The opinion of the court was delivered by: John M. Facciola United States Magistrate Judge
This case was referred to me for full case management. Currently pending and ready for resolution is plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Take Expedited Discovery [#4].
Plaintiff, People Pictures, LLC, is the owner of the copyright for the motion picture "The People I've Slept With". Plaintiff's Original Complaint [#1] ¶1. According to plaintiff, numerous individuals illegally downloaded and distributed its film over the Internet, in violation of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2010).*fn1 Id. ¶¶4, 8. At the time the law suit was filed, plaintiff did not know the identities of these individuals. Id. ¶2. Plaintiff did, however, know the Internet Protocol ("IP") address of the computers associated with the alleged infringers. Id.
In its current motion, plaintiff seeks to conduct expedited discovery [prior to the Rule 26(f)*fn2 ] conference so that it may learn the identity of these individuals and thereafter amend its complaint to reflect the same. [#1] at 2. Specifically, plaintiff seeks leave to serve Rule 45 subpoenas on the various Internet Service Providers ("ISP") associated with the previously identified IP addresses, in order to obtain "the true name, address, telephone number, e-mail address and Media Access Control ("MAC") address of each subscriber that it has identified to date and those it identifies in the future during the course of this litigation." Id. In addition, if the ISP identifies an intermediary ISP as the entity providing online services, plaintiff seeks leave to serve the subpoena on that ISP. Id.
Plaintiff therefore seeks what is in essence jurisdictional discovery. Pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although "[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f)," they may do so "when authorized . . . by court order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Such authorization, however, must be based on a showing of "good cause". Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). "[I]n order to get jurisdictional discovery[,] a plaintiff must have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Caribbean Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Furthermore, it is well within the court's purview under Rule 26 to impose reasonable limitations on discovery when "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit". Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c). See also Linder v. Dep't of Def., 133 F.3d 17, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable 'must be determined according to the facts of the case,' such as the party's need for the documents and the nature and importance of the litigation.") (internal quotation omitted); In re Micron Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The 'undue burden' test requires district courts to be 'generally sensitive' to the costs imposed on third parties . . .") (internal quotations omitted); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 231 F.R.D. 49, 51 (D.D.C. 2005) ("While quashing a subpoena goes against courts' general preference for a broad scope of discovery . . . limiting discovery is appropriate when the burden of providing the documents outweighs the need for it.").
Plaintiff's cause of action, tortious copyright infringement,*fn3 is brought under a federal statute, the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act does not provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over alleged infringers on a nationwide or other basis. Plaintiff must therefore predicate the court's jurisdiction over the infringers on the reach of District of Columbia law. It first provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in the District of Columbia as to "any claim for relief." D.C. Code § 13-422 (2001). The so-called "long arm" provision of the personal jurisdiction statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's - -
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;
D.C. Code § 13-423 (2001).
Thus, unless the infringer is domiciled in the District of Columbia, the question presented is where the infringement occurred and whether it occurred in the District of Columbia.
In Nu Image, Judge Wilkins considered this very question and followed the approach taken by the D.C. Circuit in Helmer v. Dolestskaya, 393 F.3d. 201 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Nu Image, 2011 WL 3240562, at *3. In Helmer, plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, brought suit against his former girlfriend, a Russian citizen, for fraud and breach of contract. Helmer, 393 F.3d. at 203. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to reimburse him for real and personal property acquired while they were living together in Moscow. Id. The court of appeals upheld the lower court's finding that the injury occurred outside of the District of Columbia:
The district court ruled that although [defendant] fraudulently concealed her personal background during her visit to the District of Columbia, the fraud did not cause injury here because [plaintiff] was not "physically present" in the District of Columbia when [defendant] incurred the credit card charges, when [plaintiff] paid the credit card charges, when [plaintiff] purchased the apartment, or when [defendant] registered the apartment in her own name.
As a result, the court of appeals held that, because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant's fraud caused him injury in the District of Columbia, the court could not exercise personal ...