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Mata v. Elsie Whitlow Stokes Community Freedom P.C.S.

May 21, 2007

LUZ MATA, PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF C.M., A MINOR, PLAINTIFF,
v.
ELSIE WHITLOW STOKES COMMUNITY FREEDOM P.C.S., DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Rosemary M. Collyer United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case concerns attorneys' fees*fn1 for administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Counsel for plaintiff complain that the Elsie Whitlow Stokes Community Freedom Public Charter School ("Stokes PCS") has failed and refused to pay their reasonable attorneys' fees for prevailing at a due process hearing on February 25, 2003, and through a Hearing Officer Decision ("HOD") issued on March 3, 2003. Because Ms. Mata did not prevail, no attorneys' fees are due. The complaint will be dismissed.

I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

The IDEA seeks to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). As a condition of receiving funds under the Act, the IDEA requires that school districts adopt procedures to ensure appropriate educational placement of special needs students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413. Parents who object to their child's individualized education programs are entitled to an impartial due process hearing, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1), at which they have "a right to be accompanied and advised by counsel." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1).

Section 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA gives courts authority to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party," which includes the authority to award fees to a party who has prevailed in an administrative due process proceeding. See Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc); Armstrong v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 50, 52 (D.D.C. 2004). The amount of fees awarded is based "on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C)).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

C.M. was a ten-year-old 4th grader at the relevant time in 2002, at Stokes PCS in the District of Columbia. On July 30, 2002, a multi-disciplinary team ("MDT") met to develop an initial individual education plan ("IEP") for C.M.*fn2 Complaint Exh. 2, AR at 3. He had earlier gone through a psychological-educational evaluation, which recommended a neuropsychological evaluation for possible Asperger's Syndrome. Id. C.M. was classified by Stokes PCS as "Other Health Impaired" ("OHI") based on his suffering from Asperger's Syndrome. Ms. Mata contends that the MDT directed the parents to obtain the recommended neuropsychological evaluation on their own. Id. The parent requested a due process hearing under the IDEA on November 4, 2002, presenting the question of whether Stokes PCS "fail[ed] to comprehensively evaluate the child considering his psychological-educational evaluation dated June 27, 2002, [which] clearly recommended that a neurological evaluation be done." Id. at 4. Ms. Mata also sought compensatory education for C.M.

A hearing was convened on February 25, 2003, before Hearing Officer Lois Hochhauser. At some unspecified time prior to the hearing, the requested testing was conducted. Id., AR at 11 (Hearing Officer directing consideration of the existing neurological report). At the hearing, the only issue presented was whether C.M. had been properly classified as OHI, based on suspected Asperger's Syndrome, instead of Learning Disabled ("LD") until the possible diagnosis was confirmed, if at all. Id., AR at 10.*fn3 The Hearing Officer agreed that it had been inappropriate to classify C.M. as health impaired without further testing and "conclude[d] that the designation of disability on the IEP was incorrect." Id., AR at 10-11.

Counsel for Ms. Mata "claim[ed] that this incorrect designation of disability automatically entitle[d] the student to compensatory relief." Id., AR at 11. The Hearing Officer rejected this claim and determined that she could not order compensatory relief "without some evidence that the student was denied services as a result of the incorrect designation and that the denial impacted on [sic] his special education program." Id., AR at 11. Therefore, as the Hearing Officer advised the parties during the hearing itself, she ordered the MDT/IEP team to reconvene to consider the neurological report and revise the IEP as needed. In addition, the Hearing Officer "direct[ed] that the parties discuss the student's entitlement to compensatory relief and develop a program if they agree on that entitlement. If they do not, the parent may seek a hearing on that issue." Id. AR at 11.

There is no indication in the record that Ms. Mata ever demanded a hearing on the issue of C.M.'s entitlement to compensatory relief.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Ms. Mata brings suit under the IDEA, a federal statute. As this case presents a question of federal law, this Court has original jurisdiction.

Defendant Stokes PCS moves this Court to dismiss the complaint filed by Ms. Mata for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted or, in the alternative, to enter summary judgment in its favor. A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless Ms. Mata can demonstrate no set of facts that supports her claim entitling her to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In evaluating the motion to dismiss, "the Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff[]." See Armstrong, 328 F.Supp.2d at 53 (citing Harris v. Ladner, 127 F.3d 1121, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). While the complaint is to be construed liberally, the Court need not accept factual inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Kowal v. MCI Commc'n Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

In the alternative, Stokes PCS moves this Court for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment is granted when " there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, all evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). There is no genuine issue of material fact where the relevant evidence in the record, taken as a whole, indicates that a reasonable ...


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