The opinion of the court was delivered by: REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge
This is an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The plaintiff is seeking
redress for alleged "same sex" discrimination, sexual harassment,
the creation of a sexually hostile work environment, retaliation,
and severe emotional distress.*fn1 This matter is currently
before the Court on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
("Def.'s Mot."), the plaintiff's opposition to the motion ("Pl.'s
Opp."), and the defendant's reply. For the reasons set forth
below, the defendant's motion for summary judgment will be
granted in part and denied in part.*fn2 I. Factual Background
According to the plaintiff, the following are the events that
resulted in the filing of this lawsuit. The plaintiff became a
police officer with the District of Columbia's Metropolitan
Police Department ("MPD") on or about December 6, 1985. Second
Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Compl.") ¶ 6. In July of 1989,
the plaintiff was assigned to the Sixth District of the MPD where
she remained until May of 2000. Id. Sgt. Denise Calhoun ("Sgt.
Calhoun") also worked at the Sixth District while the plaintiff
worked there and was one of the plaintiff's superiors. Id. ¶ 7.
Sgt. Calhoun began inviting the plaintiff to join her for drinks
after work and the plaintiff agreed to do so occasionally. Id.
During the summer of 1995 Sgt. Calhoun called the plaintiff at her home and asked the plaintiff to join
her at a beach house when the plaintiff would not be on duty. Id.
¶ 8. Because Sgt. Calhoun would not allow the plaintiff to bring
her daughter to the beach house she declined the offer. Id.
Shortly after the plaintiff's refusal to join Sgt. Calhoun at the
beach house, Sgt. Calhoun saw the plaintiff's mother on the
street and expressed to her that she was angry with the
plaintiff. Id. ¶ 8. Thereafter, when the plaintiff refused
invitations from Sgt. Calhoun to join her for drinks, Sgt.
Calhoun began inviting herself to visit with the plaintiff at her
home. Id. ¶ 9. Although the plaintiff rejected the invitations,
she allowed Sgt. Calhoun to enter her home whenever she appeared
because the plaintiff feared that Sgt. Calhoun would retaliate
against her if she rejected Sgt. Calhoun's visits, having heard
that Sgt. Calhoun had a violent temper. Id.
Between June 9 and June 13, 1998, Sgt. Calhoun ordered the
plaintiff to meet with her privately in her office after
roll-call. Id. ¶ 13. Because the plaintiff understood these
directives as orders from a superior officer she went directly to
Sgt. Calhoun's office after roll-call. Id. ¶ 14. However, during
these office visits, Sgt. Calhoun adored herself in a mirror and
questioned the plaintiff about her (Sgt. Calhoun's) appearance,
i.e., whether she was pretty or had a nice body figure. Id. When
the plaintiff did not reply, Sgt. Calhoun insisted that she was pretty and had a "nice ass" and also encouraged the plaintiff
to leave her boyfriend and not return to her husband because "all
men had dirty penises." Id. On several occasions, not only did
Sgt. Calhoun question the plaintiff about her appearance, but
"also touched [the p]laintiff in a manner that . . . [was]
unsettling, non-consensual and offensive" to the plaintiff. Id. ¶
Apparently, the plaintiff had a back condition and her work
schedule fluctuated. Id. She was eventually placed on limited
duty because of concerns about her back condition. Id. ¶ 17.
Consequently, she was assigned to work at a Sixth District
substation. Id. Sgt. Calhoun purportedly hung around the
substation for much of the day chatting with the plaintiff. Id. ¶
18. She complained that the plaintiff was not returning her phone
calls and questioned the plaintiff about her boyfriend answering
the phone when she called. Id.
On June 26, 1998, the plaintiff was cooking dinner at her home
for her sister when Sgt. Calhoun called the plaintiff and
informed her that she would be visiting the plaintiff to
celebrate her birthday, and also to enjoy the plaintiff's
cooking. Id. ¶ 10. When Sgt. Calhoun arrived at the plaintiff's
home, she allegedly encountered the plaintiff in her kitchen,
removed her lower garments and exposed her genitalia to the
plaintiff while asking if she found her (Sgt. Calhoun) attractive. Id. ¶ 11. Thereafter, Sgt. Calhoun drew her
police-issued weapon and pointed it at two adolescent boys that
were visiting at the plaintiff's home and instructed them to
leave. Id. Sgt. Calhoun then approached the plaintiff again and
hugged the plaintiff in the presence of others who were in the
house while announcing that she "wanted" the plaintiff. Id.;
Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts Regarding Genuine Issues
in Dispute ("Pl's Stmt.") at 2. The plaintiff ultimately asked
Sgt. Calhoun to leave her home and enlisted the assistance of
others to accompany Sgt. Calhoun out of her house. Id.
On July 2, 1998, the plaintiff informed Sgt. Thomas*fn3
about the incident that took place at her home on June 26, 1998.
