The opinion of the court was delivered by: John D. Bates United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Katharine Lagor and Timothy Lagor bring this products-liability action individually and on behalf of their minor daughter, Emily Grace Lagor, against defendant Eli Lilly and Company for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of Katharine Lagor's in utero exposure to diethylstilbestrol ("DES"). Both parties now move to transfer this action to a different venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). Plaintiffs seek transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, while defendants seek transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant defendant's motion and deny plaintiffs' motion, and accordingly this case will be transferred to the District of Rhode Island.
The parties agree as to the central facts relevant to the disposition of their respective motions to transfer. Plaintiffs reside in Seekonk, Massachusetts -- a town located approximately five miles from the Massachusetts-Rhode Island border. Plaintiff Katharine Lagor's mother, Barbara Fahey, also lives in Seekonk. While pregnant with Katharine, Fahey was prescribed DES by her physicians in Providence, Rhode Island. Fahey purchased DES at a pharmacy in Rumford, Rhode Island and ingested the drug at her home in Seekonk. Fahey gave birth to plaintiff Katharine Lagor in Providence, Rhode Island in 1955.*fn1 As a result of her embryonic DES exposure, Katharine allegedly sustained cervical incompetency and was rendered incapable of carrying a child to full term. Consequently, Katharine's daughter, Emily Grace Lagor, was born prematurely and now suffers from cerebral palsy.
Like her mother, Emily Grace Lagor was born in Providence, Rhode Island. All but one of the physicians identified as having diagnosed or treated Emily Grace and Katharine Lagor for their alleged DES-related injures are located in Rhode Island. Emily Grace has been hospitalized once in Boston, Massachusetts, and numerous times throughout Rhode Island. The operative facts of this case are thus connected to both the state of Rhode Island and the state of Massachusetts. Plaintiffs concede that this case has no connection to the District of Columbia "beyond that the Defendants conduct or have conducted significant business there." Pls.' Mot. to Transfer at 2.
28 U.S.C. §1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer any civil action to any other district where it originally might have been brought "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of justice." A party moving to transfer under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) bears the burden of establishing (1) that the plaintiff initially could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district, and (2) that considerations of convenience and the interests of justice weigh in favor of transfer. See Brannen v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 403 F. Supp. 2d 89, 92 (D.D.C. 2005); see also Trout Unlimited v. Dep't of Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996). Plaintiffs do not dispute that they could have brought this suit in the District of Rhode Island, nor do defendants dispute plaintiffs' contention that suit could have been filed in the District of Massachusetts. Subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue would be proper in both states. Because plaintiffs and defendants have both met the threshold requirement for transfer under §1404(a), the Court must assess whether either party has satisfied its burden of showing that considerations of convenience and the interests of justice support transfer to the District of Massachusetts or to the District of Rhode Island.
Section §1404(a) grants district courts broad discretion "to adjudicate motions to transfer according to 'an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.'" Stewart Org., Inc v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). Specifically, courts weigh a number of "private-interest" and "public-interest" factors in order to evaluate whether transfer is warranted in a particular case. Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16. The private-interest considerations include: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the defendant's choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses, but only to the extent that the witnesses may be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease of access to the sources of proof. Id. (citations omitted). The public-interest considerations include: (1) the transferee court's familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in adjudicating local controversies at home. Id.
A. Private-Interest Factors
Here, the private-interest factors weigh in favor of transfer to the District of Rhode Island. With respect to the first private interest factor -- the plaintiff's choice of forum -- courts have recognized that the deference generally given to a plaintiff's choice of forum is reduced when the chosen forum is not the plaintiff's home forum, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981); Boers v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 64, 65 (D.D.C. 2001), or when the chosen forum has "no factual nexus with the lawsuit," Schmid Labs., Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 654 F. Supp. 734, 737 (D.D.C. 1986). The showing a defendant must make to justify transfer is further diminished where transfer is sought to a "forum with which plaintiffs have substantial ties and . . . the subject matter of the lawsuit is connected." Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 17. Thus, in a DES case similar to this one, another judge in this district granted the defendant's motion to transfer from the District of Columbia both because the case was substantially connected to the transferee forum and because the District of Columbia had "no such connection" to the case. Thompson v. Eli Lilly and Co., Civ. A. No. 03-122, slip. op. at 5 (D.D.C. June 27, 2003). Just like in Thompson, the only link between the present case and the District of Columbia is that Eli Lilly has conducted significant business in the District. Plaintiffs Katharine and Emily Grace Lagor were born in Rhode Island, all but one of plaintiffs' physicians are located in Rhode Island, and Barbara Fahey purchased and was prescribed DES in Rhode Island. Because the District of Columbia was not plaintiffs' home forum to begin with -- nor the situs of any of the facts giving rise to this specific cause of action -- plaintiffs' initial choice of forum merits little deference.
