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Jones v. District of Columbia

August 19, 2009


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Henry H. Kennedy, Jr. United States District Judge


Phyllis Jones, as parent and next friend of A.J., a minor, brings this action against the District of Columbia and Michelle Rhee, chancellor of the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS"), in her official capacity (collectively, "the District"), alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2006) ("IDEA"). Jones alleges the District of Columbia denied A.J. the free and appropriate public education guaranteed by the IDEA when DCPS failed to convene a multi-disciplinary team meeting to begin to evaluate and determine an appropriate placement for A.J. Jones also alleges that, at the administrative hearing, Hearing Officer Woods erred by (1) failing to address the issue raised by the administrative complaint and (2) holding that under District of Columbia law, home-schooled children are not entitled to special education benefits under the IDEA.

Before the Court are Jones' and the District's cross-motions for summary judgment [## 9, 12]. Upon consideration of the motions, the opposition thereto, and the record of this case, the Court concludes that the District's motion for summary judgment must be granted, and Jones' motion for summary judgment must be denied.


A. Statutory Background

Congress enacted the IDEA to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). States*fn1 receiving grants under the IDEA must ensure that all children with disabilities of a certain age have access to a "free appropriate public education," and provide each disabled student with an individual education program ("IEP"), detailing educational services tailored to the needs of that student. Id. at § 1414(d)(2)(A). An "IEP Team" (referred to as a multi-disciplinary team ("MDT"); see, e.g., Brown v. District of Columbia, 568 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47 (D.D.C. 2008)) that includes parents, educators, and other specialists, develops each IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).

IDEA services are provided to students in public schools, id. at § 1412(a)(1)(A), and, under certain circumstances, students placed by their parents in private schools, id. at § 1412(a)(10).*fn2 Parentally-placed private school students qualify for services under the IDEA only if the school meets the state's definition of "elementary" or "secondary" school. 34 C.F.R. § 300.130 (2009). If that definition does not include home-school, a home-schooled student in that state is not entitled to IDEA benefits. Hooks v. Clark County Sch. Dist.,228 F.3d 1036, 1039-41 (9th Cir. 2000).

Finally, under the IDEA, parents have the right to an administrative hearing on a complaint "with respect to any matter relating to . . . the provision of a free appropriate public education" to their child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(1). The hearing officer's determination on that matter may be challenged in federal district court. Id. § 1415(i)(2).

B. Factual Background

As a result of a serious accident and subsequent surgeries beginning in the first grade, A.J. missed a significant amount of school and was classified as learning disabled in January 2007. At that time, A.J. lived in the District of Columbia, and an IEP for one calender year was developed for A.J. by Kimball Elementary School. In March 2007, Jones and A.J. moved to Virginia, where A.J. attended Triangle Elementary School in Prince William County for part of the school year. Prince William County Public Schools' re-evaluations in January 2008 showed that A.J.'s academic performance continued to be much lower than that of his peers.

Jones and A.J. moved back to the District of Columbia in March 2008. On March 28, 2008, Jones registered her son at Winston Educational Center ("Winston") as a home-schooled student. The same day, she sent a letter through counsel to Winston requesting a MDT meeting "to review evaluations, develop IEP, and determine appropriate placement for [A.J.]" (Compl. Ex. K at 2). It was Jones' wish to have her son in "an appropriate educational placement" by the beginning of the 2008-2009 school year and for A.J. to be home-schooled until that placement was made. (Compl. Ex. B at 4-5 (Admin. Compl.)) On April 22, 2008, twenty-five days after the request for a MDT meeting, Jones filed an administrative hearing complaint alleging that DCPS denied A.J. a free appropriate public education by failing to hold the requested meeting. At the hearing, DCPS moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that DCPS is not required to provide a home-schooled student with access to a free and appropriate public education. The hearing officer granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Jones "[f]ailed to present any evidence about why the IDEIA requires DCPS to provide their home-schooled child with a [free and appropriate public education]." (Compl. Ex. A at 8 (Admin. Decision)). Jones then filed a complaint seeking judicial review by this Court.


A. Legal Standard

When reviewing a hearing officer's determination in an IDEA case, the district court, based "on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). The court does not conduct a de novo review of the hearing, but gives "due weight" to the hearing officer'sconclusions.Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). Though less deferential than the "substantial evidence" review of most agency actions, Scorah v. District of Columbia, 322 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 (D.D.C. 2004), the hearing officer's determination should not be upset so long as her conclusion is supported by "sufficiently reasoned, specific findings," Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Publ. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 87-88 (D.C. Cir. 1991). On a motion for summary judgment, the court ...

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