Id. ¶ 20. Sgt. Thomas advised the plaintiff that he would take
care of the matter. Id. Later, on July 7, 1998, Sgt. Calhoun
again instructed the plaintiff to come to her office after
roll-call. Id. ¶ 21. On that occasion, Sgt. Calhoun told the
plaintiff that she loved her and when the plaintiff stood up to
leave, Sgt. Calhoun pulled the plaintiff's shoulder toward her,
"placed her hand firmly on [the p]laintiff's right breast and
fondled and caressed it." Id. Sgt. Calhoun then instructed the
plaintiff to "think about it." Id.; Pl.'s Stmt. at 4. The
plaintiff also reported this incident to Sgt. Thomas. Id. ¶ 22
When told about the second incident Sgt. Thomas allegedly laughed and agreed to
intercede while advising the plaintiff to calm down. Id. The
plaintiff also reported that she had been sexually harassed by
Sgt. Calhoun to Deputy Chief Musgrove. Id. ¶ 23. Musgrove
instructed the plaintiff to immediately report her complaints to
the MPD's Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office. Id.
The plaintiff also contends that when she was on foot patrol,
Sgt. Calhoun would regularly seek her out and ask if she could
join her. Id. ¶ 24. Regardless of which patrol the plaintiff
was assigned, she would get numerous radio calls from Sgt.
Calhoun. Pl.'s Stmt. at 5. On two occasions, Sgt. Calhoun picked
up the plaintiff from foot patrol and took her to her home
claiming that she wanted to show the plaintiff improvements she
had made to her home. Id ¶ 25. She then showed plaintiff the
hot tub and bedroom and invited plaintiff to come over and stay
at any time. Id.; Pl.'s Stmt. at 5. On several occasions, Sgt.
Calhoun would locate the plaintiff when she was patrolling alone
and would take the opportunity to use her squad car to take the
plaintiff for rides outside of her sector, or attempt to discuss
the same topics raised when the plaintiff went to her office
after roll-call. Pl.'s Stmt. at 5. On at least three occasions
Sgt. Calhoun directed the plaintiff to join her at a local
restaurant for food and drinks. Id.
On April 10, 1999, the plaintiff was told by Sgt. Calhoun to guard a gunshot wound victim's car that was parked in a MPD
substation parking lot. Compl. ¶ 26. The officer responsible for
investigating the shooting then told the plaintiff that she could
terminate her watch of the car. Id. The plaintiff then called her
partner and asked to be picked up at the lot. Id. When Sgt.
Calhoun returned to the substation parking lot she "loudly and
angrily chastised [the p]laintiff" for not remaining with the
vehicle as instructed. Id. Later, "Sgt. Calhoun threatened to
charge [the p]laintiff with insubordination" and told the
plaintiff, in the presence of Sgt. Thomas, that she would be
relieved of "her badge and gun if [she] was ever insubordinate
again." Id. The encounter reduced the plaintiff to tears. Id.
The plaintiff, fearful of the consequences of advancing her
complaint to a higher level in the police department, reported to
her union steward that she was being harassed by Sgt. Calhoun.
Id. ¶ 27. The plaintiff was instructed to "report her complaint
[to] the internal EEO office of the police department." Id. The
plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEO office on April 12,
1999. Id. ¶ 28. Consequently, the plaintiff was transferred to
a different "Sector" of the Sixth District in an effort to shield
her from further contact with Sgt. Calhoun. Id. Later, in
August of 1999, the plaintiff also filed a claim with the
District of Columbia Office of Human Rights and Local Business Development Id. ¶ 29. Despite working in the new Sector, the
plaintiff began encountering Sgt. Calhoun again frequently
because they were working during the same hours. Id. In
December of 1999, the plaintiff returned to the EEO office and
requested another transfer. Id. ¶ 30. The plaintiff was advised
that the EEO office could no longer assist her because she had
filed a complaint with the District of Columbia Department of
Human Rights. Id. In December of 1999, the plaintiff sought
additional help at the Police and Fire Clinic. Id. ¶ 31. The
plaintiff was then placed on sick leave by a psychiatrist until
May of 2000. Id. When she attempted to return to work, she
learned that she would have to work again "in the vicinity of
Sgt. Calhoun" and therefore, on her own initiative, opted to
remain on sick leave without pay. Id. After an additional two
months, the plaintiff returned to work upon being transferred to
another police department district. Id.
A. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment
The defendant has moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment
is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) A genuine issue of material
fact exists if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Credibility determinations, the weighing
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. at 255.
Summary judgment is mandated after there has been "adequate time
for discovery . . . against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). Summary judgment, nonetheless, is a "drastic remedy, [and
therefore] courts should grant it with caution so that no person
will be deprived of his or her day in court to prove a disputed
material factual issue." Greenberg v. Food & Drug Admin.,
803 F.2d 1213, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Summary judgment is accordingly
not appropriate, for example, where "the evidence presented on a
dispositive issue is subject to conflicting interpretations, ...