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Gibson-Michaels v. Bair

May 3, 2007

YOLANDA C. GIBSON-MICHAELS, PLAINTIFF,
v.
SHEILA C. BAIR, CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., ET AL., DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ricardo M. Urbina United States District Judge

Document Nos. 8, 9, 14, 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS'MOTIONS TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

The pro se plaintiff alleges that she was subject to employment discrimination by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") based on her age, religion, disability, sex and race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.,the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.§§ 791 et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. In addition to the FDIC, the plaintiff names the Securiguard Corporation, the USEC Corporation, the Work Violence Research Institute, Douglas R. Fahey, and Jenika Johnson as defendants. With the exception of the FDIC and defendant Johnson, who has not been served, the defendants move to dismiss. Because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Securiguard Corporation, the USEC Corporation, the Work Violence Research Institute, and Fahey, the court grants their motions to dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is a 47 year old black female and a former information specialist employed by the FDIC. Compl. at 3. She alleges that the FDIC discharged herafter the agency engaged in a series of discriminatory acts and retaliated against her for filing complaints with the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission ("EEOC"). Id. at 3-4. The plaintiff claims that beginning in September, 2002, her supervisor began a pattern of discriminatory conduct. Id. at 10. Among other actions, the plaintiff alleges that her supervisor denied her a change in office space, refused to grant her leave under the FMLA, and ordered her to attend a baby shower. Id. at 10-12.

The plaintiff further alleges that on April 14, 2004, two interns at the FDIC informed her that $500.00 were stolen from the office. Id. at 12. The interns accused each other of the theft. Id. In response, the plaintiff quoted to them a verse from the Bible. Id. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, one of the interns, defendant Johnson, had a tape-recorder in her purse. Id. at 13. The plaintiff claims this taping was approved by FDIC management. Id.

Johnson complained that she felt threatened by the plaintiff. Id. As a result, the FDIC conducted an investigation. Id. Defendant Fahey was in charge of the investigation. Id. According to the plaintiff, Fahey is an employee of the USEC Corporation and Securiguard Corporation, which contract services with the FDIC. Id. at 5-6. The plaintiff states that she contacted defendant Work Violence Research Institute about the illegal taping of her conversation, but that it never responded. Id. at 6.*fn1

The plaintiff refused to attend an interview with Fahey or to otherwise cooperate in the investigation. Id. at 13. Her supervisor informed her that failure to cooperate in the investigation could result in disciplinary action against her. Id. at 13-14. The plaintiff then filed an EEOC complaint. Id. at 14. Thereafter, the plaintiff alleges that she was subject to retaliatory actions by her supervisor, including harassment, false allegations against her, and threats of physical harm. Id. at 19-24.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

In ruling on motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Taylor v. FDIC., 132 F.3d 753, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). "'Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test."' Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim

The defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). The defendants also assert that the plaintiff fails to state a valid discrimination claim ...


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