Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Michael S. Flaherty, et al v. *Fn1 John Bryson

March 8, 2012


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gladys Kessler United States District Judge


Plaintiffs Michael S. Flaherty, Captain Alan A. Hastbacka, and the Ocean River Institute bring this suit against Defendants Commerce Secretary Gary Locke, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), and the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"). Plaintiffs allege that Amendment 4 to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan violates the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act ("MSA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 et seq.

This matter is now before the Court on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. Nos. 17, 19]. Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions, Replies, Oral Argument, Supplemental Briefs, the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.


A. Statutory Background

1. The Magnuson-Stevens Act

Congress first enacted the MSA in 1976 "to take immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources found off the coasts of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1). The Act provides a "national program" designed "to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, to insure conservation, to facilitate long-term protection of essential fish habitats, and to realize the full potential of the Nation's fishery resources." Id. § 1801(a)(6).

In order to balance the need for "a cohesive national policy and the protection of state interests," the MSA establishes eight Regional Fishery Management Councils composed of federal officials, state officials, and private parties appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. C&W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1991); 16 U.S.C. § 1852. These councils are responsible for developing fishery management plans ("FMPs") for fisheries in federal waters within the United States Exclusive Economic Zone, which includes ocean water from three to two hundred miles offshore. Id. § 1853.

Each council must prepare and submit to NMFS*fn2 an FMP and any amendments that may become necessary "for each fishery under its authority that requires conservation and management." Id. § 1852(h)(1). FMPs must include the "conservation and management measures" that are "necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery, to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to protect, restore, and promote the long-term health and stability of the fishery."*fn3 Id. § 1853(a)(1)(A).

FMPs must also be consistent with the ten "National Standards" provided for in the MSA, as well as all other provisions of the MSA, and "any other applicable law." Id. § 1853(a)(1)(C); see also id. § 1851 (setting forth National Standards).

Once a council has developed a plan, NMFS must review the plan to determine whether it comports with the ten National Standards and other applicable law. Id. § 1854(a)(1)(A). Next, after a period of notice and comment, NMFS must "approve, disapprove, or partially approve a plan or amendment," depending on whether the plan or amendment is consistent with the Standards and applicable law. Id. § 1854(a)(3). Even if NMFS disapproves the proposed FMP or amendment, it may not rewrite it. That responsibility remains with the council, except under specifically defined circumstances. Id. §§ 1854(a)(4), (c). If NMFS approves the plan or does not express disapproval within 30 days, the FMP becomes effective. Id. § 1854(a)(3).

At the beginning of 2007, Congress re-authorized and amended the MSA. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006 ("MSRA"), P.L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007). One of the goals of the MSRA was to "set[] a firm deadline to end overfishing in America." 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. S83, S83. To accomplish this purpose, Congress added provisions to the MSA calling for science based limits on total fish caught in each fishery.

The amended MSA requires the regional councils to add to all FMPs mechanisms for setting the limits, termed Annual Catch Limits ("ACLs"), on the amount of fish caught and accountability measures ("AMs") for ensuring compliance with the ACLs. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15). These limits and accountability measures must take effect "in fishing year 2011" for most fisheries, including the Atlantic herring fishery.*fn4 Pub. L. No. 109-479, § 104(b), 120 Stat. 3575, 3584.

2. The National Environmental Policy Act

Congress enacted NEPA in order "to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may . . . fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). To accomplish that goal, NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") whenever they propose "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. § 4332(2)(C).

To determine whether an EIS must be prepared, the agency must first prepare an environmental assessment ("EA"). 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). An EA must "[b]riefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact." Id. § 1508.9(a). Even if the agency performs only an EA, it must still briefly discuss the need for the proposal, the alternatives, and the environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternatives. Id. § 1508.9(b). If the agency determines, after preparing an EA, that a full EIS is not necessary, it must prepare a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI") setting forth the reasons why the action will not have a significant impact on the environment. Id. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiffs challenge Amendment 4 to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan, developed by the New England Fishery Management Council (the "Council"). 76 Fed. Reg. 11373 (Mar. 2, 2011). Atlantic herring (Clupea harengus) have been managed through the Atlantic Herring FMP since January 10, 2001. Administrative Record ("AR") 5578.

