Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Companhia Brasileira Carbureto De Calcio -- Cbcc, et al v. Applied Industrial Materials Corporation

January 26, 2012

COMPANHIA BRASILEIRA CARBURETO DE CALCIO -- CBCC, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
APPLIED INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLEES.



On Certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (10-7051)

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Fisher, Associate Judge

Argued October 27, 2011

Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, and FISHER and OBERLY, Associate Judges.

Pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-723 (2001), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit certified the following question of law to this court:

Under District of Columbia law, does a petition sent to a federal government agency in the District provide a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over the petitioner when the plaintiff has alleged that the petition fraudulently induced unwarranted government action against the plaintiff? Companhia Brasileira Carbureto de Calicio v. Applied Industrial aterials Corp., 395 U.S. App. D.C. 106, 110, 640 F.3d 369, 373 (2011). We hold that it does.

I. Legal Framework

Before a court in the District of Columbia may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two criteria must be satisfied. First, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be authorized by the District's long-arm statute. As relevant here, that statute provides:

(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's-

(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;

(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;

(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia[.]

D.C. Code § 13-423 (a) (2001). "When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section [of the long-arm statute], only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him." Id. § 13-423 (b).

Second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the requirements of due process. "To satisfy the requirements of due process, the nonresident defendant must have had sufficient 'minimum contacts' with the forum state to justify subjecting him to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by its courts." Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 811 (D.C. 1976) (en banc); see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In assessing whether a defendant's contacts with the District are sufficient, "the most critical inquiry is not whether the nonresident defendant is physically present in the forum but whether the defendant's contacts with the forum are of such a quality and nature that they manifest a deliberate and voluntary association with the forum and are not fortuitous or accidental." Harris v. Omelon, 985 A.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. 2009) (internal editing and citation omitted); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-99 ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.