The opinion of the court was delivered by: Thomas F. Hogan Chief Judge
Pending before the Court are two motions filed by the defendant, The Cradle Society, Inc., the first of which requests that this case be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and the second of which seeks a protective order prohibiting the plaintiff, Dmitry Fasolyak, from conducting any discovery, presumably until the Court makes this determination about whether it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Also pending before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery and Alternative Motion to Compel Rule 26(f) Conference and Motion for Emergency Hearing, which requests that the Court enter an order permitting discovery to proceed immediately and compelling the defendant to attend a scheduling conference. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction but that jurisdiction may be appropriate in the United States District Court for the Northen District of Illinois. Accordingly, this case will be transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
This case is traveling a road to resolution that involves detours through multiple jurisdictions. The plaintiff is an individual who resides in Maryland and the defendant is a notfor-profit corporation incorporated in Illinois, which also is where its principal office is located. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. The plaintiff alleges that he and the defendant entered into a contract according to which the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a fee for consulting services to establish and coordinate an international adoption program in the Russian Federation for the purpose of placing Russian children with adoptive parents in the United States.*fn1 Compl. ¶¶ 8-11; Rule 16(b) Statement 1 (Plaintiff's Statement of Fact). The plaintiff claims that he set up an office in Moscow for the defendant, identified individuals the defendant could employ to process adoptions in Russia, and assisted to secure accreditation from the Russian government to authorize the defendant to conduct adoptions in that country, among other services performed. Rule 16(b) Statement 2. According to the plaintiff, however, after the Moscow office became operational the defendant engaged in a number of activities that were intended to "circumvent" the plaintiff "to avoid paying his fee" and otherwise interfere with his contract performance, which allegedly culminated in the defendant wrongfully terminating the contract and defaming the plaintiff. Id.; Compl. ¶¶ 92-100, 155.Accordingly, the plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant seeking (1) damages for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation (fraud and deceit), negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, (2) an injunction to prevent the defendant from further defaming or disparaging him, and (3) "a full accounting of the operations at the Moscow office and of defendant related to Russian adoptions." Compl. ¶¶ 101-166; Rule 16(b) Statement 3.
This is not the first jurisdiction where the plaintiff filed suit, however. The plaintiff originally filed a lawsuit against the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, asserting what appear to be the very same claims advanced in the present case. Fasolyak v. The Cradle Society, Inc., No. 06-CV-00622-AW, slip op. at 4 (D. Md. June 14, 2006). On June 15, 2006, Judge Alexander Williams, Jr. issued a Revised Memorandum Opinion in the Maryland case granting the defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and indicating the court's intent to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 1. Judge Williams determined that the contract's place of performance was Russia, the fact that the defendant sent letters, e-mails, and made telephone calls to the plaintiff in Maryland did not establish substantial contacts sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff failed to prove "to a sufficient degree" that the defendant was ever in Maryland, the acts that caused the alleged injuries occurred in Russia, "the technical fact that Maryland served as the place of contracting is not a sufficient contact . . . to have personal jurisdiction over the [d]efendant," and the other factors outlined in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), favored jurisdiction in Russia and weighed against the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the court in Maryland. Judge Williams ultimately concluded that "although a choice of law provision is not a part of the contacts analysis from International Shoe or Burger King, having a choice of law provision weighs in favor of giving jurisdiction over a case to the forum specified by the contract. Here, the parties have stipulated that the contract should be governed by the law of the state of Illinois, so Illinois would be a more appropriate forum to litigate this dispute." Fasolyak, No. 06-CV-00622-AW, at 12. At the plaintiff's request, however, the court eventually dismissed the case rather than transfer it. Meanwhile, the defendant reportedly filed a lawsuit against the plaintiff in an Illinois state circuit court alleging that the plaintiff failed to perform the contract as promised. Pl.'s Mem. of Law In Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 7-8 [hereinafter "Pl.'s Opp'n Br. ___"].
The case subsequently found its way to this Court on June 21, 2006, when the plaintiff essentially refiled his Complaint in this jurisdiction. The defendant responded to the instant lawsuit in the same fashion that it responded to the previous one filed in Maryland -- the defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that, like the federal district court in Maryland, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant "is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Illinois, its principal place of business is in the State of Illinois, and the Defendant does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the District of Columbia to establish personal jurisdiction." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 1. While the defendant's motion to dismiss was pending before this Court, the plaintiff secured two subpoenas from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois compelling witnesses to appear for depositions and produce specified documents. These subpoenas were the subject of the defendant's pending Motion for Protective Order, which seeks an order from the Court prohibiting all discovery. Def.'s Mot. for Protective Order 3. The plaintiff countered by filing a Motion to Compel Discovery and Alternative Motion to Compel Rule 26(f) Conference and Motion for Emergency Hearing, which, as is self evident, seeks an order compelling the defendant to engage in discovery. Pl.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Compel 1.
I. The Defendant's Motion To Dismiss
Because the question of personal jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry the resolution of which will, ipso facto, determine the outcome of the other pending discovery motions, the Court will address that issue first, as indeed it must given that "[j]urisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that the court's decision will bind them."*fn2
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a factual basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Crane v. New York Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). "In determining whether such a basis exists, factual discrepancies appearing in the record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff." Crane, 894 F.2d at 456. Because no evidentiary hearing was held, the plaintiff may carry his burden by making a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This prima facie showing must be premised on specific facts, however, and cannot be based on mere conclusory allegations. GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
The plaintiff avers that the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant pursuant to D.C. Code § 13-422 and specific jurisdiction pursuant to D.C. Code § 13-423, which is the District of Columbia's long-arm statute.*fn3 Compl. ¶ 3. In addition, in his opposition brief filed in response to the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiff argues that the Court also may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant "is doing business here," which presumably is a reference to D.C. Code § 13-334(a), a statute that appears to involve only service of process but courts have construed to confer general jurisdiction.*fn4 Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 10; El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 673 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ("D.C. Court of appeals) has construed § 13-334(a) to "'confer[ ] jurisdiction upon trial courts here over foreign corporations doing substantial business in the District of Columbia, even though the claim arose from a transaction which occurred elsewhere, and hence, outside the scope of the long-arm statute'" (quoting Guevara v. Reed, 598 A.2d 1157, 1159 (D.C. 1991))). The Court will address in turn each of the plaintiff's proffered bases for exercising personal jurisdiction.
Any argument that this Court may exercise general personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to D.C. Code § 13-422 is easily resolved. The statute provides that "[a] District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim for relief." D.C. Code § 13-422. Accord El-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 671-72. A review of the plaintiff's Complaint and Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss reveals no facts showing that the defendant is organized under the laws of the District of Columbia or maintains its principal place of business here. To the contrary, the plaintiff's Complaint and Memorandum of Law both concede that the defendant is organized under the laws of the state of Illinois and has its principal office there. Compl. ¶ 2; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 1. Furthermore, the plaintiff makes no mention of D.C. Code § 13-422 in its brief opposing the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, stating instead that "[t]he Court's jurisdiction is predicated . . . on the District of Columbia long-arm statute," which is D.C. Code § 13-423. As mentioned above, the plaintiff's only argument in favor of exercising general personal jurisdiction ...