The opinion of the court was delivered by: John D. Bates United States District Judge
A large, concrete Latin cross has stood atop Mt. Soledad in San Diego, California for over fifty years. For almost the last twenty of those years, the cross and the veterans memorial of which it is now a part have been the subject of extensive litigation in the federal and state courts, as well as numerous legislative initiatives by local officials. Those legislative efforts shifted to the federal level in 2004, culminating in legislation through which the United States government first designated the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial as a national memorial honoring members of the U.S. Armed Forces, and then later acquired the Memorial. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, Div. J., Title I, § 116, 118 Stat. 2809, 3346 (Dec. 8, 2004); Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial Acquisition Act, Pub. L. No. 109-272, 120 Stat. 770 (Aug. 14, 2006) (hereinafter "the Act"). Immediately after the Act was signed into law, the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, Inc. ("JWV") filed suit in federal district court in California challenging under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment both the Act and the display of the cross by the Secretary of Defense ("the Secretary"), under whose control Congress placed the Memorial. Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2(c), 120 Stat. at 771.
As part of their discovery efforts in that challenge, JWV served subpoenas on the Office of General Counsel of the House of Representatives seeking nine categories of documents in the possession or control of United States Representatives Duncan Hunter, Brian Bilbray, and Darrell Issa, the three southern California Congressmen who had sponsored the Act. All three Congressmen (collectively "the Members") lodged objections to the subpoenas, contending primarily that the documents requested were irrelevant to the JWV plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claims and that some of the production sought was barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Following unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute, JWV filed in this court motions to compel each of the Members to produce the requested documents. The Members, joined by the Secretary (who is the named defendant in the California litigation), oppose the motions, a hearing on which was held on July 31, 2007. After careful consideration of the pre- and post-hearing filings, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part JWV's motions to compel.
A. History of the Mt. Soledad Litigation and Legislation
The history of the Mt. Soledad cross dates to 1916 and has been recounted in the various judicial opinions resolving legal challenges to the cross. See, e.g., Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (9th Cir. 1993); Paulson v. Abdelnour, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 580-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). A truncated account of the relevant events since 1952, and particularly the events that have occurred during the course of the recent litigation, will suffice for present purposes. The current concrete cross was constructed by the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association ("MSMA") and was dedicated to the veterans of World Wars I and II and the Korean War on Easter Sunday in 1954. Since that time, the cross has been the setting for annual Easter Sunday services, as well as weddings and baptisms. At least one local map formerly referred to the location as the Mt. Soledad Easter Cross. JWV Mem. in Support of Mot. to Compel ("JWV Mem."), Exh. A (2006 Calif. Compl.) ¶¶ 17-19.
Things began to change in 1989 when a private citizen sued the City of San Diego in federal court, alleging that the cross's presence on city property violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the "No Preference" Clause of the California Constitution. While the suit was pending, the MSMA installed a marker identifying the location as a veterans memorial, and later altered the existing structure by installing a large American flag, adding bollards that honor community and veterans groups, and erecting six concentric walls that hold approximately 1,800 plaques engraved with the names and photographs of individual veterans. JWV Mem. at 3; Id., Exh. A at ¶ 20. These changes did not, however, stave off adverse legal rulings. The district court in 1991 held that the display of the cross on public land violated the California Constitution and ordered the cross removed. Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D. Cal. 1991). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, describing the cross as "[a] sectarian war memorial [that] carries an inherently religious message and creates an appearance of honoring only those servicemen of that particular religion." Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1518. The City responded by attempting to sell the land under the cross to the MSMA. This effort was the first of what turned out to be multiple maneuvers designed to cure the constitutional infirmity while retaining the Mt. Soledad cross. The effort failed, however, when the district court invalidated the sale as directed at preserving a religious symbol and thus impermissibly showing a government preference for religion. Murphy v. Bilbray, Civ. A. Nos. 90-134, 89-820, 1997 WL 754604, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997). A second attempt to sell the land to the MSMA was struck down by the en banc Ninth Circuit on similar grounds in 2002. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1132-33.
Following these legal setbacks, the City in late 2004 came close to entering into a settlement agreement pursuant to which the cross would be moved to a nearby church and would be replaced at the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial with a non-sectarian symbol. Veterans groups and the MSMA supported the proposed settlement, and voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have allowed the City once again to sell the land containing the cross to a private party. Nevertheless, the City never officially entered into the agreement. JWV Mem., Exh. A ¶ 31. During the same period, groups that supported the display of the cross on public land began to seek federal intervention. The Thomas More Law Center ("TMLC") sent a letter to Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham the week after the unsuccessful ballot initiative. In that letter, the TMLC requested that Congressman Cunningham secure federal legislation declaring the Mt. Soledad cross a national war memorial. Id. ¶ 35. Cunningham attempted to do so less than a month later when he attached to an omnibus appropriations bill a rider that (1) designated the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial as a national war memorial, (2) authorized the Department of Interior to accept the Memorial as a donation from the City, and (3) directed the National Park Service to enter into a memorandum of understanding with the MSMA for maintaining and administering the Memorial. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, Div. J., Title I, § 116, 118 Stat. 2809, 3346 (Dec. 8, 2004) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note). The federal legislation placed the matter back in the hands of the City, which had to decide whether to donate the cross to the U.S. government. After initially voting against donation in March of 2005, the City Council decided to put the issue to a public referendum, known as "Proposition A." JWV Mem., Exh. A ¶¶ 40-44. Proposition A passed at a special election held in July of 2005. Id. ¶ 44. In October of that year, however, a California state court struck down the referendum as unconstitutional under the California Constitution. Id. ¶ 48.
While the expedited appeal of that ruling was pending, activity shifted once again to federal fora. The California district judge who had overseen the seventeen years of federal litigation entered an order in May of 2006 enforcing the original permanent injunction, such that the City had to remove the cross from public land within ninety days or face fines of $5,000 per day. Id. ¶ 50. After the Ninth Circuit denied a request for a stay, the City sought relief in the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Kennedy, acting as Circuit Justice, granted the stay. San Diegans for the Mr. Soledad Nat'l War Mem'l v. Paulson, 548 U.S. --, 126 S.Ct. 2856 (2006) (Kennedy, J., in chambers). He reasoned that "Congress' evident desire to preserve the memorial" (as expressed in the 2004 legislation), along with a pending state-court appeal that could validate the transfer outright or at least "provide important guidance regarding" issues of California law, tilted the balance toward maintaining the status quo. Id. at 2857-58. As it turns out, the California Court of Appeal in late 2006 reversed the trial court ruling that had invalidated the voter-approved transfer. Paulson v. Abdelnour, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
San Diego-area Congressmen did not, however, await the federal or state court decisions before taking action of their own. Within a week of the district court's order, Congressman Duncan Hunter (Congressman Cunningham had resigned his seat by that time) asked President Bush to invoke the authority conferred by a federal statute, 40 U.S.C. § 3113, to take immediate possession of the Mt. Soledad Cross. JWV Mem., Exh. A ¶¶ 53. Then in late June of 2006, Hunter introduced H.R. 5683, a bill designed to transfer the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial to federal control effective immediately. Congressmen Darrell Issa and Brian Bilbray (who had taken Cunningham's seat) joined Hunter as co-sponsors of the bill, and all three made public statements on the subject during the summer of 2006. The bill passed both houses of Congress by early August of 2006, and the President signed it into law on August 14, 2006. Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial Acquisition Act, Pub. L. No. 109-272, 120 Stat. 770 (hereinafter "the Act"). As enacted, the Act contains Congressional findings, announces its intent as "effectuat[ing] the purpose" of the 2004 legislation spearheaded by then-Representative Cunningham, and requires the Secretary of Defense to manage the property upon acquisition and to "enter into a memorandum of understanding with the [MSMA] for the continued maintenance of the [Memorial] by the [MSMA]." Id. §§ 1-2, 120 Stat. at 770-771.
The first legal challenge to the Act and the federal government's display of the cross was filed in the Southern District of California even before the President had signed the Act into law. Trunk v. City of San Diego, Civ. A. No. 06-1597, Dkt. #1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2006). And before the ink from either the President's signature or the Trunk complaint had dried, JWV had filed its own Complaint challenging the Act and the presence of the cross on public land. JWV Mem., Exh. A. The two cases, which named as defendants, among others, the City, the United States, the Secretary of State, and the MSMA, were consolidated for pretrial purposes in an order dated September 22, 2006. Members' Opp'n to Mot. to Compel ("Members' Opp'n"), Exh. MC 1.
During the discovery period, the Trunk plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the depositions of San Diego Mayor Jerry Sanders and Congressman Hunter. Members' Opp'n, Exh. 6. Hunter's testimony was relevant, the plaintiffs argued, because it would "confirm that the purpose of the legislation he sponsored . . . was to preserve the presence of the Mt. Soledad Latin cross on public property." Id. at 1-2. Although the JWV plaintiffs did not formally join in the motion to compel, they sent the Magistrate Judge a letter after briefing was complete indicating their support for the Trunk plaintiffs' position. The letter was necessary, JWV's counsel informed the Magistrate Judge, to respond to the City's briefing, "which falsely suggest[s] that JWV Plaintiffs' failure to join Trunk's motions is an indication that we believe Trunk's position to be without legal merit." Fed. Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Compel ("Fed. Opp'n"), Exh. E. A week later, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion to compel in an eleven-page order, a footnote in which portrayed the JWV plaintiffs as having joined in the motion. JWV Mem., Exh. E at 2 n.1. The judge ruled as an initial matter that Congressman Hunter's deposition was barred by the Speech or Debate Clause; he also concluded that the anticipated testimony of Hunter and Sanders was irrelevant to the governing Establishment Clause inquiry, and that the motion would be denied as a matter of discretion in any event because the plaintiffs had access to alternative sources of information and the requested testimony would therefore be duplicative. Id. at 6-11.
While the California litigation focused on the Trunk plaintiffs' discovery requests, the JWV plaintiffs served subpoenas on Congressmen Hunter, Bilbray, and Issa on March 21, 2007. JWV Mem., Exh. B; Members' Opp'n, Exh. MC 8. Each subpoena sought nine categories of documents within the Members' possession or control, and each was tailored, an introductory letter stated, "as narrowly as possible, and expressly [was] not seeking documents protected from disclosure by the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution." The nine specifications directed to the Members are as follows:
1. All documents concerning or relating to your contacts, communications, discussions, or interactions with any news organization or reporter regarding Mt. Soledad or the Mt. Soledad Latin Cross.
2. All documents concerning or relating to any press conference regarding Mt. Soledad or the Mt. Soledad Latin Cross.
3. All documents concerning or relating to your contacts, communications, discussions, lobbying of, financial contributions to or received, or interactions with the Thomas More Law Center, the Pacific Justice Institute, American Center for Law & Justice, Horizon Christian Fellowship, St. Vincent DePaul Management, San Diegans for the Mt. Soledad National War Memorial, the Admiral Jeremiah Denton Foundation, or any other interest group regarding Mt. Soledad or the Mt. Soledad Latin Cross.
4. All documents concerning or relating to your speeches, public statements, newsletters, letters to constituents, fundraising, or political campaign materials regarding Mt. Soledad or the Mt. Soledad Latin Cross, excepting any speeches or public statements made in proceedings of the United States House of Representatives.
5. All documents concerning or relating to your arrangement, scheduling, or coordination of meetings or appointments between any person or entity and any other person in the Executive Branch of the United States Government regarding Mt. Soledad or the Mt. Soledad Latin Cross.
6. All documents concerning or relating to your contacts, communications, discussions, or interactions with the [sic] any person in the Executive Branch of the United States Government regarding the administration or implementation of H.R. 5683.
7. All documents concerning or relating to your contacts, communications, discussions, or interactions with any person in the Executive Branch of the United States Government regarding Mt. Soledad or the Mt. Soledad Latin Cross.
8. All documents concerning or relating to your contacts, communications, discussions, or interactions with the City of San Diego regarding the administration or implementation of H.R. 5683.
9. All documents concerning or relating to your contacts, communications, discussions, or interactions with the City of San Diego regarding Mt. Soledad or the Mt. Soledad Latin Cross.
On April 9, 2007, the Members objected to the subpoenas pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B). They contended (in pertinent part) that the documents sought were not relevant to JWV's California suit, that the information requested was available from more convenient sources, and that disclosure of some of the documents was barred by the Speech and Debate Clause. JWV Mem., Exh. C; Members' Opp'n, Exh. MC 9. The Members claim that the Speech or Debate Clause protects many but not all of the documents responsive to specifications 3, 5, 7 and 9. The parties worked to narrow their differences, but were unable to reach a resolution. JWV's motions to compel followed.
A hearing on the motions was held on July 31, 2007. At the hearing, counsel for the Members represented that the Members had at least some documents responsive to all nine of the specifications. Counsel also expressed a willingness to compile and file a list describing the documents responsive to specifications 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8. The Court entered a post-hearing order requiring counsel to do so, and also requiring the JWV plaintiffs both to confirm that they still sought the documents described and to explain how those documents were relevant. Dkt. #22 (Order of July 31, 2007). In their post-hearing filing, the Members listed dozens of responsive documents and also clarified that they do not, in fact, have any documents responsive to specification 8. JWV's response and the Members' reply have been received, and the three motions to compel are now ripe for resolution.
The pending motions to compel present the superficially simple question of whether the JWV plaintiffs are entitled to any or all of the documentary discovery they seek from the Members. Likewise, the objections interposed by the Members and the Secretary of Defense appear on the surface to be nothing more than variants of objections that arise with some frequency in subpoena-related litigation: relevance and privilege. The relevance and privilege objections in this case, however, are neither superficial nor simple. They instead raise complex questions of constitutional significance, implicating on the one hand the important rights safeguarded by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and on the other the principles of legislative independence and the separation of powers enshrined in the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Cognizant of these sensitive constitutional issues, the Court will proceed cautiously in its analysis, taking care to decide only those questions directly raised in this subpoena dispute and to avoid passing on the weighty issues presented in the underlying litigation. As an initial matter, however, the Court must decide whether it need even reach these sensitive constitutional issues or whether, as the Members and the Secretary contend, two related doctrines require deference to the recent discovery ruling by the Magistrate Judge in California.
A. Law of the Case/Issue Preclusion
The Members' opening salvo is that the April 2, 2007 order by the Magistrate Judge constitutes the "law of the case" and bars the JWV plaintiffs from relitigating the relevance of the individual Congressmen's motives. Members' Opp'n at 8-9. In that order, it will be recalled, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the deposition testimony of Congressman Hunter sought by the Trunk plaintiffs was "not relevant to the inquiry under the Establishment Clause." JWV Mem., Exh. E at 7. "The law-of-the-case doctrine rests on a simple premise: 'the same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same result.'" Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)). But the doctrine applies, the D.C. Circuit has emphasized, only "within the same case, proceeding, or action." In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 439 F.3d 740, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2006). And because "'a subpoena enforcement action is technically a different case,'" the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply in that setting, which amounts to "a new, albeit ancillary, proceeding in a different court." Id. (citation and alteration omitted). The law-of-the-case doctrine thus does not apply to this "subpoena enforcement action" that is "ancillary" to the California litigation. Id.
In a similar vein, the Secretary invokes the concept of issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), arguing that the JWV plaintiffs had a full opportunity to litigate the relevance issue in the California proceeding and should be bound by the determination made there. Fed. Opp'n at 14-16. The D.C. Circuit has articulated a three-step test to decide whether collateral estoppel bars further litigation of an issue: 1) the same issue now being raised must have been contested by the parties and submitted for judicial determination in the prior case; 2) the issue must have been actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in that prior case; and 3) preclusion in the second case must not work a basic unfairness to the party bound by the first determination. See Martin v. Dep't of Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992). According to the Secretary, the relevance objection raised by the Members presents the same issue "actually" ...