The opinion of the court was delivered by: RICARDO URBINA, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER
The plaintiff, Katease Devaughn, brings suit against the
defendant, Inphonic, Inc. ("Inphonic"), alleging that the
defendant fired her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the
federal Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
The defendant moves to transfer the action to the District of
Maryland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because the plaintiff
could have originally brought this case in the district court in
Maryland and because considerations of convenience and the
interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer, the court grants
the defendant's motion and transfers this action to the District
The defendant is an online provider of wireless services with
its principal place of business in the District of Columbia. Am.
Compl. ¶ 2; Def.'s Mot. to Transfer ("Def.'s Mot.") at 1 & Ex. 1
("Haithcock Aff."). The defendant also has an office in Largo,
Maryland. Def.'s Mot. at 1. The plaintiff is a Largo, Maryland resident who was
employed in the defendant's Largo office as a Credit Activations
Specialist from November 2001 to February 21, 2005. Am. Compl. ¶¶
1, 3; Def.'s Mot. at 1. In her amended complaint, the plaintiff
claims that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis
of race and wrongfully terminated her for taking approved medical
leave between February 15, 2005 and February 21, 2005. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 4, 6-9. The defendant denies the plaintiff's claims and argues
that it lawfully terminated the plaintiff for insubordination.
Ans. at 3; Haithcock Aff. ¶ 9.
During her employment with the defendant, the plaintiff worked
exclusively at the Largo office and her personnel records remain
in Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 6, 10. The plaintiff's supervisor at the
time of her termination, J.D. Darby, resides in Maryland. Id. ¶
11. The plaintiff's supervisor prior to Darby, James Reed,
currently resides in Virginia. Haithcock Aff. ¶ 12.
In June, 2005, the plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with
the Prince George's County Human Relations Commission in which
she listed the defendant's address as 9301 Peppercorn Place,
Largo, Maryland. Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Transfer
("Def.'s Reply") at Ex. 1 at 2. The plaintiff does not allege
that she filed any similar claim in the District of Columbia
Office of Human Rights.
In May 2005, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior
Court for the District of Columbia in which she asserted that the
defendant violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and
the District of Columbia Family and Medical Leave Act. Compl. ¶¶
12, 15. On June 22, 2005, the plaintiff amended her complaint to
substitute those causes of action with claims that the defendant
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the federal Family and Medical
Leave Act. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15. The defendant removed the action to
this court and subsequently moved to transfer the case to the
District of Maryland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Not. of
Rem.; Def.'s Mot. at 1. The court now considers the motion to
A. Legal Standard for Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and
Transfer to Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
When federal jurisdiction is not premised solely on diversity,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) controls venue, establishing that venue is
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides,
if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a
judicial district in which any defendant may be
found, if there is no district in which the action
may otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
In an action where venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
nonetheless authorizes a court to transfer the action to any
other district where it could have been brought "for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) vests
"discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions to
transfer according to [an] individualized, case-by-case
consideration of convenience and fairness." Stewart Org., Inc.
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). Under this ...