Petitions for Review of Decisions of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (CRB (Dir. Dkt) No. 03-119, 03-119A).
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Glickman, Associate Judge
Before RUIZ, GLICKMAN and FISHER, Associate Judges.
Dissenting opinion by Associate Judge RUIZ at p. 17.
Howard University Hospital and MaryAnne Tagoe petition for review of a decision by the Department of Employment Services ("DOES") on Tagoe's worker's compensation claim, which she filed after suffering a stroke while working as a physician in the Hospital's residency program. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") who conducted the evidentiary hearing found that Tagoe's stroke and ensuing migraines were work-related, her failure to give timely written notice of her injury was excused, but she had not become disabled within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, the ALJ awarded Tagoe her medical expenses but denied her claim for disability compensation and vocational rehabilitation benefits. The Director of DOES affirmed the ALJ's compensation order. After hearing oral argument on the parties' review petitions, we remanded the record for supplemental proceedings. The record was returned to us on July 6, 2007, and we have since received additional briefs from petitioners. Their petitions for review (in Nos. 04-AA-397 and 04-AA-399) are now ready for decision.*fn1
In its petition, the Hospital contends that the DOES erred in excusing Tagoe's failure to give timely notice of her injury. We agree with that contention, which means that Tagoe's claim for disability compensation (though not her claim for medical and vocational rehabilitation benefits) is barred. For her part, Tagoe complains of certain rulings admitting or excluding evidence, and of the agency's rejection of her claim for vocational rehabilitation. We conclude that Tagoe's claims entitle her to no relief.
In accordance with the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act,*fn2 we are authorized to set aside the DOES decision in this worker's compensation case if it is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record or otherwise not in accordance with law. To pass muster, "(1) the decision must state findings of fact on each material, contested factual issue; (2) those findings must be based on substantial evidence; and (3) the conclusions of law must follow rationally from the findings."*fn3 Our application of the "substantial evidence" test, which requires "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,"*fn4 is deferential to the ALJ's fact-finding prerogatives.*fn5 Similarly, though in general we review de novo the legal conclusions of the Director and his surrogate, the Compensation Review Board ("CRB"),*fn6 we acknowledge their expertise and DOES's responsibility for administering the Workers' Compensation Act. Hence, we ordinarily must defer to their reasonable interpretations of ambiguous provisions in that legislation.*fn7
II. The Duty to Furnish Timely Notice of Injury
In June 2000, after having earned a medical degree in Ghana, MaryAnne Tagoe commenced a one-year transitional residency program at Howard University Hospital. On October 4, 2000, while on a rotation with the cardiothoracic vascular surgery unit, Tagoe suffered what was described in her medical records as a "cerebral artery occlusion with cerebral infarction"--in other words, a stroke. Her treating physician in the Hospital's emergency room, and for some time thereafter, was Dr. Roger Weir, a member of the neurology department. Tagoe remained hospitalized for a week and then recuperated at home for two weeks before returning to work on October 25, 2000. She did not complete her tour with the cardiothoracic unit but started her next assigned rotation in November and successfully completed the transitional residency program in June 2001 with an overall "satisfactory" rating. Although Tagoe received a contingent offer of a second-year residency at another institution, she did not pursue it. Instead, from October 2001 through July 2002, Tagoe worked for several months as a care manager and medical assistant at two assisted living facilities. Tagoe then entered a master's degree program in public health at the George Washington University, where she performed successfully. The record does not contain information on her subsequent professional progress.
As the ALJ found and the Hospital does not dispute, Tagoe's stroke was precipitated by the stress of her duties as a resident; in her cardiothoracic rotation, Tagoe reportedly had been working more than ninety hours a week and sleeping only a few hours a night. Tagoe did not inform her supervisors or the Hospital of the causal relationship between her work and her medical condition, however, until she filed a written notice of injury with the Office of Workers' Compensation on May 29, 2001. Tagoe claimed she had continuing migraine headaches resulting from her stroke that prevented her from completing her medical training, with a consequent loss of income. She sought payment of her medical expenses, disability benefits, and vocational rehabilitation payments to cover her tuition at George Washington University.
In addition to disputing Tagoe's claim on its merits,*fn8 the Hospital argued that the claim was barred by Tagoe's failure to furnish written notice of her injury, including its alleged cause, within 30 days after she was or should have been aware of its relationship to her employment, as the Workers' Compensation Act requires.*fn9 The purposes of this notification requirement are to enable the employer to investigate the facts surrounding the injury and to provide prompt medical attention.*fn10
While the failure to give proper notice does not preclude a claim for causally related medical expenses (which may include the cost of vocational rehabilitation services),*fn11 it ordinarily does bar a claim for disability income benefits.*fn12 D.C. Code § 32-1513 (d) provides, however, that failure to give proper notice shall not bar a compensation claim under two circumstances:
(1) If the employer (or his agent in charge of the business in the place where the injury occurred)... had knowledge of the injury... and its relationship to the employment and the Mayor determines that the employer... ...