The opinion of the court was delivered by: HENRY KENNEDY JR., District Judge
Presently before the Court is the motion for summary judgment
brought on behalf of the District of Columbia and Adrienne
Poteat.*fn1 Upon consideration of the parties' submissions
and the entire record, the Court will grant the motion and
dismiss the case.*fn2
The relevant complaint allegations are as follows. On July 17,
2000, plaintiff sustained a hernia after being forced to carry
300 pounds of property from one cell block to another.
Correctional officers acting under the direction of a "supervisor
[who] said Poteat said drag his ass in the cell" then grabbed
plaintiff's wrists and ankles and "dragged my back and buttock
across the recreation upstairs floor until they got to cell
three." Amended Complaint at 5-6. Plaintiff was hollering and
"screaming all the way to the cell from the grapefruit size knot
poking out of my p[e]lvic area." Id. at 6. Plaintiff was left
in his cell for five hours while he "yelled, screamed for help and medical care and treatment." Id. Two
corrections officers failed to respond even after a member of the
prison medical staff informed them that plaintiff needed
emergency medical treatment. Id. Plaintiff received medical
treatment at D.C. General Hospital for a ruptured hernia only
after having "crawled from the top [tier] on my hands and knees
with handcuffs on and leg irons[,] pass inmates and their
visitor[s] in the down stairs recreation area, out the front gate
to the van." Id. at 7. Upon his return from the hospital,
plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation where he "was
never given a shower, no clean clothes, no property, no
medication for pain and [] was neglected by the correctional
staff." Amended Complaint at 9. Plaintiff seeks $3 million in
damages.
The Court should grant summary judgment in favor of a party if
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In determining a motion for summary
judgment, the court may assume that facts identified by the
moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted,
unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine
issues filed in opposition to the motion." LCvR 7(h). The Court
must view the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and
believe and give benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from
the nonmoving party's evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). As a general rule, "[i]n
deciding whether there is a genuine issue of fact before it, the
court must assume the truth of all statements proffered by the
party opposing summary judgment." Greene v. Dalton,
164 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999). "If material facts are at issue, or,
though undisputed, are susceptible to divergent inferences, summary
judgment is not available." Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Alveska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United
States Envtl. Protection Agency, 856 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir.
1988)). Material facts are those "that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law." Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248.
Defendants assert that the federal claim, brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, is barred because plaintiff did not exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing this action, as is required
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Act states that:
[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). It "applies to all inmate suits about
prison life. . . ." Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 532,
122 S.Ct. 983, 992 (2002), without regard to the availability of an
administrative remedy. Booth v. Churner,
532 U.S. 731, 741,
121 S.Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001). A prisoner's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies requires dismissal of the case without
prejudice to refiling after he has done so. Jackson v. District
of Columbia,
254 F.3d 262, 270-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Defendants have provided the applicable administrative
grievance procedures. See Defendants' Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at
4-5 (citing Exhibit 3 Department Order 4030.1D (May 4, 1992)).
The procedures require a prisoner first to attempt to resolve the
dispute or complaint informally. If he is unsuccessful, he must
file a formal grievance "pertain[ing] to one specific incident,
charge, or complaint" within 15 days of the incident "by
completing IGP Form 1." Department Order at 4 ¶ F2. The
institution is required to provide a written response within 15
days from its receipt of the grievance or the prisoner may proceed to the next step. Id.
at 5. An inmate has five days from his receipt of the
institution's response to appeal to the associate director and
five days from his receipt of the associate director's decision
to appeal to the director. "The Director shall be the final level
of appeal for each inmate who files a grievance in the
[Department of Corrections]." Id. at 6 ¶ G6. Plaintiff asserts
that he filed a timely grievance, but his evidence, a receipt, is
of dubious value insofar as it does not describe or in any way
identify an incident.*fn3 See Plaintiff's Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1. Moreover,
defendants have proffered the Affidavit of William Meeks (Exhibit
4), who states that the Department of Corrections has "no records
of a grievance appeal" from plaintiff concerning the alleged
events. Meeks Aff't. ¶ 8. Plaintiff has not refuted this evidence
and therefore has failed to create a genuine issue of material
fact on the exhaustion question. See Defendants' Statement of
Material Facts Not in Dispute ¶¶ 12-15 (citing record). Based on
the unrefuted evidence establishing that plaintiff did not
exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court must dismiss the
federal claim. Jackson v. District of Columbia,
254 F.3d at 270-71.
Plaintiff asserts that his "common law tort claims can
proceed." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
at 3. Those claims, however, are neither specifically pleaded in
the amended complaint nor identified in the opposition to the
pending motion. In light of the dismissal of the federal claim,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
local law claims.*fn4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). For the preceding reasons, defendants' motion for summary
judgment is granted based on the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. A separate order dismissing the case in
its entirety accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
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