Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Liberty Property Trust v. Republic Properties Corp.

August 13, 2008

LIBERTY PROPERTY TRUST, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,
v.
REPUBLIC PROPERTIES CORPORATION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

On March 31, 2008, this Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint. See Republic Prop. Trust v. Republic Props. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2008) (Lamberth, J.).*fn1 Plaintiffs now ask the Court to reconsider two aspects of that decision. Accordingly, the Court has considered plaintiffs' motion [31], defendants' joint opposition [34], plaintiffs' reply [35], and the applicable law. For the reasons expressed herein, plaintiffs' motion shall be DENIED.

This Court's previous opinion set out the facts of this case at some length. See 540 F. Supp. 2d at 149-52. For present purposes, it suffices to recount a few, salient details. On July 19, 2005, defendants Richard L. Kramer ("Kramer") and Stephen A. Grigg ("Grigg"), along with non-party Mark Keller, organized Republic Property Trust ("the REIT") to acquire, develop, and ultimately operate office properties in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Both Grigg and Kramer served on the REIT's Board of Trustees -- Grigg as Vice-Chairman, and Kramer as Chairman. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.) The REIT also employed Grigg as President and Chief Development Officer. (Id. ¶ 4.)

Prior to its initial public offering ("IPO") on December 20, 2005, the REIT established several subsidiary entities, among them Republic Property Limited Partnership ("RPLP"). (Id. ¶ 13.) Through these subsidiaries, the REIT then acquired real property and contracts in exchange for its own shares and/or RPLP limited partnership units. (Id.)

One such transaction forms the subject of this lawsuit. Defendant Republic Properties Corporation ("RPC") -- an entity wholly owned and controlled by Kramer and Grigg*fn2 -- contributed a property development contract it had previously signed with the city of West Palm Beach, Florida, in exchange for limited partnership units that would be worth $1,202,808.00 when the IPO occurred. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 18.) To formalize the exchange, the parties executed a second contract. (Id.) Grigg, with Kramer's knowledge and approval, signed on RPC's behalf, and the REIT's CEO signed for RPLP. (Id. ¶ 19.) RPC made various representations in this latter contract, some of which plaintiffs now allege were materially false or misleading, and based on which they sued RPC, Kramer, and Grigg for federal securities fraud. (Id. ¶¶ 102-10.)

This Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint once it determined that the facts pleaded therein did not establish that the limited partnership units at issue were "investment contracts" under the seminal test of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), and that plaintiffs had consequently failed to state a claim under the federal securities statutes.*fn3 See 540 F. Supp. 2d at 160-62. It also resolved a threshold issue, standing, against the REIT, concluding that RPLP, the entity that had actually issued the limited partnership units in exchange for the property development contract, was the only proper plaintiff. See id. at 154-56; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (private plaintiff must be an actual purchaser or seller of securities to have standing to sue under federal securities laws). Plaintiffs have asked the Court to reconsider both conclusions, and it will begin with the latter.

First, however, the Court must identify the legal standard it will apply to plaintiffs' motion. Our Court of Appeals has characterized motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) as "discretionary." Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Thus, a court need only grant such a motion if it finds that there has been an intervening change of controlling law, that new evidence is available, or that granting the motion is necessary to correct a clear error or to prevent manifest injustice. Id. Indeed, Rule 59(e) motions are "disfavored" and should be granted only in "extraordinary circumstances." Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) (Hogan, C.J.).

Plaintiffs' argument in favor of the REIT's standing falls far short of this threshold. In essence, plaintiffs urge the Court to look to function rather than form: although the REIT and Liberty Property Limited Partnership ("LPLP") are distinct legal entities, they operate as "an integrated business," and LPLP's limited partnership units' value bears a direct relationship to the REIT's publicly traded shares' value.*fn4 (See Mot. for Reconsideration at 9.)

This Court would ordinarily find such an appeal to pragmatism more persuasive. Yet here, plaintiffs have unwittingly offered additional support for the Court's original assessment. They explain that the purpose of creating and operating their business through distinct legal entities -- a REIT whose shares are publicly traded and a private, limited partnership -- is to permit investors who acquire limited partnership units by contributing real property to defer the tax consequences that would follow from their direct acquisition of shares in the REIT. (See id. at 2-3.) That is, plaintiffs created two, distinct legal entities precisely because these entities receive differential treatment under the tax laws. Hence, when it serves their interests, plaintiffs wish the law to look on the REIT and LPLP as distinct entities. Here, where differential treatment harms their interests, they urge the opposite.

Plaintiffs are separate and distinct legal entities. They must abide by the consequences of their chosen legal forms equally when it is to their detriment as when it benefits them. Hence, plaintiffs' "integrated business" does not persuade the Court that its previous decision as to standing was infected by "clear error" or precipitated "manifest injustice." See Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208. Consequently, it reaffirms its ruling that "[LPLP] -- and only [LPLP] -- is the proper plaintiff." See 540 F. Supp. 2d at 156.

In challenging the Court's ruling that the limited partnership units at issue here were not "investment contracts" under Howey, plaintiffs offer four, interrelated lines of argument. First, they recast the "function over form" reasoning described above. (See Mot. for Reconsideration at 4-6.) Second, they suggest the authorities on which this Court relied do not support the result it reached. (Id. at 6-8.) Third, they allege that some authors and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") treat limited partnership units issued by REIT operating partnerships such as RPLP as securities. (Id. at 4-5.) Finally, they contend that determining whether particular limited partnership units are investment contracts requires "fact-intensive analysis" not feasible at the pre-answer motion stage of litigation. (Id. at 8.) The Court will briefly address each of these arguments.

Plaintiffs summarize their "core" argument as follows:

Though issued by different entities in order to achieve tax deferral for asset contributing investors, the units in [LPLP] and the REIT's public common shares are economic equivalents. For example, the total number of outstanding common shares of the REIT equals the total number of partnership units owned by the REIT. In addition, the cash distributions made on each partnership unit mirror the cash distributions made on each publicly held common share of the REIT. Finally, the limited partners of the umbrella partnership generally have a right, after one year, to have their partnership units redeemed by the umbrella partnership. Significantly, this redemption right, essentially, amounts to a onefor-one conversion right for partnership unit holders because the REIT has the option to issue one publicly traded share, instead of cash, for each redeemed unit. . . . Accordingly, from an economic perspective, an investment in the limited partnership via asset contribution is substantially the same as a cash investment in shares of the publicly traded REIT.

(See Reply [35] at 2 (quoting Mot. for Reconsideration [33] at 3-4).) In short, plaintiffs argue that because LPLP's limited partnership units and the REIT's common shares are functional equivalents, the Court should simply treat the limited partnership units at issue here as if they were publicly-traded common shares -- stock, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.