Atlantic herring inhabit the Atlantic Ocean off of the East coast of the United States and Canada, ranging from North Carolina to the Canadian Maritime Provinces. Id. at 6091. Atlantic herring can grow to about 15.6 inches in length and live 15-18 years. Id. at 6092. Atlantic herring play a vital role in the Northwest Atlantic ecosystem, serving as a "forage species," i.e. food, for a number of other fish, marine mammals, and seabirds. Id. at 6111.

Human beings also hunt Atlantic herring. Fishermen and women predominantly catch Atlantic herring using midwater trawl gear, paired midwater trawls, and purse seines. AR 6146. To do this, boats working alone or in tandem drag nets through the water scooping up fish as they go. Not surprisingly, these nets snare large numbers of other fish and marine wildlife at the same time. Id. at 6146-48, 6170-80.

Of particular concern to Plaintiffs are four species, often caught incidentally with Atlantic herring, collectively referred to as "river herring": (1) blueback herring (Alosa aestivalis), (2) alewive (Alosa pseudoharengus), (3) American shad (Alosa sapidissima), and (4) hickory shad (Alosa mediocris). See Pls.' Mot. 1. River herring are apparently so-called because they are anadromous--that is, they spawn in rivers but otherwise spend most of their lives at sea, whereas Atlantic herring spend their entire lives at sea. Id. It is undisputed that river herring play a similar role to Atlantic herring, providing forage for large fish and mammals, including cod, striped bass, bluefin tuna, sharks, marine mammals, and seabirds. Id. at 1, 8; see also AR 763-64. The Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan, as updated by Amendment 4, provides ACLS and AMs for Atlantic herring but not for river herring.

C. Procedural Background

On May 8, 2008, NMFS published a Notice of Intent, announcing that the Council would be preparing Amendment 4 to the Atlantic Herring FMP as well as an Environmental Impact Statement. AR 5577. The Notice explained that the MSRA required that ACLs and AMs be established by 2011 for all fisheries not subject to overfishing. Id. at 5578. Because the Atlantic herring fishery had not been determined to be subject to overfishing, Amendment 4 was "necessary to update the Herring FMP in a manner . . . consistent with the new requirements of the MSRA" and was required to be in place by 2011. Id.

The Notice also indicated measures under consideration by the Council. Specifically, the Notice stated that Amendment 4 might address as many as five objectives:

1. To implement measures to improve the long-term monitoring of catch (landings and bycatch) in the herring fishery;

2. To implement ACLs and AMs consistent with the MSRA;

3. To implement other management measures as necessary to ensure compliance with the new provisions of the MSRA;

4. To develop a sector allocation process or other LAPP ["Limited Access Privilege Program"] for the herring fishery; and

5. In the context of objectives 1--4 (above), to consider the health of the herring resource and the important role of herring as a forage fish and a predator fish throughout its range.


However, on December 28, 2009, NMFS and the Council changed course. At that time, NMFS issued a second Notice of Intent explaining that "only the ACL/AM components will move forward as Amendment 4, and that the Council intends to prepare EA for the action." Id. at 5640-41. In addition, "[a]ll other proposed measures formerly included in Amendment 4, including the catch monitoring program for the herring fishery, measures to address river herring bycatch, criteria for midwater trawl access to groundfish closed areas, and measures to address interactions with the mackerel fishery, will now be considered in Amendment 5." Id. at 5641. The Notice also promised that those "measures will be analyzed in an EIS" to be issued with Amendment 5. Id.

In short, the Government dropped from Amendment 4 any attempt to add protections for fish other than the Atlantic herring, such as the river herring of concern to Plaintiffs in this litigation, electing only to address Atlantic herring ACLs and AMs.

