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Johnson v. Lewis

September 19, 2006

KENNETH W. JOHNSON, PLAINTIFF,
v.
STACEY LEWIS ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Richard W. Roberts United States District Court

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se plaintiff Kenneth W. Johnson has filed an action against several individuals and a law firm, alleging violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, legal malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Each defendant*fn1 has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.*fn2 Because Johnson does not state a claim under the civil rights statutes, those claims will be dismissed, and supplemental jurisdiction of the state law claims will be declined under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

BACKGROUND

Johnson, a man of mixed racial ancestry who alleges that he "looks either Caucasian/European or predominately Caucasian/ European" (Am. Compl. at 6), complains because none of the defendants, all attorneys, agreed to represent him in his pursuit of legal remedies relating to matters that occurred in 1997 when he was arrested, tried, and acquitted in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia.*fn3 On the basis of these refusals, he alleges race discrimination, legal malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

According to Johnson, he approached attorney Jesse Gadson in 2002 about filing a claim for post-judgment relief, but Gadson declined and directed Johnson to the public law section of the Library of Congress. (Am. Compl. at 40-41.) Johnson visited Gadson again sometime shortly before January 15, 2003, because Gadson had given him more time and more valuable information than had any other attorney Johnson had contacted. (Id. at 41.) On January 15, 2003, Gadson entered into a contract with Johnson for the limited purpose of "investigat[ing] the possibility of filing a law suit against the District of Columbia government." (Id. at 40, 50 (quoting agreement between Gadson and Johnson).) After conducting the agreed-upon investigation, and viewing additional materials at Johnson's request, Gadson again declined to represent Johnson, expressly because Gadson felt he did not have the experience necessary for the case.*fn4 (Id. at 44.)

According to the amended complaint, in September 2003, Johnson asked Tony Lee, an attorney and partner in the law firm McGuireWoods, LLP,*fn5 to "provide legal counsel on filing a motion to set aside the prior judgment in Johnson v. District of Columbia . . . C.A. 3837-98 before the Superior Court of the District of Columbia pursuant to [R]ule 60(b). . . . And asked Tony Lee to have the July 15, 1998 judgment vacated. He refused[]!" (Am. Compl. at 53.) The amended complaint recounts some of the advice Lee gave Johnson and his conclusion that Lee could not help Johnson in his efforts. (Id. at 53-54.) The facts Johnson alleges suggest that Lee made a contract with Johnson and, as agreed, provided legal counsel to him.

Johnson alleges that he spoke to attorney Elbert Shore on April 15, 2004, about Shore entering an appearance in an action Johnson had filed pro se three days earlier captioned Johnson v. Mance, asserting claims relating to events occurring in 1997 and another event occurring in 2004.*fn6 (Am. Compl. at 66.) Johnson alleges that he paid Shore a $75.00 consultation fee and presented Shore with the facts underlying the Mance action, that Shore asked and was told about Johnson's mixed racial ancestry, and that Shore refused to represent Johnson in the matter. (Id.)

Then, sometime in June 2004, Johnson attempted to engage the legal services of Harold N. Harmon and Robert F. Condon. Johnson "offered his [pending pro se] lawsuit against Robert Mance" to Harmon and Condon and told them of the facts in the case. (Id. at 62.) A motion to dismiss in that case had been filed on June 7, 2006. Harmon and Condon later sent Johnson a retainer agreement, but before the agreement reached Johnson, the case was dismissed. (Id.) After Johnson informed Harmon and Condon that the case had been dismissed, they responded in a letter: "Please be advised that we will not be able to represent you in your case that was dismissed by Judge Robertson in the U.S. District Court or in your current Motion for Summary Reversal filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." (Id.)

Johnson alleges that the defendants' refusals were racially discriminatory and deprived him of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. He also alleges that these same refusals constituted legal malpractice and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, in violation of state common law.

DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). A "complaint should not be dismissed unless plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief. . . . To that end, the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiffs' favor, and we grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. . . . However, the court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must the court accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

I. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS

A. Claim for discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Johnson alleges that all defendants violated § 1981 when they "refused to either make or enforce a contract with Johnson, because Johnson is a predominately Caucasian U.S. Citizen, who has scant physical evidence of any African blood or ancestry . . . ." (Am. Compl. at 6.) Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." Johnson claims that the black defendants ---- who are not identified ---- have discriminated against him because he appears white. (Am. Compl. at 6.) He also alleges that white defendants ---- who are not identified ---- have discriminated against him because although he appears white, they knew of his black ancestry. (Id.) The only defendant Johnson alleges knew of his black ancestry is Elbert Shore. (Id. at 66.)

Johnson infers race-based discrimination by all the defendants, but for each defendant, that inference enjoys no support from the facts Johnson pleads. First, Johnson alleges that he was perceived as a white citizen by all defendants except Shore, who knew of his black ancestry. (Am. Compl. at 6, 66.) White plaintiffs certainly may sue under § 1981. However, because § 1981 entitles all persons to the same contracting rights as are "enjoyed by white citizens," Johnson's allegations that defendants saw him as white and treated him like a white person because he is mostly white hardly states a claim grounded in some differential treatment based upon race that is cognizable under § 1981. See MacInstosh v. Building Owners & Managers Ass'n Intern., 355 F. Supp. 2d 223, 226 (D.D.C. 2005) (discussing how although a ...


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