The opinion of the court was delivered by: Henry H. Kennedy, Jr. United States District Judge
Herbert St. Claire Crichlow ("Crichlow") brings this action against Warner Music Group Corp. ("Warner") contending that he is owed royalties for songs that he wrote. Warner moves to dismiss Crichlow's action on several grounds [#4]. Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition thereto, and the record of this case, the court concludes that Warner's motion must be granted because this court is unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over Warner.
Crichlow, a songwriter and resident of Sweden, signed two music publishing agreements with subsidiaries of Warner. Crichlow and a company named Megasong Publishing A/S ("Megasong") entered into a music publishing agreement (the "Megasong Agreement"). Megasong was subsequently acquired by Warner/Chappell Music Denmark A/S, which is in turn owned by Warner/Chappell Music Scandinavia AB. Warner/Chappell Music Scandinavia AB is in turn owned by Warner Bros. Music International, Inc., which is owned by Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. is owned by Warner via two non-operating holding companies. Thus, Warner is separated from Megasong by approximately seven corporate levels.
Acting on behalf of A Lemon Groove AB ("Lemon Groove"), Crichlow entered into another music publishing agreement ("Artemis Agreement") with Muziekuitgeverij Artemis BV. Muziezkuitgeverij Artemis BV is owned by Warner/Chappell Music Group (Netherlands) BV. Warner/Chappell Music Group (Netherlands) BV is approximately 81% owned by New Chappell, Inc. New Chappell, Inc. is owned by Warner Bros. Music International, Inc., which is owned by Warner via two non-operating holding companies. Accordingly, Warner is separated from Muziekuitgeverij Artemis BV by approximately six corporate levels.
Crichlow has brought suit against Warner, asserting that he is owed money pursuant to the Megasong and Artemis Agreements. Warner neither participated in the negotiations nor is obligated to perform any actions under the agreements, however. These two agreements were signed by Warner's subsidiaries Megasong and Muziekuitgeverij Artemis BV.
Warner is a publicly traded U.S. company, incorporated in Delaware and with its principal place of business in New York. Although Crichlow has brought this action in the District of Columbia, Warner's sole contact with this forum consists of its Public Policy and Government Affairs office ("Public Policy Office"), which is located in the District of Columbia. Several of Warner's subsidiaries, such as Asylum Records and East West Records, sell musical products in the District of Columbia. Warner itself does not sell these products.
Warner has moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) to dismiss Crichlow's action for lack of personal jurisdiction.*fn1 Crichlow rejoins that this court has general jurisdiction pursuant to the District of Columbia long-arm statute because Warner is "doing business" in the District of Columbia. Warner is correct that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over Warner.
A. Law of Personal Jurisdiction
The plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Naegele v. Albers, 355 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). To make such a showing, the plaintiff is not required to adduce evidence that meets the standards of admissibility reserved for summary judgment and trial; rather, he may rest his arguments on the pleadings, "bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as [he] can otherwise obtain." Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In determining whether personal jurisdiction exists, the court should resolve factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor, Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2004), although it need not accept a plaintiff's "conclusory statements." GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
The jurisdictional reach of a federal court is the same as that of a state or local court of general jurisdiction in the forum where the federal court sits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Therefore, the jurisdictional reach of the court in this case is determined by the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, subject to a further demonstration that the court's exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent with constitutional due process requirements. See U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Crane, 814 F.2d at 762.
Pursuant to D.C. Code § 13-334(a), the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is "doing business" in the District of Columbia. On its face, this statutory provision appears to involve only service of process. Courts have construed it, however, to confer general jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, ...