On March 2, 2011, NMFS published Amendment 4 as a Final Rule in the Federal Register. Id. at 6325. In keeping with the December 28, 2009 Notice of Intent, Amendment 4 designated Atlantic herring as the only "stock in the fishery" and did not provide for any measures specifically targeted at protecting river herring. Id. at 6326. The Final Rule implemented an Interim Acceptable Biological Catch ("ABC") Control Rule for Atlantic herring, from which ACLs could then be determined. Id. at 6327. The Final Rule also established three AMs: (1) when a threshold amount of Atlantic herring is caught, NMFS is to close relevant management areas; (2) if a certain amount of haddock is incidentally caught, vessels are to face restrictions; and (3) if the total amount of Atlantic herring caught in a year exceeds any ACL or sub-ACL, the ACL or sub-ACL is to be reduced by a corresponding amount in the year after the calculation is made. Id.

On April 1, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint [Dkt. No. 1]. Plaintiffs allege that: (1) Defendants violated the MSA and APA by failing to include catch limits for river herring in Amendment 4; (2) Defendants violated the MSA and APA by failing to set adequate ACLs for Atlantic herring in Amendment 4; (3) Defendants violated the MSA and APA by failing to set adequate AMs for Atlantic herring in Amendment 4; and (4) Defendants violated NEPA by failing to develop an EIS for Amendment 4. Compl. ¶¶ 70-113.

On September 9, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pls.' Mot.") [Dkt. No. 17]. On October 7, 2011, Defendants filed their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion and Cross- Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Mot.") [Dkt. No. 19]. On October 28, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Reply to Defendants' Opposition and Opposition to Defendants' Motion ("Pls.' Reply") [Dkt. No. 20]. On November 18, 2011, Defendants filed their Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition ("Defs.' Reply") [Dkt. 22]. On January 4, 2012, oral argument on the cross-motions was heard by this Court. On January 11, 2012, with the Court's permission, Defendants and Plaintiffs filed respective Supplemental Memoranda ("Defs.' Supp. Mem." and "Pls.' Supp. Mem.") [Dkt. Nos. 27 and 28].


Summary judgment will be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because this case involves a challenge to a final administrative decision, the Court's review on summary judgment is limited to the Administrative Record. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)); Richards v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Summary judgment is an appropriate procedure for resolving a challenge to a federal agency's administrative decision when review is based upon the administrative record.").

Agency decisions under the Magnuson-Stevens Act and NEPA are reviewed pursuant to Section 706(2) of the APA. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(B) ("the appropriate court shall only set aside" actions under the MSA "on a ground specified in [5 U.S.C. §§] 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D)."); Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, ___F.3d___, No. 10-5299, 2011 WL 2802989, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 2011); C&W Fish, 931 F.2d at 1562; Oceana v. Locke, ___F. Supp. 2d___, No. 10-744 (JEB), 2011 WL 6357795, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2011). In relevant part, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) requires a court to hold agency action unlawful if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

The arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA is a narrow standard of review. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). It is well established in our Circuit that the "court's review is . . . highly deferential" and "we are 'not to substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency' but must 'consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.'" Bloch v. Powell, 348 F.3d 1060, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting S. Co. Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 313 F.3d 574, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Paddack, 825 F.2d 504, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1987). However, this deferential standard cannot permit courts "merely to rubber stamp agency actions," NRDC v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2000), nor be used to shield the agency's decision from undergoing a "thorough, probing, in-depth review." Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d 1487, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

An agency satisfies the arbitrary and capricious standard if it "examine[s] the relevant data and articulate[s] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); Lichoulas v. FERC, 606 F.3d 769, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Finally, courts "do not defer to the agency's conclusory or unsupported suppositions." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 2004).


A. Standing

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed because they lack Article III standing. Defs.' Mot. 13-15. The doctrine of standing reflects Article III's "fundamental limitation" of federal jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). The doctrine "requires federal courts to satisfy themselves that 'the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his [or her] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)) (emphasis on "his" in original).

To obtain the injunctive relief they seek, Plaintiffs must show that (1) they have "suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); see also Summers, 555 U.S. at 493; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that their alleged injury is "imminent" or "traceable." Defs.' Mot. 13. They have not challenged any of the other requirements for standing.

