*fn4 The Court must focus on the quality of the contacts rather than their quantity. See Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 995 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) ("notions of fundamental fairness require that the defendant's contacts with the forum be evaluated qualitatively rather than quantitatively in assessing "transacting business" prong of long-arm statute).

  Upon consideration of the contacts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint, the Court concludes that the contacts simply are not of the quality that would support a conclusion that the institutional defendants have "purposefully availed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state," such that they "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" here under Section 13-423(a)(1). Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 474-7S.*fn5 First, no prior negotiation of the Institutional Match Contract between any institution and the NRMP took place at all, let alone in the District of Columbia; the contract is a form contract into which the institutional defendants entered by listing their names and the number of residency positions Page 14 they had available. See Omnibus Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions by Various Defendants to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), Ex. O, NRMP Institutional Agreement. Second, it is not contested that the future consequence of the Institutional Match Contract for the moving institutional defendants was the placement of residents with those defendants outside the District of Columbia; the execution of the contract did not result in any continuing connections with the District. Compare Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 480 (contract executed in forum "envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts with [plaintiff] in the forum").

  Third, no terms in the Institutional Match Contract itself indicate any special connection with the District of Columbia. The only indication at all that the Match occurred in the District of Columbia is the listing of the NRMP's Washington, D.C. address on the face of the contract. Fourth, the contract includes a choice-of-law provision designating Illinois law. While this by no means conclusively demonstrates that defendants are beyond the Court's jurisdictional reach, it does inform the assessment of whether the defendants could have reasonably foreseen being involved in litigation in the District of Columbia concerning the execution of the Institutional Match Contract. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 482.

  Finally, there is nothing in the parties' actual course of conduct that indicates that the moving institutional defendants should have reasonably foreseen being subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. There is no debate that the Match is very important to the institutional defendants' business of providing health care; it is the mechanism by which the institutional defendants hire resident doctors. The NRMP is not involved, however, in the hospitals' Page 15 substantive process of evaluating potential residents prior to submission of the preference lists. Nor does the NRMP continue to play a role in the hospitals' business once the Match is completed or in any other fashion exert control over the rest of the hospitals' affairs. The mere fact that the NRMP, with its principal place of business in the District of Columbia, entered into a contract with others cannot "standing alone" provide jurisdiction over those other contracting parties. See Health Communications. Inc. v. Mariner Corp., 860 F.2d at 462 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 482) (no jurisdiction absent demonstrated integration of parties' businesses or continued influence of forum resident over non-resident defendant, notwithstanding fact that contract was partially performed in forum); Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d at 995 (proper application of minimum contacts formula requires consideration "not only of whether a nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum, but also of whether those contacts are voluntary and deliberate, rather than fortuitous").

  Plaintiffs rely heavily on Schwartz v. GDI Japan. Ltd. in support of their jurisdictional argument. Plaintiffs are correct that the Court in Schwartz stated that "[t]he `transacting any business' provision of the District's long-arm statute embraces the contractual activities of a non-resident defendant that cause repercussions in the District" and that "[i]t is `therefore sufficient . . . that the suit [be] based on a contract that [has] [a] substantial connection with the District." Schwartz v. GDI Japan. Ltd., 938 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d at 992). Plaintiffs fail to recognize, however, that the defendant's contacts with the District of Columbia in Schwartz were much more extensive than those of the moving institutional defendants here. In Schwartz, the foreign defendant not only had assumed a contract with the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American Art ("NMAA"), but also had Page 16 assumed any additional contracts entered into by the defendant's former agent with the museum, which indicated the defendant's continuing "[intention] to reap the financial benefits from transacting business [with the NMAA] in this forum." Schwartz v. CDI Japan. Ltd., 938 F. Supp. at 7. Furthermore, the assumed contract expressly designated the District of Columbia as the site of the execution of the contract, called for the delivery of products to the Smithsonian in the District of Columbia, and required the defendant to make payments and reimbursements to the NMAA into a District of Columbia bank account. See id. at 6. In addition, an agent of the non-resident defendant had negotiated the assumed contract in the District. See id. at 8. No similar contacts with the forum of this quality exist in the instant circumstances.

