Plaintiff Marlon J. Harris, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689 ("Union") seeking reinstatement to his position as an Electrical Mechanic C with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"). Before the Court is the Union's motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth herein, the Union's motion will be granted.
Under the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between WMATA and Local 689 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, an employee in plaintiff's position is assessed points for unscheduled absences according to the "Attendance Report Procedures" for Local 689. WMATA's Mot. for Summ. J. ("WMATA Mot."), Ex. A (CBA) & B (Attendance Report Procedures), Harris v. WMATA, No. 11-cv-0891 (D.D.C. July 6, 2011).*fn1
On October 26, 2009, WMATA discharged plaintiff because he exceeded the maximum number of points allowed during a 365-day period. WMATA Mot., Statement of Materials Facts ¶ 1 ("WMATA Facts"). Plaintiff filed a grievance challenging his termination. WMATA Facts ¶ 2. The grievance process ended on March 3, 2010, when the Union and WMATA entered into a "last chance" settlement agreement. Id. ¶ 2; WMATA Mot., Ex. C, ¶ 3 ("Settlement Agreement"). The terms of the settlement provided that plaintiff would be reinstated, but that for the ensuing six-month period he would be "automatically terminated from employment with WMATA" for "any violations under the [Attendance Report Procedures]." WMATA Facts ¶ 3; Settlement Agreement ¶ 3. The Settlement Agreement was signed by representatives of WMATA and the Union. WMATA Mot., Ex. C, at 2.
Plaintiff returned to work on May 13, 2010, but after he reported late on June 29, 2010, he was terminated for violating the Attendance Report Procedures and the Settlement Agreement. WMATA Facts ¶ 3; WMATA Mot., Ex. D. Plaintiff filed a new grievance, which was denied at Steps 1-4 of the grievance process established by the collective bargaining agreement. CBA § 104(b); WMATA Facts ¶ 4; WMATA Mot., Exs. E-I. After receiving the fourth step denial of plaintiff's grievance, on July 27, 2010, the Union opted not to demand arbitration. WMATA Facts ¶ 5; CBA § 104(b).*fn2
On May 13, 2011, plaintiff filed the above-captioned suit against the Union. His complaint, in its entirety, stated:
I was wrongfully terminated from my job as an Electrical Mechanic C for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). I went to my Union Local 689 to rectify this matter. After being out of work for six months, I was called by WMATA and told to come in for a physical. I did and passed and then began asking when I would return to work. I was then told by WMATA that the Union would inform me on my return date. I called the Union and asked when I was to return to work and was told that they though[t] I was already at work. I informed them that I was not. They told me to call back and they would get to the bottom of the situation. After an additional two months, I was called and told to return to work. I did return to work and two months later I was terminated again due to an agreement that was made with management that I had no knowledge or had ever been informed of such agreement. I am requesting a jury trial.
I would like to appeal the agreement made by my Union since I did not sign it and was never made aware of it. I feel that I should not be held responsible for an arrangement that I did not receive, sign nor agree to it[sic]. I would like the reinstatement of my position as an Electrical Mechanic C for WMATA with all benefits and back pay. (Compl. at 1-2) (emphasis added).*fn3 The Union moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. (Union Mot. to Dismiss, July 29, 2011 ["Union Mot."]). Plaintiff responded on August 26, 2011. (Pl.'s Resp. to Union Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 1, Aug. 26, 2011 ["Pl.'s Resp."].)*fn4
The Union has moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to join WMATA as a party under Rule 19, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), for failure to exhaust internal union appeals and on the ground that it cannot be liable for damages stemming from WMATA's allegedly wrongful conduct. (Union Mem. at 1.) As plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, there is no need to address the merits of the Union's alternative arguments.
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'" such that a court may "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to or incorporated in the complaint, matters of which courts may take judicial notice, and documents appended to a motion to dismiss whose authenticity is not disputed, if they are referred to in the complaint and integral to a claim. U.S. ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Tech. Servs., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2010).
II. BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Although plaintiff's complaint does not identify a specific legal basis for his claim against the Union, the Court will construe it as alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, as plaintiff is challenging the Union's settlement of his grievance proceeding after he was first terminated by WMATA. See, e.g., Ramey v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 580 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2008) (construing claim for conspiracy against union as one for breach of the duty of fair representation because "[t]o the extent that the Union had a duty to [plaintiff], that duty is defined . . . by a collective bargaining agreement . . . as well as applicable federal statutes," and is, therefore, governed by § 301 of the LMRA); Price v. Union Local 25, No. 10-1865, 2011 WL 2144564, at *2-*3 (D.D.C. June 1, 2011) (where plaintiff made no "specific legal claim," court ...