The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ricardo M. Urbina United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the court on the defendant's motion to dismiss. The pro se plaintiff is employed at the United States Department of Veterans Affairs ("the VA"). She alleges that her supervisor sexually harassed her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.*fn1 Because the court concludes that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to commencing this action, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff is employed by the VA. Def.'s Mot. at 1.*fn2 On January 21, 2010, the plaintiff filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint with the VA, asserting claims of sexual harassment, non-sexual harassment and hostile work environment.
Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. 1 at 1; Def.'s Mot., Ex. 3 at 2.On January 27, 2010, she filed a pro se complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia against her supervisor, Ogbeide Oniha, alleging that he sexually harassed her from June 2009 to October 2009. Compl. at 1. Although the plaintiff has since been reassigned to another office, she alleges that Oniha has attempted to follow her from the VA to the Metro stations and onto Metro trains. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. The plaintiff does not seek monetary damages, asking instead for an order restraining Oniha's contact with her. Id.
On February 19, 2010, the government removed this action from the Superior Court to this court, and the United States was substituted for Oniha as the defendant. See Notice of Removal & Ex. B. On February 26, 2010, the defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Def.'s Mot. at 8-9. The motion is now fully briefed, and the court turns to the applicable legal standard and the parties' arguments.
A. Legal Standard for Exhaustion of Remedies
In actions brought under Title VII, a court has authority over only those claims that are (1) contained in the plaintiff's administrative complaint or claims "like or reasonably related to" those claims in the administrative complaint and (2) claims for which the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies. Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Caldwell v. Serv. Master Corp., 966 F. Supp.33, 49 (D.D.C. 1997). Once a formal administrative complaint has been filed, the employee may file a civil action only after the agency issues a final decision or 180 days lapses from the time of the filing, whichever happens first. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Winston v. Clough, 2010 WL 1875626, at *4 (D.D.C. May 11, 2010).
It is the defendant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that "because untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving it"). Meager, conclusory allegations that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies will not satisfy the defendant's burden. Id. at 12 (noting that a mere assertion of failure to exhaust administrative remedies without more is "clearly inadequate under prevailing regulations to establish a failure to exhaust administrative remedies").
Dismissal results when a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies. Rann v. Chao, 346 F.3d 192, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's ADEA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Gillet v. King, 931 F. Supp. 9, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1996) (dismissing the ...