The opinion of the court was delivered by: Richard W. Roberts United States District Judge
Plaintiff Kenneth A. Hinton, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis at the time,*fn1 filed this pro se complaint based on diversity jurisdiction, asserting legal malpractice and other common law claims against his former defense counsel James A. Rudasill. Rudasill has moved to dismiss the complaint. Because Hinton's claims are either barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or do not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the complaint will be dismissed.
Rudasill was Hinton's court-appointed defense counsel in federal criminal proceedings in this court. In his verified complaint, Hinton alleges that between approximately April 3, 2007 and May 2, 2007, Rudasill committed legal malpractice in representing Hinton in proceedings to revoke Hinton's supervised release, and that Rudasill's malpractice caused Hinton to suffer loss of income, loss of liberty, and loss of consortium. See Compl., Ex. A (Decl. of Kenneth A.2-Hinton, "Statement of Claim & Facts" ("Hinton Compl.") at 1.*fn2 In brief, the complaint alleges that Rudasill did not appear in court as ordered, id. ¶ 1, did not present mitigating evidence on behalf of defendant, id. ¶¶ 2, 10, made misstatements to the court and did not adequately explain things to either Hinton or the court, id. ¶¶ 3-7, and failed to educate the court about its statutory obligations. Id. ¶¶ 9.
This very same conduct by counsel relating to the revocation proceedings during the period April 3 through May 2, 2007, was the subject of the appeal in Hinton's federal criminal proceedings in which Hinton contended that Rudasill provided ineffective assistance of counsel. In his appeal, Hinton was represented by counsel from the District of Columbia Office of the Federal Public Defender. The court of appeals decided the merits of the issue, concluding "that counsel's behavior did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that Hinton could not show that a "deficient performance prejudiced the defense. United States v. Hinton, No. 07-3056, 275 Fed. Appx. 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 2008) (internal quotation marks, alterations and citations omitted).*fn3
Hinton also asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Hinton's Compl. at 1, and alleges that Rudasill committed malpractice in an appeal of a different criminal matter in Maryland state court by failing to explain the legal proceedings to him and by failing to contact on Hinton's behalf the clerk for that court. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. These claims were not part of Hinton's federal appeal.
Rudasill filed a verified answer and motion for summary dismissal, affirmatively raising in his defense the argument that the 2008 decision of the federal appeals court precludes Hinton's malpractice claims in this suit, and arguing that the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Def.'s Answer to Compl. & Mot. for Summ. Dismissal ("Def.'s Ans. & Mot. to Dismiss") ¶ 12. Hinton filed an opposition. See Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.
I. THE MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ALREADY LITIGATED
To conserve judicial resources, relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, prevent inconsistent litigation and encourage reliance on adjudication, federal courts have traditionally adhered to the jurisprudential doctrine of collateral estoppel. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). One version of collateral estoppel, known as non-mutual defensive estoppel, bars a party who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in an earlier case and lost from relitigating that same issue in a later case against a different defendant.
Id. at 94-95; Pharmaceutical Care Management Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 522 F.3d 443, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
The legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel in the revocation proceedings against Hinton and for legal malpractice in those same proceedings are equivalent. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Bigelow v. Knight, 737 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D.D.C. 1990). In either instance, the proponent must establish both that the performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was the proximate cause of injury to the counsel's client. Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A.2d 57, 60 (D.C. 1949); Bigelow v. Knight, 737 F. Supp. at 671. Where the issue of defense counsel's performance has been litigated and decided, the plaintiff is estopped from relitigating the same performance issues in another forum. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d at 609-10 (collateral estoppel bars a legal malpractice claim in a civil suit after a court in a criminal appeal has determined that counsel did not give ineffective assistance); Bieglow v. Knight, 737 F. Supp. at 671 (citing McCord v. Bailey and applying collateral estoppel after decision in a criminal appeal made under D.C. Code § 23-110). Therefore, in this suit, Hinton is collaterally estopped from relitigating the legal malpractice claims against Rudasill because those claims were fully litigated and decided against him in his federal criminal appeal. The federal appeals court determined that Rudasill's performance between April 3, 2007 and May 2, 2007 was not deficient and that, in any case, Rudasill's performance did not harm Hinton's defense. Accordingly, Hinton's legal malpractice claims based on his counsel's performance in his revocation proceedings are precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and will be dismissed.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court assumes all factual allegations in the complaint to be true, even if they are doubtful. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that a court must construe the complaint "liberally in the plaintiffs' favor" and "grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged"). A court need not, however, "accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must [a] court accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court is limited to considering "the facts alleged in the ...