  The Court therefore concludes that the moving institutional defendants' entry into the Institutional Match Contract, and the accompanying electronic and/or mail correspondence those defendants sent into the District in support of the contract, do not and cannot provide a basis for personal jurisdiction under Section 13-423(a)(1) of the long-arm statute.

  b. The Organizational Defendants

  Aside from the conclusory, generalized allegations in the complaint concerning "defendants," which the Court already has found insufficient to meet the pleading standards for personal jurisdiction over the institutional defendants in Section II(B)(1)(a), supra, plaintiffs provide scant additional support for their jurisdictional claim that the ABMS or the CMSS transacts business in the District of Columbia for the purposes of the long-arm statute. In their complaint, plaintiffs introduce the ABMS as "an Illinois not-for-profit corporation whose membership consists of 24 recognized medical specialty certification boards in the United Page 17 States" that "develop and apply professional and education standards for the evaluation and certification of physician specialists." Compl. ¶ 20. Plaintiffs also allege that the ABMS is one of five "governing sponsors" of the NRMP. Id. With respect to the CMSS, plaintiffs allege that it is "a not-for-profit corporation whose membership consists of 17 physician societies in specialties having a member board participating in ABMS" and that it also is one of five "governing sponsors" of the NRMP. Id. ¶ 21.

  Plaintiffs do not define "governing sponsor" in their complaint. In their opposition to defendants' motions to dismiss, plaintiffs cite to statements by the Executive Director of the NRMP, Robert L. Beran, Ph.D., that the ABMS and the CMSS are two of five "sponsors" of the NRMP. Pls.' (b)(2) Opp. at 30 (citing Defendant National Resident Matching Program's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, Ex. A, Affidavit of Robert L. Beran, Ph.D. ("Beran Compel Aff") ¶ 1). Plaintiffs assert that the ABMS thus itself "admits" that it is a sponsor of the NRMP, that its representative serves as President of the NRMP and that its representative telephones the NRMP several times a month. Plaintiffs also assert that the CMSS admits to its "involvement" with the NRMP and has "contacts with the District of Columbia." Pls.' (b)(2) Opp. at 30. Plaintiffs charge that the relationships between these two organizational defendants and the NRMP are "ongoing and committed [, and] as sponsors, [the ABMS and the CMSS] are entitled to and do elect two members to the twelve member NRMP Board of Directors." Id. at 36. From this predicate, plaintiffs argue that "the two moving Organizational Defendants play an integral role in governing the NRMP, [and in] formulating its policies, including the anti-competitive policies of the Match," and that they therefore are subject to suit in the District of Columbia under Section 13-423(a)(1). Id. Page 18

  The ABMS and the CMSS offer support for their motions to dismiss in the form of sworn declarations from their Executive Vice President and President, respectively. Each states that his organization does not elect members to the NRMP board, but instead nominates individuals from the organization to serve; the NRMP board itself elects its members. See Declaration of Stephen H. Miller, M.D., Ph.D., in Support of Motion of the American Board of Medical Specialties to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) ("Miller Decl.") ¶ 6; Declaration of Bruce E. Spivey, M.D., in Support of Motion of the Council of Medical Specialty Societies to Dismiss the Complaint ("Spivey Decl.") ¶ 6. In addition, Dr. Spivey states that the CMSS nominees to the NRMP board are not officers or employees of the CMSS and do not act on the CMSS's behalf. See Spivey Decl. ¶ 6. While it may be that nomination is tantamount to election, both Dr. Miller and Dr. Spivey state that their respective organizations do not exercise any control over the activities of the NRMP after their organizations' nominees are elected to the NRMP board. See Miller Decl. ¶ 6; Spivey Decl. ¶ 6. In a separate affidavit, the Executive Director of the NRMP confirmed that "the sponsoring organizations only have the right to nominate. Election of new board members is left to the discretion of the current Board. The sponsoring organizations have no other power with respect to the NRMP." Beran Compel Aff. ¶ 3 (emphasis added). Furthermore, while Dr. Miller is both Executive Vice President of the ABMS and President of the NRMP, he states that all the business he conducts with NRMP personnel, which includes several telephone conversations a month and travel once or twice a year to the District of Columbia, is in his capacity as NRMP Page 19 President and not on behalf of the ABMS. See Miller Decl. ¶ 7. These statements in declarations and affidavits offered in support of defendants' motions remain uncontradicted by plaintiffs.

