United States District Court, D. Columbia
December 20, 2005.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/Respondent,
DANA ANDRE TINNEN, Defendant/Movant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: THOMAS HOGAN, Chief District Judge
Defendant has filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In response, the United
States moves to transfer the case to the jurisdiction where
defendant is confined, the District of Maryland.
Defendant's motion alleges that on September 22, 1995, in
United States District Court, he was sentenced to 12 months
imprisonment. Following the service of eight months of this
sentence, defendant was transferred to the custody of the
District of Columbia for prosecution on a manslaughter charge. On
March 7, 1997, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
sentenced defendant to an imprisonment term of five to fifteen
Because defendant had not completed his District Court sentence
prior to being released to the custody of the District of
Columbia, the United States Marshals Service lodged a detainer
against defendant. In his motion, defendant requests that the
Court remove the detainer to enable him to complete his District
Court sentence before serving the remainder of his sentence for
manslaughter. He alleges that the detainer has resulted in the
miscalculation of his sentence and retarded his halfway house
The United States contends that the Court should construe
defendant's motion as one for habeas relief. Habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for
a federal prisoner bringing a claim that would have a
"probabilistic impact" upon the duration of his custody.
Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(en banc); see also Bourke v. Hawk-Sawyer, 269 F.3d 1072, 1073
(D.C. Cir. 2001). In his motion, defendant is essentially
challenging an adverse calculation of his sentence. Since
defendant's claim, if successful, would result in the reduction
of his sentence, he can only seek relief through a habeas
petition. Razzoli v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371,
374-76 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Habeas corpus jurisdiction resides only in the district court
where the prisoner is incarcerated. Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). The warden where the prisoner resides is
the custodian for purposes of habeas jurisdiction. Stokes v.
U.S. Parole Comm'n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 125 S.Ct. 448 (2004); Blair-Bey v. Quick,
151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Defendant is currently incarcerated in Annapolis Junction,
Maryland. This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over this
matter. The United States' motion will be granted and the case
transferred to the District of Maryland.
A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
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