The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROYCE LAMBERTH, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's motion for
judgment of affirmance [10] of the Commissioner's denial of
benefits, plaintiff's opposition and defendant's reply thereto.
Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, the
administrative record, and the entire record herein, defendant's
motion will be GRANTED.
I. Procedural Posture and Administrative Record
On August 2, 1996, plaintiff filed an application for
disability insurance benefits in which he claimed to have become
disabled and unable to work on July 21, 1996. (Administrative
Record "AR" at 84.) Plaintiff further claimed that he remained
disabled at the time in which he filed his application. (Id.)
On the same date, plaintiff filed a "Disability Report" in which
he claimed that his "severe lower back pain . . . prevents any
sitting or standing for over a period of 15 minutes" and as such,
prevented him from working. (Id. at 155.) On September 18,
1997, the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), Office of
Disability and International Operations notified plaintiff that his application for Social Security
disability benefits was denied. (Id. at 32.) On October 6,
1997, plaintiff notified defendant of his request for a
reconsideration of this decision. (Id. at 35.) In his request
for reconsideration, plaintiff identified "chronic back pain
deterioration" as his reason for requesting a reconsideration,
while also asserting that he has "persistent muscle back spasms,
limitations in bending, sitting and standing for long periods . . .
spinal disk deterioration." (Id. at 38.) After an independent
reconsideration, plaintiff was notified on April 12, 1998 that
his initial denial of Social Security benefits was affirmed and
that he does "not meet the disability requirements of the law."
(Id. at 40-41.) The letter also noted that upon
reconsideration, the SSA found that plaintiff's "remaining
physical capacities are consistent with the physical demands of
several jobs that [plaintiff has] held in the relevant past such
as car salesman and driver." (Id. at 41.)
Plaintiff again disagreed with the decision of the SSA and in a
letter dated May 7, 1998, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Id. at 43.) Because
plaintiff resides in Panama, he also waived his right to appear
at this hearing, and requested that a decision be rendered on the
evidence. (Id. at 46, 24.) At the hearing, Judge Jan K.
Michalski implemented the five-step sequential process as set for
at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 in determining whether plaintiff was
disabled and thereby eligible for Social Security disability
benefits. (Id. at 25.) In making the determination, the ALJ
relied upon the diagnosis of Dr. Alfredo DuBois, M.D., who
conducted a consultative orthopaedic evaluation of plaintiff on
June 9, 1997. (Id.) Dr. DuBois diagnosed plaintiff with, among
other things, "low back pain and limited back motion related to
L4-L5 bulging disc, L5-S1 HNP, and L4-L5 and L5-S1 degenerative
joint disease; left ankle pain. . . ." (Id. at 26.) Dr. DuBois
also concluded that plaintiff "could sit for 6 hours out of an 8 hour work day, and he could walk for 1 hour at a time and a
total of 3 hours in work day, and he could stand for 2 hours at a
time and a total of 4 hours out of an 8 hour work day . . ."
(Id. at 26.) The ALJ then determined that plaintiff "did not
have significant limitations in his ability to do basic work
related activities such as light lifting and carrying, as well as
moving his head and neck in jobs with the option to sit or stand
to suit his comfort, on July 21, 1996, and through the date of
the decision." (Id. at 27.) Accordingly, on August 3, 1998, the
ALJ then found that plaintiff "was not under a `disability,' as
defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from July 21,
1996 to the date of this decision . . . [and] is not entitled to
a period of disability or disability insurance under Sections
216(i) and 223, respectively, of the Social Security Act." (Id.
at 31.)
On September 28, 1998, plaintiff requested an appeal and review
of the ALJ's decision. (Id. at 49.) Upon consideration of the
appeal, the SSA, Office of Hearings and Appeals remanded the case
back to the ALJ to "mark and number the evidence as exhibits," as
well as to "consider [plaintiff's] other jobs, in addition to the
job of truck driver, in determining he can perform past relevant
work . . . [in addition to further evaluating plaintiff's
subjective complaints and [providing] rationale reflecting that
the factors in 20 C.F.R. 404.1529 were addressed." (Id. at 69.)
On remand to the ALJ, plaintiff again waived his right to
appear and testify, and requested that a decision be made on the
evidence in the record. (Id. at 11.) Furthermore, plaintiff
chose to proceed with a hearing without a representative. (Id.)
Utilizing the same five-step process, the ALJ relied upon medical
records from the Department of Veterans Affairs for the time
period of October 1969 through August 8, 1996 the time in which
plaintiff served in the military. (Id. at 13.) In these
records, the ALJ noted that on July 19, 1996, plaintiff had complained of low back pain for thirteen years. The ALJ also
again relied upon the diagnosis from Dr. DuBois, who noted that
plaintiff would "have minimal symptoms providing he is not
involved in strenuous activities involving the back and left
ankle." (Id.)
The ALJ then reviewed the diagnosis of Dr. Jaime A. Jaspe C.,
an orthopedics and traumatology surgeon, who noted that plaintiff
had "chronic back pain for over 9 years and [an] X-Ray performed
in December of 1997 showed arthosis sign [sic]." (Id. at 14.)
Dr. Jaspe C. noted that periods of long driving will produce more
pain and more disability for plaintiff. (Id.)
The ALJ then analyzed plaintiff's allegations of pain and other
subjective symptoms in finding them not entirely credible.
(Id.) In making this determination, the ALJ relied on the
findings of Dr. DuBois who suggested "that claimant does not
experience debilitating pain when performing less strenuous
activities as reflected in the established residual functional
capacity." (Id. at 15.) The ALJ further noted that "[t]he
validity of Dr. DuBois report is supported by the findings of the
Disability Determination Services' medical consultant who
reviewed the evidence and found that claimant retains the
residual functional capacity of light level work." (Id.) In
concluding, the ALJ determined that plaintiff retained the
residual functional capacity to perform the "actual functional
demands and job duties of his past relevant security guard job,
as it is ordinarily performed in the national economy, and as the
[plaintiff] actually performed that job." (Id. at 16.) As a
result, the ALJ therefore determined on October 24, 2001 that
plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. (Id. at 16.)
On May 1, 2003, the SSA denied plaintiff's request for an
appeal of the ALJ's decision. Dissatisfied with this result,
plaintiff filed this instant suit on June 30, 2003.
II. Analysis 1. Applicable Law
The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of any
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration after a hearing to which she was a party.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, the court is to give deference to the
Commissioner's findings: if they are supported by substantial
evidence, they are to be treated as conclusive. Id. The Supreme
Court has defined "substantial evidence" in this context as "more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971),
quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938). To determine whether the Commissioner's decision is
supported by substantial evidence, the Court must "carefully
scrutinize the entire record." Davis v. Heckler,
566 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.D.C. 1983). The Court may not reweigh the evidence
and "replace the [Commissioner's] judgment regarding the weight
and validity of the evidence with its own." Davis,
566 F. Supp. at 1195. "[B]ecause the broad purposes of the Social Security Act
require a liberal construction in favor of disability, the Court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
claimant. This way, the Court can give effect to the remedial
purposes of the Social Security Act." Davis v. Shalala,
862 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
The Social Security Act defines disability as the
inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The inability to engage in substantial
gainful activity includes the inability to perform the claimant's previous ...