Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (CA-00-9035 (RP)) (Hon. Steffen W. Graae, Trial Judge).
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kramer, Associate Judge
Before GLICKMAN, RUIZ and KRAMER, Associate Judges.
This appeal involves a challenge to the trial court's grant of summary judgment in a tax foreclosure action which revoked the court's prior default judgment in favor of the appellant. Since we find that the trial court correctly applied the law in its summary judgment order, we affirm.
This appeal involves real property located in the District of Columbia at 1245 13th Street, #608, Northwest ("the property"). Thomas Browner became owner of this property on March 22, 1995, and subsequently defaulted on his property taxes. As a result, the District of Columbia placed a tax lien on the property on October 1, 1996. The District later sold the lien to District TLC Trust, which in turn filed this foreclosure action against Browner in Superior Court on December 15, 2000. During the pendency of the case, District TLC Trust sold its interest in the property to the appellant, 13th Street, NW #608 Trust. All parties with an interest in the property were duly notified of the foreclosure action. After none of the interested parties responded to the court, the appellant filed an unopposed motion for default judgment which was granted on June 4, 2003.
Meanwhile, Browner entered into a contract for sale of the property with the appellee, Edward Anderson, on January 28, 2003, prior to the default judgment entered in favor of the appellant.*fn1 Browner executed the deed to the property in favor of the appellee on August 28, 2003. Anderson had no actual notice of the tax foreclosure when he entered into the contract to purchase the property and only became aware of the action after the deed was conveyed. Once the appellee discovered the foreclosure action, he filed a motion to intervene in the matter on January 21, 2004. The motion to intervene was granted and simultaneously the previous default judgment was vacated.
After the appellant rejected Anderson's repeated attempts to redeem the property, Anderson filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted on July 29, 2004. In its order, the trial court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion, finding that Anderson had come into ownership of the property on the date he had entered into the contract for sale with Browner, thereby rejecting the appellant's argument that title only passed once the deed was conveyed. The trial court found that there was a "valid, enforceable sales contract to convey the property," and also that the appellant was bound to accept Anderson's payment for redemption of the property.
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because lis pendens*fn2 defeats the application of equitable conversion. First, the appellant claims that the contract for sale between Anderson and Browner was void and therefore unenforceable. Since the appellant did not raise this argument in the trial court, we will not consider this claim on appeal. See, e.g., Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 388 (D.C. 2005) ("[A]rguments not raised in the trial court are ordinarily waived on appeal.") (citing Hollins v. Fannie Mae, 760 A.2d 563, 572 (D.C. 2000)).
Second, the appellant contends that the mere filing of the foreclosure action in this case triggered lis pendens protection, which defeated Anderson's claim to the property based on equitable conversion. We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See, e.g., Jane W. v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown College, 863 A.2d 821, 825 (D.C. 2004) ("In reviewing a trial court's order granting summary judgment, we conduct an independent review of the record, and our standard of review is the same as the trial court's standard in considering the motion for summary judgment."). Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is "no genuine issue of material fact and [the moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Childs v. Purll, 882 A.2d 227, 233 (D.C. 2005). In considering summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. LaPrade v. Rosinsky, 882 A.2d 192, 196 (D.C. 2005).
The doctrine of equitable conversion "follow[s] from the view that equity regards as having been done that which ought to be done, and which equity would order done . . . ." ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.13 (2d Ed. 1993). Common law equitable conversion "views a contract of sale as immediately vesting the purchaser with beneficial ownership of the realty, and limiting the property interest of the vendor to the promised consideration . . . retaining legal title only as trustee for the purchaser until the deed of conveyance is delivered." Gustin v. Stegall, 347 A.2d 917, 922 (D.C. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976)]. See CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK & WHITMAN § 10.13 ("[O]nce the parties have entered into a contract that equity would specifically enforce, the buyer's interest in the contract is converted into real estate and the seller's interest into personal property."). Equitable conversion has long been recognized and applied in the District of Columbia. See Lenman v. Jones, 33 App. D.C. 7, 23 (1909), aff'd, 222 U.S. 51 (1911); see also SMS Assocs. v. Clay, 868 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D.D.C. 1994) ("The District of Columbia both recognizes and adheres to the doctrine of equitable conversion.") (citing Liberty Nat'l Bank of Washington v. Smoot, 135 F. Supp. 654, 659 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 77, 70 F.3d 638 (1995); Gustin, supra, 347 A.2d at 922-923; District of Columbia v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 335 A.2d 238, 243 n.7 (D.C. 1975).
Equitable conversion was appropriately applied in this case. Ownership of the property passed from Browner, the former owner, to the appellee when they entered into the sales contract on January 28, 2003, in accordance with the well-settled law of this jurisdiction. This transaction occurred prior to the default judgment in the foreclosure case on June 4, 2003, which would have taken good title away from Browner. The doctrine of equitable conversion thus dictates that the ...