The opinion of the court was delivered by: Alan Kay United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is pending before this Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for [summary judgment on the issue of] Fees and Costs ("Fee Motion") and Memorandum in support thereof ("Memorandum") ; Defendant's opposition to the Motion ("Opposition") ; and Plaintiff's reply to the Opposition ("Reply") .*fn1 Plaintiff Yvonne Huntley Flores ("Plaintiff') has requested $1,039.40 in legal fees and costs, a portion of which is contested by Defendant District of Columbia ("Defendant" or "the District") on grounds that the documentation supporting such claim is inadequate; the hourly rate charged by Plaintiff's counsel is excessive and some of counsel's billing entries are "remote" in time. (Opposition, Exh. 1 [Defendant's chart of proposed allowable fees and reasons for fee reductions].)*fn2
Plaintiff is the guardian of a minor child who prevailed in an administrative action brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Improvement Act ( collectively "IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B), a court may award attorney's fees to a parent who prevails in an IDEA proceeding. Prior to filing this civil action, the Plaintiff participated in a February 12, 2008 due process hearing wherein the Hearing Officer determined that:
DCPS violated the terms of the Consent Decree by refusing to honor the letter from Petitioner's counsel requesting a compensatory education meeting, and by insisting that such a meeting could be requested only by means of a selection card, because the Consent Decree does not require the use of any particular method for electing a compensatory education meeting. (February 22, 2008 Impartial Due Process Hearing Officer's Decision ("HOD") at 5, attached to Notice of Removal  (emphasis in original).) The Hearing Officer inter alia ordered DCPS to "convene an IEP/MDT meeting to discuss and determine the form and amount of compensatory education due Student. . . ." (Id.)
The District does not contest Plaintiff's prevailing party status in this case but the District does note an objection to Plaintiff's "inadequate documentation" in the chart attached to its Opposition as Exhibit 1. The District proffers no explanation for this objection other than its claim that the HOD in this case "appears identical" to an HOD in another case involving Plaintiff Yvonne Huntley. Comparing the two HODs, this Court notes that Plaintiff Yvonne Huntley is the guardian for two siblings, both of whom were scheduled for due process hearings on February 12, 2008, one at 9:00 a.m. and the other at 11:00 a.m. During the first hearing, the Petitioner made an oral motion to consolidate the hearings. (February 22, 2008 HOD at 2.) The Hearing Officer granted the motion to consolidate because the "Complaints in both matters were filed on the same date, alleged the same single claim, and involved essentially the same set of facts. . . ." (Id.) While the HODs are very similar [because the complaints alleged the same single claim], this Court finds that the District's claim of "inadequate documentation" is misplaced. Counsel for Plaintiff prepared a complaint on behalf of each sibling and both complaints were set for hearings that were consolidated, thus resulting in the issuance of two similar but separate HODs. The Court notes that the District makes no claim that the time billed for the two HODs or any follow-up on the HODs is duplicative and the time charges billed for both are reasonable.
Plaintiff originally filed her complaint for legal fees and costs with the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defendant removed this and other simultaneously filed cases to this Court and the parties subsequently consented to the referral of all such cases to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes. The parties were directed to brief the issues in these cases in the form of motions for legal fees and responses thereto.
The IDEA gives courts authority to award reasonable attorney's fees to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B). An action or proceeding under IDEA includes both civil litigation in federal court and administrative litigation before hearing officers. Smith v. Roher, 954 F. Supp. 359, 362 (D.D.C. 1997); Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of any fee requests. See In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[A] fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates.") "An award of attorneys' fees is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the case." Smith, 954 F. Supp. at 364 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhard, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). The result of this calculation is the "lodestar" amount. Smith, 954 F. Supp. at 364.
20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(C) states that "[f]ees awarded under this paragraph shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished." 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(C). To demonstrate a reasonable hourly rate, the fee applicant must show: an attorney's usual billing practices; counsel's skill, experience and reputation; as well as the prevailing market rates in the community. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. The determination of a "market rate for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult" and is decided by the court in its discretion. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11. "To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested [hourly] rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Id. An attorney's usual billing rate may be considered the "reasonable rate" if it accords with the rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers possessing similar skill, experience and reputation. Kattan by Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C.Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
A party moving for summary judgment on legal fees accordingly must demonstrate prevailing party status and the reasonableness of the fees requested in terms of hours spent and hourly rate. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), summary judgment shall be granted if the movant shows that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Summary judgment should be granted against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The court is required to draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and to accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The nonmoving party must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252. Nor may the non-moving party rely on allegations or conclusory statements; instead, the non-moving party is obliged to present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find it its favor. Greene v Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).