1. Injury in Fact--Imminence

Plaintiffs claim that they are harmed (1) because they are unable to fish for or observe river herring and (2) because, due to the decline of river and Atlantic herring as forage, they are less able to fish for or observe striped bass. Flaherty Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 12-13; Hastbacka Decl. ¶¶ 6-9, 14-16; Moir Decl. ¶¶ 14, 16-17 [Dkt. No. 17-2]. Defendants argue that the injury associated with striped bass is not actual or imminent because Plaintiffs have failed to assert that they are "actually unable to fish for striped bass as a result of NMFS' actions." Defs.' Mot. 13 (emphasis in original).

Defendants are incorrect. Captain Alan Hastbacka has asserted that the fish his clients target, which include striped bass, are "more abundant, bigger, and healthier" when "there are adequate forage fish" and that he can "sell more tackle . . . when the fishing is good." Hastbacka Decl. ¶ 6. During at least one fishing season, the fish targeted by Captain Hastbacka and his clients, including striped bass, disappeared when the Atlantic herring stock in the area was depleted. Id. ¶ 9. Michael Flaherty similarly states that "Defendants' failures challenged in this case . . . negatively impact the health and population levels of the striped bass I fish for." Flaherty Decl. ¶ 12.

In other words, Plaintiffs claim that their ability to fish striped bass for sport or business has been, and will continue to be, harmed by the state of the Atlantic herring fishery because adequate conservation measures to protect the herring upon which striped bass feed have not been adopted. See, e.g., N.C. Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 518 F. Supp. 2d 62, 82 (D.D.C. 2007) (economic harm "is a canonical example of injury in fact sufficient to establish standing.") (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

Indeed, Defendants themselves have amply made the point that Atlantic herring serve as an important forage species for striped bass and other ocean predators. AR 6111. In its analysis of Amendment 4, the Council stated that its actions "should acknowledge the role that Atlantic herring plays in the Northwest Atlantic ecosystem and address the importance of herring as a forage species for many fish stocks, marine mammals, and seabirds."

Id. According to the Council, "[o]ne of the objectives of this amendment . . . is . . . to consider the health of the herring resource and the important role of herring as a forage fish." Id. at 6111-12. Hence, there is no doubt that Plaintiffs face imminent harm to their interests in striped bass, should Defendants fail to properly manage Atlantic herring.

Defendants attempt to analogize this case to FCC v. Branton, 993 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1993). They argue that, "[a]s in Branton, where the plaintiff did not have standing because his injury was based on a possibility that he may someday be exposed to harm, Captain Hastbacka's concern that he may 'someday' be unable to fish for striped bass as a result of the actions that NMFS took in Amendment 4 is patently insufficient to satisfy the 'injury in fact' requirement." Defs.' Mot. 13-14.

Defendants' analysis is not convincing. Branton pointed out that "[i]n order to challenge official conduct one must show that one 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' in fact as a result of that conduct." 993 F.2d at 908 (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969)). The plaintiff in Branton alleged "that he was injured because he was subjected to indecent language over the airwaves" on one past occasion. Id. at 909. Our Court of Appeals held that "a discrete, past injury cannot establish the standing of a complainant . . . who seeks neither damages nor other relief for that harm, but instead requests the imposition of a sanction in the hope of influencing another's future behavior." Id. The allegation of a single incident of indecent language is obviously very different from the ongoing scenario presented here, where Plaintiffs state that the striped bass which they and their clients fish and observe are now and will in the future be threatened by overfishing of the Atlantic and river herring.

Plaintiffs in this case have alleged continuous and ongoing harm to their ability to fish for species dependant on the Atlantic and river herring. The harm to striped bass stemming from improper regulation of forage fish presents a concrete explanation for how Plaintiffs will be injured by Defendants' actions. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564; N.C. Fisheries Ass'n, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (in addressing the injury in fact prong, "courts ask simply whether the plaintiff has 'asserted a present or ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.