United States District Court, D. Columbia
August 19, 2005.
VERNON M. BOYKIN, Petitioner,
SUZANNE HASTINGS, Respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: ELLEN S. HUVELLE, District Judge
This matter comes before the court on petitioner's pro se
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court will dismiss the
Petitioner attacks his conviction and sentence imposed by the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia. A challenge of this
nature must be brought in a habeas action in the Superior Court
under D.C. Code § 23-110(g), which provides:
[An] application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for
relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not
be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it
appears . . . that the Superior Court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.
D.C. Code § 23-110(g). "Section 23-110 has been found to be
adequate and effective because it is coextensive with habeas
corpus." Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C. 1992). It
is settled that "a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse
to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is
`inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention'" Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (internal footnote omitted); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993
(1986). A prisoner's lack of success in his attempt to
collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a
motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy
inadequate or ineffective. See Wilson v. Office of the
Chairperson, 892 F.Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 1995).
Accordingly, the Court will deny the petition. An Order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately
on this date.
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