The opinion of the court was delivered by: John M. Facciola United States Magistrate Judge
This case was referred to me by Judge Kessler for the resolution of discovery disputes. Currently pending before me is the issue of whether defendant must produce certain documents, claimed to be privileged and submitted for in camera review, to plaintiff. Also before me is Plaintiff's Motion to Require Defendant to File Privilege Log in Public Record and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof [#322]. For the reasons stated herein and in accordance with this Memorandum Order, defendant need not produce any of the documents listed in its privilege log but must file the privilege log within 5 days of the date of this Order. If plaintiff believes that she has new arguments to advance in light of the privilege log, plaintiff will then have 10 days to submit any additional arguments regarding the privilege log and the documents described therein, and defendant will have 10 days to respond.
In 1991, Lavonne Jinks-Umstead ("Jinks-Umstead" or "plaintiff") began working for the Department of the Navy ("Navy" or "defendant"). In February 1997, she was assigned to work at Carderock as a Head Contracting Officer. At some point after her assignment to Carderock, the Navy decided to reduce the number of staff at that office. Defendant also removed plaintiff's supervisory status. Plaintiff claims that these restructuring decisions were discriminatory and retaliatory, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Defendant, however, maintains that the decisions were based on legitimate business reasons.
Many discovery issues have arisen in this matter. Currently ripe and ready for resolution is the issue of whether certain documents, submitted by defendant for in camera review, are protected from disclosure by the work-product and attorney-client privileges.
II. PRIVILEGES CLAIMED BY DEFENDANT
A. The Work-Product Privilege
The work-product privilege exists because "it is essential [to our adversarial system] that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). A lawyer's work product is reflected in "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways. . . . Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own." Id. at 511.
Because of these important interests, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) provides that materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by an attorney or a party are protected from disclosure, and they may be subject to discovery only upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Moreover, even if the work-product privilege yields to a showing of need, the court must still protect the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney." Id. See also Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 117 F.3d 607, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1997). These materials, known as opinion work product, "are entitled to special protection and require a stronger showing of necessity to justify release . . . although the precise contours of this showing have not been resolved." Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 439 (D.D.C. 1983) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) and Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-01 (1981)). See also In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
In reviewing documents claimed to be protected by the work-product privilege, the court must determine "whether, in light of the nature of the document or the factual situation in a particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). See also Nesse v. Pittman, 202 F.R.D. 344, 349 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). As I have previously noted, "the concept of 'in anticipation of litigation' contains two related, but nevertheless distinct, concepts. One is temporal. The other is motivational." Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 181, 189 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 314).
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege
In this Circuit, "the attorney-client privilege is narrowly circumscribed to shield from disclosure only those communications from a client to an attorney made in confidence and for the purpose of securing legal advice." Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 204 (D.D.C. 1998). See also Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 618; In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The privilege extends to "communications from attorneys to their clients if the communications 'rest on confidential information obtained from the client'" and therefore tends to disclose it. Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 618 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 99 and citing Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 (D.C. Cir.1977)).
I have summarized my rulings in the following charts. The first chart indicates the abbreviations I have utilized when determining whether each document is protected by the privilege or privileges defendant has asserted. The second chart contains my ...