The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ricardo M. Urbina United States District Judge
DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND;GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE
This matter is before the court on the pro se plaintiff's motion to remand, or, in the alternative, for voluntary dismissal of her claim. The plaintiff initially alleged a variety of statutory and common law claims against the defendants in connection with a promissory note and deed of trust that was executed by the plaintiff in 1996. Earlier this year, the court dismissed all but one of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff now moves to remand or, in the alternative, to voluntarily dismiss her remaining claim without prejudice. Because the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's remaining claim, the court denies the plaintiff's motion to remand. Because the defendants would not be prejudiced by voluntary dismissal, however, the court grants the plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss her claim without prejudice.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff commenced this action in May 2010 in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See generally Compl. She alleges that Capital One, N.A. ("Capital One") and an attorney, David Prensky ("Prensky") engaged in tortious conduct in connection with a promissory note and deed of trust that was executed by the plaintiff in 1996. See generally id. In her original complaint, the plaintiff asserted a variety of causes of action against the defendants under District of Columbia law, including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. Notice of Removal ¶ 1.
On June 9, 2010, the plaintiff amended her complaint to include additional claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. See generally Am. Compl.; Notice of Removal ¶ 4. On June 17, 2010, the defendants filed a notice of removal in this court, asserting that the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on the presence of a federal question, the diversity of the parties and the amount in controversy. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 10-12.
In July 2010, the plaintiff moved to remand this case to the Superior Court and for joinder of Chasen & Chasen, the law firm with which Prensky is associated, as a defendant in this action. See generally Pl.'s Mot. to Remand ("Pl.'s Mot."). This court denied both motions in a January 2011 Memorandum Opinion. See generally Mem. Op. (Jan. 6, 2011). Soon thereafter, defendant Capital One moved to dismiss all of the claims against it, and defendant Prensky moved to dismiss all but one of the claims against him. The court granted both motions in March 2011. See generally Mem. Op. (Mar. 28, 2011). Following the court's March 2011 decision, the only remaining claim in this action is the plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim against defendant Prensky.
The plaintiff filed an appeal, which the Circuit summarily rejected as premature. See generally Busby v. Capitol One, N.A., Case No. 11-7035 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 19, 2011), Order. In September 2011, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for remand or, in the alternative, for voluntary dismissal. See generally Pl.'s Mot. With the plaintiff's motion now ripe for adjudication, the court turns to the parties' arguments and the relevant legal standards.
A. The Court Denies the Plaintiff's ...