  The Court concludes that plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that either the ABMS or the CMSS transacts business in the District of Columbia for purposes of the long-arm statute. Plaintiffs' only true jurisdictional claim rests on the fact that these organizational defendants are "governing sponsors" of the NRMP and nominate two directors to the NRMP board. Because plaintiffs do not define "governing sponsor," the Court is left to consider what that term may mean. In light of plaintiffs' assertion that as governing sponsors the organizational defendants have the power to direct policy and determine procedures of the NRMP, perhaps the most analogous relationship is that of a parent corporation with control over the activities of its subsidiary. See, e.g., El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[I]f parent and subsidiary `are not really separate entities,' . . . or one acts as an agent of the other, . . . the local subsidiary's contacts can be imputed to the foreign parent."). If this is the most analogous relationship, however, it does not serve plaintiffs well. Plaintiffs fail to allege a sufficient level of control by the ABMS and/or the CMSS over the NRMP, and the uncontradicted declarations submitted by Dr. Miller and Dr. Spivey state unequivocally that their organizations do not exercise any control over the activities of the NRMP. The Court therefore has no basis to attribute the activity of the NRMP in the District of Columbia to either organization.*fn6 Page 20

  2. Sections 13-423(a)(3) and (4): Tortious Injury

  Section 13-423(a)(3) of the long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over a person who causes "tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia." D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(3). To invoke this subsection, plaintiffs must show that the moving defendants either directly or through an agent caused tortious injury to plaintiffs in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia. See Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 946 F. Supp. 54, 73 (D.D.C. 1996); see generally Moncrief v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 807 A.2d 217, 219 (D.C. 1986).

  Section 13-423(a)(4) of the long-arm statute provides:
A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's . . . causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.
D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(4). In order to establish personal jurisdiction under this subsection after jurisdictional discovery has taken place plaintiffs must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) plaintiffs suffered a tortious injury in the District of Columbia; (2) the injury was caused by a defendant's act or omission outside of the District; and (3) the defendant had one of Page 21 the three enumerated contacts with the District of Columbia. See Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 53; Trager v. Berrie, 593 F. Supp. 223, 225 (D.D.C 1984).*fn7

  Under both "tortious injury" subsections of the long-arm statute plaintiffs must allege that they have suffered a tortious injury in the District of Columbia. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege no injury to the named plaintiffs within the District of Columbia. In their opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiffs attempt to describe an injury, citing to allegations in the complaint that the defendants' actions restrained competition in the recruitment, hiring, employment and compensation of resident physicians nationwide. Because the District of Columbia is part of the alleged national relevant market in which competition was restrained, plaintiffs argue that they lost "the right to negotiate with employers in the District of Columbia for placement as resident physicians" as a result of the alleged anticompetive activity. Pls.' (b)(2) Opp. at 37-38. Plaintiffs have failed, however, to allege or otherwise demonstrate any facts that any named plaintiff pursued or would have pursued a resident position within the District of Columbia by ranking or interviewing with a District of Columbia hospital, or undertook any other action in connection with residency employment in the District. Absent such allegations, Page 22 plaintiffs' argument fails. There has been no tortious injury to any plaintiff in the District of Columbia. If the Court were to find jurisdiction under this flawed premise, any plaintiff alleging an antitrust conspiracy could satisfy the tortious injury requirement under either "tort" prong of the long-arm statute simply by asserting that the District of Columbia is part of the relevant market.*fn8

  At oral argument, plaintiffs argued belatedly that the injury was the Match itself-that is, that the injury is the actual binding of the fourth year medical student to a specific residency program — and thus the tortious injury occurred in the District of Columbia where the Match is executed. See Transcript of February 23, 2003 Motions Hearing, Afternoon Session ("Tr.") at 41 ("As soon as that rank order list is submitted, and the algorithm employed, and that match is made, that is the injury."). Without reaching the merits of this "injury" claim, the Court rejects this line of reasoning in light of the plaintiffs' own assertion in their complaint and briefs that plaintiffs are bound and thus, by extension, injured upon entry into the Student Match Contract rather than upon the execution of the contract. See Compl. ¶ 86(b); Pls.' (b)(2) Opp. at 6 n.4 ("[M]edical school seniors who sign up for the Match agree that they will accept the position to which they are matched if a match is made, and will enroll in the residency program to which they are matched by the NRMP. `The listing of [. . .] a program by an applicant on the Page 23 individual's Rank Order List establishes a commitment to [. . .] accept an appointment when a match results.'") (quoting NRMP Handbook for Institutions and Program Directors at 4-5). There are no allegations that plaintiffs were in the District of Columbia when they entered into the Student Match Contract. The Court concludes that plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to demonstrate any tortious injury in the District of Columbia, and therefore that jurisdiction cannot be predicated on Section 13-423(a)(3) or (4) of the long-arm statute.

