The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ricardo M. Urbina United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
This matter is before the court on the defendant's motion to dismiss certain claims of discrimination raised in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint. The plaintiff, an African-American male formerly employed by the defendant, alleges that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his race by not selecting him for a position that ultimately went to a white male, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant discriminated against him by making the conditions of his employment so intolerable and unbearable that he was effectively forced to resign.*fn1 The defendant now moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims except those based on his non-selection, arguing that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to any of his other claims.
The court concludes that the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, like his initial Complaint, is devoid of any indication that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to any claims not premised on his non-selection. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant's motion to partially dismiss the plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, the plaintiff began working as a Senior Human Resources Consultant with the defendant, a pediatric medical center located in Washington D.C. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. The plaintiff alleges that in January 2006, the defendant began searching for an individual to fill the position of Director of Training and Organizational Development ("the Position"). Id. ¶ 8. The plaintiff applied for the Position in February 2006. Id. The plaintiff alleges that he was highly qualified for the Position based on his training, background, education and experience. Id. The plaintiff further alleges that the selecting official, Christine Porto, advised the plaintiff to schedule a formal interview with her. Id. ¶ 9. Yet before interviewing the plaintiff, Porto hired Marc Goldman, a white male, to fill the Position. Id. ¶¶ 9, 14.
The plaintiff also contends that the defendant made the conditions of his employment so intolerable and unbearable that he was forced to resign in August 2006.*fn2 Id. ¶ 10. Although the plaintiff fails to describe, even in broad terms, the conditions that he found intolerable and unbearable, see generally Am. Compl., he alleges that "[a] continuous pattern of Defendant's misconduct existed" and that the "[c]onditions were so egregious and intolerable that any reasonable person in Plaintiff's situation and like circumstances would have resigned." Id. ¶ 10. The plaintiff asserts that this treatment was "directly attributable" to racial animus. See id.
The plaintiff maintains that he timely filed a charge of discrimination with the District of Columbia's Office of Human Rights ("the EEO Complaint") and was issued a right to sue letter based on that complaint on July 28, 2008. Id. ¶ 15. No other EEO activity is mentioned in the plaintiff's pleadings. See generally id.; Compl.
On May 23, 2008, the plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the district court. See generally Compl. On August 18, 2008, the defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint, based on, inter alia, the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Def.'s First Mot. to Dismiss at 4-7. Rather than respond to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff sought leave to amend his Complaint. See generally Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to Amend. On September 29, 2008, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend and denied the defendant's first motion to dismiss. See Minute Order (Sept. 29, 2008).
On October 17, 2008, the defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss, seeking the dismissal of all claims in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint except those premised on his non-selection for the Position. See generally Def.'s Second Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."). The plaintiff submitted his opposition to the motion on November 25, 2008.*fn3 See generally Pl.'s Opp'n.
A. Legal Standard for Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In actions brought under Title VII, a court has authority over only those claims that are (1) contained in the plaintiff's administrative complaint or claims "like or reasonably related to" those claims in the administrative complaint and (2) for which the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies.*fn4 Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Bailey v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37-38 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that "[i]f a plaintiff's EEOC charge makes a class of allegation altogether different from that which she later alleges when seeking relief in federal district court, she will have failed to exhaust administrative remedies"). The claims asserted in a complaint filed in federal court "must arise from 'the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination.'" Id. (quoting Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 491 (4th Cir. 1981)). This exhaustion requirement "serves the important purpose of giving the charged party notice of the claim and 'narrow[ing] the issues for prompt adjudication and decision.'" Id. (quoting Laffey v. ...