Several district courts have also recently held that where a plaintiff herself seeks transfer, the plaintiff's "second or third choices of forum receive no deference." Health Discovery Corp. v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc., Civ. A. No. 06-260, 2007 WL 128283, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2007) (emphasis added); see also Tiffany v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., Civ. A. No. 06-2524, 2006 WL 2792868, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2006). Although the record does not disclose plaintiffs' motivations for initially filing suit in the District of Columbia and then requesting transfer to the District of Massachusetts four months later (rather than bringing suit in Massachusetts originally), the Supreme Court has warned against allowing parties to use motions to transfer as veiled means of forum shopping. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636 (stating that §1404(a) was intended as a "judicial housekeeping measure" rather than a "forum-shopping instrument"); see also Schmid Labs, 654 F. Supp. at 737 (stating that "the transfer provisions in the U.S. Code . . . were in part intended to prevent forum shopping"); Tiffany, 2006 WL 2792868, at *2 (denying plaintiffs' motion to transfer where filing suit in one jurisdiction and then moving to transfer was indicative of forum shopping). Regardless of whether, as defendants urge, plaintiffs' decision to sue in this district constituted a strategic attempt to avail themselves of the District of Columbia's "advantageous statute of limitations," see Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Transfer ("Def.'s Mem.") at 5, or reflected more practical concerns (such as the presence of plaintiffs' counsel here), this Court accords no weight to plaintiffs' second-choice forum.
The remaining private-interest factors likewise favor transferring the present action to the District of Rhode Island. First, there is a substantial nexus between defendants' forum choice and the facts of this case. As another member of this Court recently explained in Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., Civ. A. No. 06-1375, 2007 WL 1589496, at *2 (D.D.C. June 1, 2007), "the issues of whether the plaintiffs were exposed to Eli Lilly's product, the extent of the plaintiffs' injuries, and causation all center around Eli Lilly's sale of DES" -- a sale that, in this case, occurred in Rhode Island.
The third private-interest factor the Court considers -- where the claim arose -- also leans in favor of transfer to Rhode Island. Not only was the DES prescribed to Fahey in Rhode Island, but she also purchased the drug and gave birth to her daughter Katharine there as well. Both Katharine and Emily Grace Lagor received diagnoses and treatment for their alleged DES-related injuries almost exclusively in Rhode Island. Although plaintiffs claim that Fahey's ingestion of DES in Massachusetts serves to make Massachusetts the place of the plaintiffs' injuries, see Pls.' Mem. at 6, and thus the site where their claims arose, plaintiffs have failed to cite any case where the mere fact of DES ingestion in a state warranted transfer to that state. Rather, in all of the cases cited by plaintiffs, the site of ingestion was also the site of the DES prescription, purchase, and usually, the birth of the afflicted child. See Thompson, Civ. A. No. 03-122, slip op. at 2 (finding site where DES was prescribed, purchased, and ingested to be location giving rise to plaintiffs' claims); see also Dean, 2007 WL 1589496, at *3 (plaintiffs' claims arose in Massachusetts because the alleged prescription, purchase, and exposure to DES occurred in that state); Clayton v. Eli Lilly & Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2006) (operative events regarding DES claim include not only site of DES ingestion and in utero exposure, but also place where DES prescription was filled). Moreover, even though Massachusetts was the technical site of plaintiff Katharine Lagor's injuries, Rhode Island remains the place of plaintiff Emily Grace Lagor's injuries, since they occurred not during in utero DES exposure in Massachusetts, but from a premature birth in Rhode Island. Thus, the clear majority of the material events that constitute the factual basis of plaintiffs' claims occurred in Rhode Island.
While plaintiffs argue that the fourth private-interest factor -- the convenience of the parties -- warrants transfer to Massachusetts, the Court does not find this factor dispositive. By initially filing suit in the District of Columbia, plaintiffs made clear their willingness "to forego the convenience of a geographically nearby forum." Dean, 2007 WL 1589496, at *3. In addition, defendants correctly point out that plaintiffs' hometown of Seekonk, Massachusetts is actually fifty miles closer to the federal courthouse in Providence, Rhode Island than to their requested federal courthouse in Boston, Massachusetts. See Def.'s Mem. at 8. The Court further notes that the parties' desired forums are in relatively close proximity, thereby minimizing any inconvenience to plaintiffs that could result from a transfer to Rhode Island as opposed to a transfer to Massachusetts. Although both parties are represented by counsel in the District of ...