 C. Personal Jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Clayton Act: "Transacting Business"

  Plaintiffs assert that the Court has jurisdiction over all the moving defendants under the jurisdictional grant of Section 12 of the Clayton Act. See Compl. ¶ 7. Section 12 states that "[a]ny suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found." 15 U.S.C. § 22.

  In determining whether jurisdiction over defendants exists under the Clayton Act, the Court must assess "whether the corporation is doing business in the district of any substantial character, even if its business is entirely interstate in character and is transacted by agents who do not reside in the District." Caribe Trailer Systems, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 475 F. Supp. 711, 716 (D.D.C. 1979). See also Mvlan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., Civil Action No. 89-1671, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3521, at *21 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 1990); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1195 (D.D.C. 1984). The Court must look for "tangible manifestations of doing business" in the District of Columbia, such as the Page 24 presence of officers, employees, agents, offices, ownership of property, maintenance of corporate records or bank accounts. Caribe Trailer Systems, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 475 F. Supp. at 716. Unlike the "transacting business" analysis conducted under the District of Columbia long-arm statute, jurisdiction under Section 12 does not require that the transactions on which jurisdiction is based be related to the cause of action underlying the suit. See Diamond Chemical Co., Inc. v. Atofina Chemicals, Inc., 268 F. Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. at 1195).

  1. The Institutional Defendants

  Plaintiffs do not allege any tangible manifestations of doing business in the District of Columbia on the part of the moving institutional defendants. Instead, they invite the Court to consider the institutional defendants' participation in the Institutional Match Contract, the COTH Survey and activities related to the institutions' membership in the AAMC. See Pls.' (b)(2) Opp. at 44 ("[E]ach of the moving Institutional Defendants enter into multiple agreements with the D.C.-based NRMP and AAMC to perform highly prized services which require regular and on-going contacts with each of the D.C.-based entities, and the Institutional Defendants pay fees into the District of Columbia for those services.").

  It is undisputed that Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc., Boston Medical Center Corp., Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Emory University, Rhode Island Hospital, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, St. Louis University, Stanford Hospital & Clinics, Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Inc., Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, University Hospitals of Cleveland, Inc. and Page 25 Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. participated in the Match and in the annual COTH Survey by submitting the institutions' resident stipend data to the AAMC, and by receiving the results of the Survey in return.*fn9

  In addition to participating in the Match and the COTH Survey, a majority of the moving institutional defendants admit that they or their employees had additional contacts with the District of Columbia. First, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation states that it employs one lobbyist who travels to the District of Columbia "solely for the purpose of lobbying the federal agencies and government," but asserts that such actions are protected by the government contacts exception. Defendant The Cleveland Clinic Foundation's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion and the Omnibus Memorandum in Support of Motions by Various Defendants to Dismiss the Complaints Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) at 6 n.3. Second, Beth-Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc., Boston Medical Center Corp., Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Rhode Island Hospital, Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Inc., University Hospitals of Cleveland, Inc. and Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. acknowledge that they employ individuals who are members of organizations such as defendant American Hospital Association Page 26 ("AHA"), the AAMC and/or the COTH Section and that these employees travel to the District of Columbia to fulfill their obligations to such organizations.*fn10

  Third, Baylor College of Medicine acknowledges that it has had two additional contacts with the District: specifically that it contracted with a firm that provides services concerning relations with the federal government, and that certain Baylor residents each year attend a program conducted in the District of Columbia by the United States Department of Defense. See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Baylor College of Medicine's Motion to Dismiss the Complaints Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) at 3 n.2. Finally, the Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund admits that it has one assistant professor who "is providing technical advice concerning infectious disease programs in Africa pursuant to a subcontract for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This employee Page 27 works out of a private nonprofit organization that is the prime contractor to USAID." Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Tulane's Motion to Dismiss the Complaints Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2); Declaration of Anthony P. Lorino ¶ 4.

  To the extent that the moving institutional defendants admit to their agents' presence in the District of Columbia in order to lobby certain agencies of the federal government on the defendants' behalf, such contacts with the District are excluded from the jurisdictional analysis under the "government contacts" exception. Under this exception, a person or company does not subject itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the District of Columbia merely by filing an application with a government agency or by seeking redress of grievances from the Executive Branch or the Congress. See Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d at 813. "The District of Columbia's unique character as the home of the federal government requires this exception in order to maintain unobstructed access to the instrumentalities of the federal government." Cellutech, Inc. v. Centennial Cellular Corp., 871 F. Supp. 46, 50 (D.D.C. 1994). See also Mallinckrodt Medical. Inc. v. Sonus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 989 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D.D.C. 1998).

