United States District Court for the District of Columbia
April 1, 2005.
Frank Simmons, Petitioner,
United States Parole Commission, et al., Respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: EMMET SULLIVAN, District Judge
This matter is before the Court on consideration of
petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.*fn1 For the reasons stated below, the petition will
On October 5, 1988, petitioner was sentenced by the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia to an aggregate term of two to
six years' imprisonment. Resp't Resp., Faller Decl., ¶ 3. The
District of Columbia Board of Parole granted parole on April 23,
1991. Id. On May 22, 1992, petitioner was convicted of
attempted distribution of cocaine, and was sentenced by the Superior Court to a term of three to nine years'
imprisonment.*fn2 Id., ¶ 4. On March 13, 1996, petitioner
was paroled. Id. On this same day, however, a parole violator
warrant was executed, so that petitioner was forced to serve time
remaining on the sentences imposed in 1988. Id. Petitioner was
paroled on March 24, 1997.*fn3 Resp't Resp., Ex. D
(Certificate of Parole).
Petitioner was returned to custody on July 21, 1999 upon
execution of a parole violator warrant.*fn4 Faller Decl., ¶
5. On October 18, 1999, the D.C. Board of Parole revoked
petitioner's parole for criminal and noncriminal violations of
the conditions of his release. Resp't Resp., Ex. E (Notice of
Action). The United States Parole Commission, which in the
interim assumed responsibility for District of Columbia
offenders, reparoled petitioner on October 18, 2000.*fn5
Id., Ex. F (Certificate of Parole).
Petitioner again found himself in custody on July 27, 2001 upon
the execution of another parole violator warrant. Faller Decl., ¶
6. He was reparoled on August 27, 2002. Resp't Resp., Ex. H
(Certificate of Parole). The Parole Commission revoked his parole
on March 12, 2003, and reparoled him on March 12, 2004. Id.,
Ex. I (Notice of Action), J (Certificate of Parole). Yet another parole violator warrant was
issued on October 18, 2004. Id., Ex. L (Warrant). Petitioner
was returned to custody on November 15, 2004. See id., Ex. M
(D.C. Probable Cause Hearing Digest). After waiving his right to
a revocation hearing, the Parole Commission revoked parole on
January 5, 2005. Id., Ex. N (Waiver), Ex. O (Notice of Action).
Petitioner's parole effective date is July 14, 2005, and his
mandatory release date is December 14, 2005. Id., ¶ 7.
Petitioner contends that, although his sentences allegedly
expired in 2000, he unlawfully remains in custody. Pet. at 5. He
argues that the Parole Commission "has been `impersonating to be
Article III Judges' to re-sentence all D.C. Code offenders
without the power of being lawfully under the `Judicial Branch.'"
Id. at 3. In addition, he contends that he wrongfully is denied
credit for all time spent on parole prior to revocation, in
violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 8. None of petitioner's arguments has
The Parole Commission has no authority to impose a prison
sentence upon conviction of a crime; this authority rests with
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See D.C. Code §
11-923(b) (granting jurisdiction to Superior Court over any
criminal case under District of Columbia law). Rather, the Parole
Commission has full authority to grant, deny, or revoke a
District of Columbia offender's parole, and to impose or modify
conditions upon an order of parole. See D.C. Code § 24-131(a).
If a parolee allegedly has violated conditions of his release,
the Parole Commission is authorized to "[i]ssue a warrant for the
apprehension and return of the offender to custody."
28 C.F.R. § 2.98(a)(2). Among the available sanctions for a parolee's violation of conditions of his release
is his return to custody. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20. The Parole
Commission does not add years to petitioner's prison sentence.
Petitioner finds himself in custody long after his original
Superior Court sentence ordinarily would have expired because of
his own conduct while on parole.
Furthermore, petitioner is not entitled to receive credit
toward service of his sentence for "street time." See Davis v.
Moore, 772 A.2d 204 (D.C. 2001) (en banc) (holding that
retroactive application of Noble does not violate due process
and ex post facto clauses); United States Parole Comm'n v.
Noble, 711 A.2d 85 (D.C. 1998) (concluding that time offender
spends on parole before revocation cannot be credited toward
service of sentence).
A writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a District of
Columbia prisoner unless he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994). Petitioner has made no such showing, and,
therefore the Court must deny his petition. An Order consistent
with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued this same day.