The opinion of the court was delivered by: Alan Kay United States Magistrate Judge
Pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement  and Plaintiff's "Motion to Procede [sic] to Trail [sic] / Response to Court Order Filed May 9, 2007" , which the Court construes as an opposition to Defendants' Motion.
This case involves multiple claims asserted by Brent Singleton, a pro se plaintiff and veteran of the United States Army, against the Department of the Army and the Department of Veterans Affairs. According to documents supplied by the government as exhibits to their Motion, Plaintiff enlisted in the Army in January, 1985 and was honorably discharged in December, 1987. Plaintiff re-enlisted in the Army in October, 1989 and was honorably discharged again in May, 1993.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the present case on February 8, 2007. Plaintiff alleges that the Department of the Army: (1) "failed to grant Plaintiff a proper military retirement and discriminated against Plaintiff disallowing his rightful disability/retirement status;" (2) "failed to properly provide health care for the injuries sustained while on duty with the Army;" (3) "failed to respond to Superior Court case #03-2-11970-4 brought by Plaintiff;" and (4) "failed to comply with the Ten Year Rule" . Plaintiff further alleges that the Department of Veterans Affairs: (1) "discriminated against Plaintiff in failing to provide timely and effective treatments on the basis of his being court-martialed by the Army, were incompetent in their treatment, and committed medical malpractice in failing to properly diagnose and treat Plaintiff's injuries; and (2) failed to respond to Superior Court case #03-2-11970-4 . Plaintiff seeks $36,000,000 in damages, back pay from 1993 to the present, pre-judgment interest, attorney's fees and costs.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Plaintiff, as the party invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). Because subject matter jurisdiction involves the Court's power to hear Plaintiff's claims, the Court must give close scrutiny to Plaintiff's factual allegations. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those filed by an attorney. Haines v. Kramer, 404 U.S. 519, 596 (1972). A pro se plaintiff's complaint is to be construed liberally in his favor, and the Court will grant such a plaintiff "the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
A. Plaintiff's Retirement, Disability, and Back Pay Claims
Plaintiff alleges that the Department of the Army denied him retirement and disability benefits and that the Department of Veterans Affairs owes him back pay from 1993 to the present. Plaintiff is seeking, among other things, $36,000,000 in damages. While Plaintiff does not specify a jurisdictional basis for these claims in his Complaint, the Court will construe these allegations as claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1491, also referred to as the Big Tucker Act.
Section 1491(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over non-tort claims against the United States for which monetary damages are sought. The Little Tucker Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) further provides that the Court of Federal Claims and the United States District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction over non-tort claims against the United States in which the plaintiff's prayer for damages does not exceed $10,000. Read together, these statutes make clear that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over non-tort claims against the United States for which damages in excess of $10,000 are sought. In the present case, Plaintiff asserts non-tort claims for retirement and disability benefits and back pay against two agencies of the United States government and seeks far more than $10,000 in monetary damages. Therefore the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over these claims and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain them.
When an action is filed with a court that lacks jurisdiction, the court may, in the interest of justice, transfer the action to a court where the action could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Transfer of claims, rather than dismissal, is the appropriate remedy to cure a lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless the action was not timely filed with the original court, in which case a transfer would not be in the interest of justice. Danko v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp., 846 F.2d 366, 368-369. See also 17 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 111.52 (discussing situations in which transfer is not in the interest of justice).
The applicable statute of limitations is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), which provides that "[e]very civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues." For claims arising from a service member's discharge from the Army, such as claims for retirement pay and back pay, the statute of limitations begins to run when the discharge becomes final. Kendall v. Army Bd. for Corr. of Military Records, 996 F.2d 362, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A claim for disability benefits accrues at the time of discharge if the service ...