  The Court also concludes that the institutional defendants' membership in and contacts with the AAMC or the COTH Section in the District of Columbia should not be considered in the evaluation of whether any defendant transacted business of any "substantial character" in the District because it is established that the "government contacts" exception extends "to non-resident contact with trade associations located with [sic] the District of Page 28 Columbia." World Wide Minerals. Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstahn, 116 F. Supp.2d 98, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2000). The AAMC is a typical association for these purposes; it is "a non-profit association founded [] to work for reform in medical education" and "[a]s an association of medical schools, teaching hospitals, and academic societies, the AAMC works with its members to set a national agenda for medical education, biomedical research, and health care, and assists its members by providing services at the national level that facilitate the accomplishment of their missions." See Omnibus Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions by Various Defendants to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), Ex. F, "About the AAMC." Any travel to the District by an institutional defendant's agent for the purpose of fulfilling the membership obligations of the institution in the AAMC or the COTH Section therefore does not subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the Court. See World Wide Minerals. Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstahn, 116 F. Supp.2d at 105-06; American Association of Cruise Passengers v. Cunard Line. Ltd., 691 F. Supp. 379, 380 (D.D.C. 1987) ("attendance at a trade association meeting [. . .] does not constitute `transacting business'" under the long-arm statute).

  The Court thus is left to consider only plaintiffs' allegations with respect to the institutional defendants' participation in the Match Program and the COTH Survey, and the de minimis contacts admitted by Baylor College of Medicine and the Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund with respect to those institutions. The Court concludes that these contacts are not sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction over the moving institutional defendants under Section 12 of the Clayton Act. While plaintiffs attempt to construe the COTH Survey as a service contracted for by the institutional defendants with the AAMC in the District of Columbia, plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the Survey is administered and published by the AAMC Page 29 and not at the behest of any individual hospital. Compare Pls.' (b)(2) Opp. at 18-19 with Compl. ¶ 74. Although institutional defendants provide their individual information to the AAMC and the results of the Survey are distributed by the AAMC to its members, the institutional defendants are not required to provide information in order to receive the Survey. In fact, the Survey is available to the public at large. See http:/www.aamc.org/hlthcare/coth-hss.start.htm. Upon consideration of plaintiffs' allegations with respect to the COTH Survey, alone or in conjunction with the allegations regarding the Institutional Match Contract and/or the de minimis allegations in the complaint described above, the Court concludes that any amalgamation of these contacts with the District of Columbia fails to demonstrate that any of the moving institutional defendants is doing business in the District "of any substantial character," thereby justifying jurisdiction under the Clayton Act. See Caribe Trailer Systems, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 475 F. Supp. at 716.*fn11

  2. The Organizational Defendants

  Plaintiffs do not allege any additional contacts with the District of Columbia that would subject the moving organizational defendants to the Court's jurisdiction in addition to those evaluated in the Court's "transacting business" analysis under Section 13-423(a)(1) of the long-arm statute. For the reasons stated in Section II(B)(1)(b), supra, the Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the ABMS or the CMSS has transacted "substantial business" within the District of Columbia. Page 30

 
D. "Conspiracy Jurisdiction" Under the Long-Arm Statute
  Plaintiffs assert that the Court has jurisdiction over all the moving defendants pursuant to the "conspiracy" theory of long-arm jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, acts undertaken within the forum by one co-conspirator in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy may subject a non-resident co-conspirator to personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See Second Amendment Foundation v. United States Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (applying conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction to long-arm statute's "transacting business" subsection); First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d at 1377-78; Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d at 424-425 (discussing application of conspiracy theory under Section 13-423(a)(3)).

  Plaintiffs claim that personal jurisdiction exists over each moving defendant pursuant to the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction stemming from Section 13-423(a)(1). See Pls.' (b)(2) Opp. at 24-30.*fn12 Conspiracy jurisdiction under this subsection presumes that "[p]ersons who enter the forum and engage in conspiratorial acts are deemed to `transact business' there `directly'; [and] coconspirators who never enter the forum are deemed to `transact business' there `by an agent.'" Second Amendment Foundation v. United States Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d at 523 (quoting D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(1)). So long as any one co-conspirator commits at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy in the forum jurisdiction, there is personal Page 31 jurisdiction over all members of the conspiracy. See Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 78. In this context, plaintiffs must allege (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) the nonresident's participation in or agreement to join the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy within the forum's boundaries. See Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d at 425.

