The opinion of the court was delivered by: GLADYS KESSLER, District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt #62] and Defendant's Second Renewed
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment or
to Transfer (Def.'s Mot.") [Dkt. #61]. Having considered the
Motions, the Oppositions, the Replies, the entire record in this
case, and the applicable case law, the Court will deny both
Plaintiff is a federal prisoner who has been in the custody of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") since 1981. Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint ("Sec. Amd. Compl."), ¶ 4; Def.'s Mot.,
Ex. 1 ("Montemayor Dep.") at 4. He brings this action against BOP
under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Sec. Amd. Compl., ¶ 2.
Since 1993, BOP's records have designated Plaintiff an
associate of a Security Threat Group ("STG" or "STG group")
because of his alleged affiliation with a prison gang.*fn1
Sec. Amd. Compl., ¶ 7; Pl.'s Facts, Ex. 6 (Wilford Dep.) at 75.*fn2 Plaintiff
consistently has denied any gang association, and asserts that
BOP's records pertaining to him in this regard are entirely
false. See Sec. Amd. Compl., ¶¶ 6-8, 13.
Plaintiff alleges that BOP's reliance on the false records of
gang association "began a pattern of regularly isolating
[Plaintiff] in administrative detention," including confinement
in a small cell, severe restrictions on activities, and
restrictions on access to his personal property.*fn3 Sec.
Amd. Compl., ¶ 9. These periods of administrative detention, he
alleges, caused substantial stress and has adversely affected his
health.*fn4 Id., ¶¶ 14-15. In particular, Plaintiff
remains concerned that actual members of the gang will retaliate
against him. Id., ¶ 16.
In 2002, BOP determined that the STG designation was not
warranted. Sec. Amd. Compl., ¶ 20. Although BOP stated that it
would remove the STG designation from its records pertaining to
Plaintiff, the agency allegedly continues to maintain and rely
upon false records of gang association. Id., ¶ 21. Consequently, Plaintiff has been placed
in administrative detention on other occasions solely on the
basis of the alleged gang affiliation, and has been transferred
from one BOP facility to another. Id., ¶¶ 22-23. Such
treatment, Plaintiff alleged, constitutes a "continuing pattern
of harassment . . . that has gone on for over a decade." Id., ¶
In this action, Plaintiff demands, among other relief, monetary
damages and amendment or expungement of the inaccurate records.
Sec. Amd. Compl., ¶ 33.
With regard to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, a complaint should not be
dismissed unless the "`plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'"
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.2d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-45 (1957)). In
deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must "accept the
plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construe the
complaint `liberally,' `grant[ing] plaintiff? the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'"
Browning, 292 F.3d at 235 (quoting Kowal v. MCI Communications
Corp., 16 F.2d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
For a motion to transfer, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that
"[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
Section 1404(a) vests "discretion in the district court? to
adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized,
case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness."
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27 (internal citations omitted). The
moving party bears the burden of establishing that the transfer
of the action to another federal district is proper. See Shenandoah Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v.
Tirana, 182 F. Supp.2d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2001).
Finally, with regard to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, such
dispositive motions may be granted if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material
fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). When evaluating a summary judgment motion,
"[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge." Id. at 255; Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The
party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but . . . must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248;
see also, Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett &
Dunner, 101 F.2d 145, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
III. DEFENDANT'S SECOND RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR ...