The opinion of the court was delivered by: Henry H. Kennedy, Jr. United States District Judge
Invoking this court's diversity jurisdiction, Kristina Nevius brings this action against her former employer, Africa Inland Mission International, Inc. ("AIM"), asserting causes of action arising from and related to her termination as a missionary in Namibia.*fn1 Before the court is AIM's motion to dismiss Nevius's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief [#2]. Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition thereto, and the record of this case, the court concludes that AIM's motion must be granted.
AIM is a non-profit religious organization based in New York which sponsors missionaries, primarily in Africa, to establish and support Christian ministries. In June 1998, Nevius, a resident of the District of Columbia, joined AIM as a missionary. Nevius alleges that she signed a standard AIM missionary contract which required her to raise sufficient money, through either fund-raising or her own funds, to cover the costs of her missionary work. AIM was to deduct and retain seven percent from the funds she raised for her own support; the remaining funds were to be provided to Nevius to defray her personal expenses. If she undertook a project which required funds above the cost of her personal support, she was required to raise those funds as well. Ten percent of those funds raised to fund a particular project were to be kept by AIM and the rest was to be given to Nevius to fund her service project. Her employment with AIM was also governed by its constitution, by-laws, policies and procedures, which provided that she was entitled to a hearing and an appeal if allegations of misconduct were raised. The by-laws also provide that missionaries "who [are] found not believing" may have their relationship with the mission terminated, and those whose conduct undermines the standing of the mission may be disciplined by several means, including termination. Def.'s Ex. A (AIM By Laws § IX).
In September 1999, Nevius was sent to Grootfontein, Namibia, where she established a soup kitchen to feed poor local children. Her work was initially supported by the local White-dominated church, which offered segregated services to parishioners, but that church eventually objected to the presence of Black children at her mission. Consequently, she relocated her mission and established the Mark 9:37 Mission Project, a home for abused, neglected, and orphaned children, with AIM's permission.*fn2
In 2005, a dispute arose between Nevius and AIM. On April 7, 2005, Mick Rineer, the regional AIM supervisor, accused Nevius in the presence of others of mishandling AIM funds and negligence in caring for the children at the home. Rineer subsequently evicted Nevius and the children in her care from the Project's home. Ted Barnett, the director of AIM, sent Nevius a letter dated April 28, 2005, asserting that he had received reports regarding her abuse of children, of other missionaries, and her sexual behavior, and demanding her return to the United States. The letter indicated that Barnett would not share the details of the allegations against her until she returned to New York, at which point she would be expected to respond to them. Nevius asserts that AIM and officials from the local church were colluding to terminate her and the Project so they could turn the property into a "bed and breakfast" inn for Whites, which she contends constitutes racial and sexual discrimination. Compl. ¶ 34. Nevius was subsequently terminated without a hearing and AIM retained all charitable contributions that were raised for the Mark 9:37 Project.
Nevius asserts the following claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) race and sex discrimination in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA); (3) defamation; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) conversion; and (6) breach of trust and a demand for an accounting of charitable contributions to AIM. In its motion, AIM contends that these claims must be dismissed because (1) the "ministerial exception," derived from the First Amendment, deprives this court of jurisdiction over employment decisions of ecclesiastical organizations; (2) Nevius's DCHRA and defamation claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations; and (3) Nevius has failed to state a claim for relief.*fn3
The First Amendment, in relevant part, provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. amend. I. It has long been held that the Free Exercise Clause exempts the selection of clergy from employment discrimination statutes and precludes civil courts from adjudicating such cases. See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that state and federal laws barring age discrimination may not be enforced against church). This so-called "ministerial exception" is designed to protect the freedom of the church to select those who will carry out its religious mission. Otherwise, a judicial inquiry into a church's reasons for asserting that an employee was not suited for a particular religious post could result in an excessive entanglement in its affairs. E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United Methodist Church v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 795 (D.C. 1990). The ministerial exception has also been applied to lay employees of religious institutions whose "primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship." Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 461 (quoting Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In a case alleging employment discrimination, such as the present one, the application of the familiar burden-shifting rubric of the McDonnell Douglas test would quickly mire this court in a religious dispute which it may not properly resolve. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006). Nevius, who is White, asserts that she was unlawfully dismissed for illegal discriminatory reasons. AIM has indicated its intent to defend its employment action on grounds related to religious doctrine - that is, that its motivation in dismissing Nevius was not unlawful discrimination but rather was due to her failure to serve the mission's ecclesiastical needs. See Def.'s Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (describing complaints lodged against Nevius regarding "her missionary duties and unbiblical behavior"). Nevius is likely to counter that the religious reason is merely a pretext for firing her, which AIM might rebut with evidence regarding the proper role and behavior of a missionary. Such an argument would swiftly devolve into a controversy over who is suitable to serve as a missionary of this particular organization, which is ultimately a theological dispute that cannot be decided by this court. See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1993).
Perhaps mindful of this obstacle, while Nevius describes herself as a missionary and acknowledges that AIM is a "Christian missionary organization," Compl. ¶ 5, she does not describe any of her duties or activities in Namibia as religious nor does she attach the written contract which may have set out her duties. AIM, in its motion to dismiss, contends that her duties included "the teaching and spreading of the faith" and to "regularly instruct others on the Gospel and teachings of Jesus Christ." Def.'s Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 11. AIM also points out that the Project was entitled "Mark 9:37," a reference to a passage in the New Testament regarding Christ's encouragement of ministering to children. Id. at 12. The constitution and by-laws of AIM, referenced in the complaint and attached to AIM's motion to dismiss, make plain that the primary duty of its missionaries is to "make disciples [of Christ] of the people in Africa," Def.'s Ex. D (AIM Constitution Art. II), and that they may be dismissed if they are "found not believing the principles set forth in the doctrinal basis of the mission," Def.'s Ex. A (AIM By Laws § IX).
Ordinarily, the court may not look to facts outside of the complaint - such as assertions in a motion to dismiss - in resolving a motion to dismiss unless those documents are incorporated by reference into the complaint. Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. R.E. Hazard Jr., 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 79 n.17 (D.D.C. 1998) (recognizing that "factual allegations in briefs are not properly considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss"). However, the court may take judicial notice of a passage in the Bible. See Truong v. American Bible Society, 367 F. Supp. 2d 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (taking judicial notice of the age of the Bible). And the court also takes notice of the common definition of the word "missionary": "One who is sent on a mission, especially one sent to do religious or charitable work in a territory or foreign country," as well as "[o]ne who attempts to persuade or convert others to a particular program, doctrine, or set of principles; a propagandist." American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2006). As evidenced by the plain language of the complaint and the documents incorporated therein, Nevius's duties certainly involved ...