  "Mere speculation" that a conspiracy exists or that "the non-resident defendants are co-conspirators [is] insufficient to meet plaintiff's [] burden." Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 78. A plaintiff resting on the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction "must plead with particularity the conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy." Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d at 1031 (internal quotation omitted). See also United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. at 122. This requirement is strictly enforced, and courts in this Circuit have applied the conspiracy jurisdiction theory "warily" in light of concerns that plaintiffs will use the doctrine to circumvent the constitutional boundaries of the long-arm statute. Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 77. As Judge Silberman said in his concurring opinion in Edmond, "we cannot allow plaintiffs to subvert the important constitutional principles of sovereignty and due process that underlie personal jurisdiction limitations with mere unspecified and unsubstantiated claims that multifarious defendants were part of a broad conspiracy and that one of them committed some [act] in the plaintiffs' desired forum." Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d at 428 (Silberman, J, concurring) (internal quotation omitted). See also United States v. Page 32 Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp.2d at 122; In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073, at *46.*fn13

  In addition, once jurisdictional discovery has taken place it still is necessary under a theory of conspiracy jurisdiction that plaintiffs demonstrate jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Second Amendment Foundation v. United States Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d at 524; First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d at 1377-78 ("bare allegation of conspiracy or agency is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction"); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073, at *46 (in conspiracy jurisdiction context, issue remains "whether [plaintiffs] have satisfied their preponderance of the evidence burden necessary to defeat the pending motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction"). Since jurisdictional discovery is limited, however, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence only that acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy took place in the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs do not have to demonstrate the very existence of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. See Second Amendment Foundation v. United States Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d at 524 ("The general rule . . . that a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts applies to conspiracy-based jurisdiction.") (internal quotation omitted). To impose this additional requirement would place on plaintiffs the inequitable burden of demonstrating the Page 33 existence of something by a preponderance of the evidence about which they have not yet had the opportunity to conduct discovery.

  The Court concludes that if the activities alleged constitute a conspiracy to restrain trade, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy took place in the District of Columbia. Specifically, it is uncontested that defendant NRMP conducts the Match in the District of Columbia and that defendant AAMC facilitates the COTH Survey from the District. Plaintiffs also have submitted documentation demonstrating that the District-based institutional defendants MedStar-Georgetown Hospital Medical Center, George Washington University and MedStar Health, Inc. contracted in the District of Columbia with the NRMP to participate in the Match and employed resident physicians in the District of Columbia through the Match Program during the relevant period. See Pls.' (b)(2) Opp., Ex. 2, NRMP Directory 1999 Match, Hospitals and Programs Participating in the Matching Program at 12-13. Thus, if there was a conspiracy plaintiffs have demonstrated that several of the conspirators committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in the District of Columbia. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073, at *46. The question remains whether plaintiffs adequately have alleged that a conspiracy existed.

  As the Court explains in Section IV(B), infra, plaintiffs adequately have alleged a conspiracy to depress resident compensation between, inter alia, those institutional defendants that participated in the Match and the NRMP. The Court therefore concludes that the fifteen moving institutional defendants who themselves acknowledge that they took part in the Match Program are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction. Those institutional defendants are Barnes Jewish-Hospital, Baylor College of Medicine, Beth Page 34 Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc., Boston Medical Center Corp., Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Emory University, Rhode Island Hospital, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, St. Louis University, Stanford Hospital & Clinics, Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Inc., Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, University Hospitals of Cleveland, Inc. and Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.*fn14 Because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendant Washington University Medical Center participated in the Match or otherwise participated in the conspiracy, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Washington University Medical Center. The Court therefore will deny the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by fifteen of the sixteen moving institutional defendants — the exception being the motion of Washington University Medical Center, which the Court will grant.

  With respect to the ABMS and the CMSS, the organizational defendants that moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court concludes that because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that either organization participated in the conspiracy, see Section IV(B)(2), infra, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over these organizational defendants under a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction and will grant their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Page 35

 
III. DEFENDANT NRMP'S RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
A. Background
  The NRMP moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claim against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that to the extent that plaintiffs' claim relates to the NRMP and its governing sponsors, the claim is subject to compulsory arbitration. The NRMP therefore seeks an order "compelling plaintiffs to arbitrate the first element of their tripartite claim; namely, that defendants used the Matching Program to eliminate competition in the recruitment and employment of resident physicians." Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant National Resident ...

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