The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gladys Kessler United States District Judge
Plaintiffs William S. Harris, Reginald E. Howard, and Peter M. Thornton, Sr. are former employees of Waste Management Holdings, Inc. ("Old Waste") and participants in the Waste Management Profit Sharing and Savings Plan ("Old Waste Plan" or "Plan"). They bring this action on behalf of the Plan's approximately 30,000 participants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq., against Defendants,*fn1 all of whom were fiduciaries of the Old Waste Plan*fn2 or of its successor plan, the Waste Management Retirement Savings Plan ("New Waste Plan").*fn3
This matter is now before the Court on the portions of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that address Counts VI and VII against Defendants State Street Bank and Trust Company ("State Street") and Old Waste [Dkt. No. 435], and on State Street's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 442].*fn4 Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions, Replies, and the entire record herein, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied as to Counts VI and VII. State Street and Old Waste's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
This action arises from Old Waste's announcement on February 24, 1998, that, prior to 1992 and continuing through the first three quarters of 1997, it had materially overstated its reported income by approximately $1.3 billion, and that it was therefore restating several of its financial statements for periods between 1991 and 1997. That announcement led to the filing of a securities class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which settled on September 17, 1999 (the "Illinois Litigation").
Earlier, on July 15, 1999, the Illinois district court entered a Preliminary Approval Order approving a proposed settlement and provisionally certifying a class, for settlement purposes only, of all persons (other than Defendants and their affiliates) who had acquired Old Waste common stock between November 3, 1994, and February 24, 1998. See Fifth Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 138 [Dkt. No. 408]. Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, "a Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action, dated July 20, 1999 (the 'Illinois Class Notice'), was sent to [all] members of the [Illinois settlement class], including the Plan and its fiduciaries." Id. The Illinois Notice described the scope of the release that would be given by members of the Illinois settlement class in exchange for the settlement consideration, and advised class members of their right to object to or opt out of the proposed settlement by September 2, 1999. See id.
At the time of the Illinois settlement, State Street served as Trustee and Investment Manager for the New Waste Plan.*fn6 State Street Bank and Trust Co.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def.'s SoF") ¶ 4 [Dkt. No. 442]; Pls.' Counter-Statement in Response to State Street Bank and Trust Co.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pls.' CSoF") ¶ 4 [Dkt. No. 470-1]. As Trustee and Investment Manager, State Street received the Illinois Class Notice on or about July 27, 1999. Def.'s SoF ¶ 13; Pls.' CSoF ¶ 13. State Street then forwarded the Notice to Monet Ewing, an attorney in its legal department. Def.'s SoF ¶ 14; Pls.' CSoF ¶ 14. At that time, it was State Street's practice to review the terms of a securities class action settlement and to prepare and submit claims on behalf of benefit plans for which it served as trustee.
Def.'s SoF ¶ 16; Pls.' CSoF ¶ 16. Under the terms of the settlement in the Illinois Litigation, Old Waste and its agents were released from liability for any claims--including unknown claims--brought by members of the Illinois Settlement Class in exchange for $220 million. Def.'s SoF ¶ 12; Pls.' CSoF ¶ 12; Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action 7-8, July 20, 1999 [Dkt. No. 440-16]. On December 1, 1999, State Street submitted a claim on behalf of the New Waste Plan, resulting in a recovery of $86,609.76. Def.'s SoF ¶ 28; Pls.' CSoF ¶ 28.
On April 1, 2002, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court, alleging ten counts of ERISA violations pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(2), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Plaintiffs' claims were originally divided into three periods. First, Plaintiffs alleged five ERISA violations related to the Plan's purchase of inflated shares of Company Stock in the first claim period between January 1, 1990, and February 24, 1998 (Counts I-V, the "First Period Claims"). Second, Plaintiffs alleged four ERISA violations related to the release of claims by the Plan's fiduciaries in the Illinois Litigation in the second claim period between July 15, 1999, and December 1, 1999 (Counts VI-IX, the "Second Period Claims"). Third, Plaintiffs alleged one ERISA violation related to the release of claims by State Street in the Texas Litigation in the third claim period between February 7, 2002, and July 15, 2002 (Count X).
While there has been a significant amount of litigation regarding the various counts, the only counts relevant to the pending Motions are Counts VI and VII, which are also the only remaining counts specific to State Street.*fn7 Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fifth--and final--Amended Complaint, Count VI alleges that, during the second claim period, from July 15, 1999, to December 1, 1999, State Street breached its fiduciary duty by failing to adequately investigate and preserve claims of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404 in the Illinois Litigation and by causing those claims to be released.*fn8 Count VII alleges that, during the same time period, Old Waste and State Street engaged in a prohibited transaction in violation of ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A) by releasing claims in the Illinois Litigation.*fn9
On March 30, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which addressed, in part, Counts VI and VII against State Street and Old Waste ("Pls.' Mot."). On the same date, State Street filed its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mot."). On May 2, 2011, State Street filed a Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Opp'n") [Dkt. No. 467], and Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to State Street's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pls.' Opp'n") [Dkt. No. 470]. On June 8, 2011, Plaintiffs ("Pls.' Reply") [Dkt. No. 497] and State Street ("Def.'s Reply") [Dkt. No. 506] filed their respective Replies.
Summary judgment may be granted "only if" the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), as amended Dec. 1, 2007; Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In other words, the moving party must satisfy two requirements: first, that there is no "genuine" factual dispute and, second, if there is, that it is "material" to the case. "A dispute over a material fact is 'genuine' if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.'" Arrington, 473 F.3d at 333 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the substantive governing law. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
As the Supreme Court stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Supreme Court has further explained, [a]s we have emphasized, "[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 . . . (1986) (footnote omitted). "'[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.'"
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48) (emphasis in original).
However, the Supreme Court has also consistently emphasized that "at the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. In both Liberty Lobby and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000), the Supreme Court cautioned that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate ...