The opinion of the court was delivered by: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge
Plaintiff Robert Rae, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action against the United States alleging misconduct by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in the collection of taxes. This case is similar in many respects to a number of cases filed in this Court by individuals around the country seeking damages for such alleged misconduct. In this case, like many cases in this Court before it, plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim for damages pursuant to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights ("TBOR"), see 26 U.S.C. § 7433, as well as under a multitude of other statutory and constitutional provisions. Pending before the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Upon consideration of the motion, response and reply thereto, supplemental briefing and evidence provided by plaintiff, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.
On September 29, 2006, the plaintiff filed this action challenging a decision by the IRS pursuant to multiple provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, including 26 U.S.C. § 7433 (2000), in addition to bringing claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000), 26 U.S.C. § 2410, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2000) ("APA"), the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 1658, and various sections of the United States Constitution. See Compl. ¶ I. Despite seeking redress under at least sixteen separate statutory provisions, the underlying relief sought by the plaintiff is the release of tax liens that were allegedly procured by officers, employees and agents of the United States, who intentionally and recklessly disregarded internal revenue laws, thereby causing procedurally invalid Notice of Federal Tax Liens and Notices of Levy to issue. Plaintiff also seeks a judgment for $26,000,000.00 in statutory damages, $28,967.01 in compensatory damages, and $86,901.03 in treble damages. See Compl. 40-41. It appears that the basis for plaintiff's claim is that the IRS failed to provide the plaintiff with documentation supporting the tax assessment against him. See Compl. ¶ VII. The plaintiff therefore seeks an order from this Court directing the IRS to release the allegedly illegally assessed federal tax liens and issue a judgment for damages. See Compl. 40.
Although the government raised various grounds for dismissal in its Motion to Dismiss, the Court need only consider the argument that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must make sufficiently detailed factual allegations in his complaint "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct 2197, 2200 (June 4, 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and "grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged," Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief [in his complaint] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Moreover, the Court need not accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint or "legal conclusion[s] couched as ... factual allegation[s]." Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 193 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may only consider the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents attached as exhibits, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice. EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Finally, the pleadings of pro se parties "[are] to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Nonetheless, "[a]lthough a court will read a pro se plaintiff's complaint liberally, a pro se complaint, [no less than any other complaint], must present a claim on which the Court can grant relief." Chandler v. Roche, 215 F. Supp. 2d 166, 168 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Crisafi v. Holland, 665 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
A. The United States is the Proper Party Defendant
The caption to plaintiff's complaint names five employees of the IRS, Ms. J. Lynch, Ms. J. Daley, C. Sherwood, Patrick Dillon, and Peter Bousnakis, as defendants in this action, in addition to the United States, for "having individually and collectively participated in causing damage and harm to Plaintiff." See Compl. ¶ II. Plaintiff makes clear that he is suing defendant employees in their official capacities, not in their individual capacities. "Plaintiff has sued and named the Defendants in their official capacity." See Pl's Opp'n to Def's Mot. 14. For this reason and because 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422(f) and 7433(a) provide that, with an exception inapplicable here, suits for tax refunds ...