The opinion of the court was delivered by: Paul L. Friedman United States District Judge
"This case concerns defendant EPA's failure to discharge fully its duty under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments to promulgate regulations governing the discharge of certain hazardous air pollutants." Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d 46, 47 (D.D.C. 2006). By Order of March 31, 2006, this Court entered judgment for plaintiff, finding that EPA's admitted failure to promulgate emission standards pursuant to the Clean Air Act constituted "a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter that is not discretionary with the Administrator" within the meaning of Section 304(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). See Order at 1, Mar. 31, 2006. The Court ordered EPA to fulfill its statutory duties regarding the promulgation of emission standards under Sections 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B), Section 112(c)(6), and Section 183(e) on a prescribed schedule. See id. at 1-3. The Court explained the reasoning underlying its March 31, 2006 Order in its August 2, 2006 Opinion. See Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. at 46.
Pursuant to the schedule established by the Court's Order, EPA was to have fully discharged all of its statutory duties by June 15, 2009. See Order at 3, Mar. 31, 2006; Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 48. Since 2006, however, the Court has granted a number of EPA's motions to extend the deadlines in its March 31, 2006 Order, all without opposition from plaintiff. Thus, as amended, the Court's March 31, 2006 Order now requires, in relevant part, that EPA fully discharge its statutory duties under Sections 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B), and Section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act by January 21, 2011. See Order at 1-2, Sept. 20, 2010; Order at 1, Jan. 12, 2011. EPA now requests an extension of this January 21, 2011 deadline - but this time its request is opposed.*fn2
This matter is before the Court on EPA's motion to amend paragraphs 1(i) and 3 of the Court's March 31, 2006 Order to allow EPA additional time to promulgate regulations governing emission standards for certain hazardous air pollutants. Six intervenors have collectively filed a response in support of EPA's motion. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Upon consideration of the parties' and intervenors' arguments, the applicable legal standards, and the entire record in this case, the Court will deny in part and grant in part EPA's motion.*fn3
A. The Clean Air Act and the 1990 Amendments The Clean Air Act ("CAA" or "the Act") regulates hazardous air pollutants ("HAPs"). The first federal attempt to regulate these HAPs, enacted in 1970, "worked poorly." See S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 128 (1989). Indeed, from 1970 until 1990, "EPA . . . listed only eight substances as hazardous air pollutants . . . and . . . promulgated emissions standards for seven of them." See H.R. REP. NO. 101-490, pt. 1, at 322 (1990). Accordingly, on November 15, 1990, Congress enacted sweeping revisions to the Act. See PUB. L. NO. 101-549, 104 STAT. 2399. The purpose of these revisions was to "entirely restructure the existing law, so that toxics might be adequately regulated by the Federal Government." S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 128 (1989). In place of the prior "risk-based approach," Congress imposed a technology-based emission-control scheme that limited EPA's discretion and that set strict requirements and deadlines for the promulgation of emission standards. See NRDC v. EPA ("NRDC II"), 489 F.3d 1364, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
As the Court previously described:
Title III of the revised statute created a complex scheme for the regulation of 189 specified [HAPs], and directed EPA to identify the sources of those pollutants and to promulgate regulations governing the emission of HAPs from those sources. Congress by statute added to the Clean Air Act the list of pollutants to be regulated, minimum stringency requirements,and (most important for this case) regulation deadlines. It did so because it believed that EPA had failed to regulate enough HAPs under previous air toxics provisions.
Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (emphasis added). Title III recognizes and directs EPA to identify and regulate two basic kinds of sources of air pollutants: (1) major sources; and (2) area sources. Id. These two types of sources are distinguished by the amount of their respective HAP emissions. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(a)(1), (2). At issue in this case are the following two requirements regarding both area sources and major sources:
1. Regulate area sources of the thirty most dangerous HAPs:
Sections 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B), require EPA (1) to "identify not less than 30 hazardous air pollutants which, as the result of emissions from area sources, present the greatest threat to public health in the largest number of urban areas"; (2) to identify the categories or subcategories of sources "accounting for 90 per centum or more of the aggregate emissions of each of the 30 identified hazardous air pollutants" by November 15, 1995; and (3) to issue emission standards for those area source categories by November 15, 2000. Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 49. The emission standards must be based on one of three types of pollution control mechanisms: (1) maximum achievable control technologies ("MACTs"); (2) health-based standards; or (3) generally available control technologies.
See 42 U.S.C.§§ 7412(d)(2), (d)(4), and (d)(5). As of 2006, EPA had fulfilled the first two of its duties under Sections 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B). EPA had failed, however, to fulfill its third duty: by 2006, it had promulgated emission standards for only fifteen of seventy area source categories. Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
2. Regulate sources of seven statutorily-specified HAPs:
Section 112(c)(6) of the Act calls for EPA to regulate the sources of seven specific HAPs, without regard to whether those sources are major sources or area sources and without regard to their inclusion on EPA's list of sources of the thirty most dangerous HAPs. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(6); Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 49. EPA's duties and deadlines with respect to Section 112(c)(6) are identical to its duties with respect to the thirty most dangerous HAPs under Sections 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B). See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(6). The only difference is that EPA emission standards promulgated pursuant to Section 112(c)(6) cannot be based on generally available control technologies. Rather, the emission standards must be either (1) MACTs or (2) health-based standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(2) and (d)(4).
As the Court explained in Sierra Club v. Johnson, because one source may emit numerous pollutants, there is the potential for EPA to satisfy its Section 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B) requirements and its Section 112(c)(6) requirements simultaneously. See Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 48 n.3. In other words, EPA may not need to promulgate regulations directly under Section 112(c)(6), because regulations it promulgates under other sections of the Act may suffice to "account for 90 per centum or more of the aggregate emissions" of the pollutants listed in that section. Id. at 59. Nevertheless, as of 2006, EPA had failed to promulgate emission standards under Section 112(c)(6) for five source categories. Id. at 49. These five source categories were also among the fifty source categories that were required to be regulated under Sections 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B). Id. at 50.
B. History of This Litigation
In 2001, plaintiff filed seven different complaints against EPA, each seeking relief for EPA's failure to discharge a different aspect of its regulatory duties under the Act. These cases were consolidated, and the parties entered into a partial consent decree on May 22, 2003.
Other issues could not be resolved, however, and the parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment. EPA did not contest the issue of liability: it admitted that it had failed to promulgate regulations by the statutory deadline of November 15, 2000. Accordingly, the only matter before the Court was to fashion an appropriate equitable remedy.
On March 31, 2006, the Court issued its Order denying EPA's motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Court ordered EPA to fulfill its statutory duties under Sections 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B), Section 112(c)(6), and Section 183(e) on a prescribed schedule that would "best preserve the intent of Congress in enacting the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, without calling upon defendants to do the impossible." See Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 61. That Order required, in relevant part, that EPA "promulgate standards under CAA Section 112(d) for those area source categories listed by EPA pursuant to CAA Section 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B) as source categories that are necessary to meet the 90 percent statutory threshold identified in Section 112(c)(3) and (k)(3)(B), and for which it has not yet issued standards" on a set schedule to be completed in full by June 15, 2009. See Order at 2, Mar. 31, 2006; Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 48, 61. That Order further required that "[n]o later than December 15, 2007, EPA shall promulgate emission standards assuring that source categories ...