The opinion of the court was delivered by: Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge
Pending before the Court is defendant District of Columbia's Motion for Summary Judgment . There are two issues requiring resolution in this matter: (1) whether the plaintiff, James Alan Rogers ("Rogers"), who was committed to the custody of the District of Columbia Jail ("D.C. Jail") on December 15, 2007, was overdetained and, if so, (2) whether Rogers' negligent training and supervision claim withstands judicial scrutiny. The Motion is now ripe for review. Upon consideration of the Motion , the Opposition , the Reply  thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record herein and for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants-in-part and denies-in-part the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Our saga begins with the tale of plaintiff's numerous arrests. Plaintiff was arrested on four different charges in 2007: two felony charges for violating the Bail Reform Act, one felony charge for Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance and one misdemeanor charge for carrying an open can of alcohol without a permit. The District of Columbia issued a bench warrant for Rogers' arrest on December 14, 2007, when he failed to appear in Court.
Def.'s Reply  at ¶ 2, Feb. 14, 2012. He was committed to the custody of the D.C. Jail on December 15, 2007 for the aforementioned charges, and was not released until August 14, 2008. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J.  at 33, 40--41, Dec. 12, 2011. During plaintiff's jail stay, he was sentenced on two separate occasions for all of the remaining charges. Id. at 40--41.
Rogers states that he was overdetained at the D.C. Jail for approximately two months in 2008, claiming that he should have been released in June of 2008, but that D.C. Jail officials held him until August of that year. Id. According to Rogers, his overdetention was a direct result of D.C. Jail's negligent training and supervision of its employees with regard to calculating jail credits. In response, defendant argues that Rogers was not overdetained, and that plaintiff improperly pleaded his negligent supervision claim, thus rendering his argument moot.
On February 27, 2008, the Court sentenced plaintiff to fifteen days in the D.C. Jail for the alcohol violation (CTF 003154). Id. at 33. Because he had accrued six days of jail credit on other charges-two days of credit for time served on February 5 and 6, 2007, and four days of credit for time served between December 15 thru December 18, 2007-he served only eight days of his sentence, from February 27 thru March 6, 2008. Id. at 31, 33, 36.
On April 25, 2008, the Court sentenced plaintiff on the remaining three charges. With regard to his Possession charge, identified as CF2 003129, Rogers was sentenced to twenty-four months in jail with five years of supervised release. Id. at 26, 30. The Court, however, reduced his sentence to six months in prison, followed by one year of supervised release. Id. at 30. The sentencing notes from the Superior Court's docket sheet clearly state that "[d]efendant will receive credit for time served." Pl.'s Opp. [14-1] 11, Jan. 17, 2012.
Plaintiff also committed two felonies when he violated the Bail Reform Act twice. His first charge-identified as CF2 17114-occurred on July 21, 2007. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J.  at 24. He was committed to the custody of the D.C. Jail on December 17, 2007, for this charge. On April 25, 2008, the Court sentenced plaintiff to twelve months in Jail, followed by three years of supervised release. Id. at 28. The Court, however, suspended the execution of his sentence, issued a release order for this charge only, and allowed plaintiff to serve one year of supervised release. Id. at 27, 28. His second felony violation of the Bail Reform Act-identified as CF2 028827-occurred on December 15, 2007, and he was committed to the custody of the D.C. Jail on the same day. Id. at 29, 32, 43. On April 25, 2008, the Court issued a release order for this charge, ordering plaintiff released without bond. Id.
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on September 6, 2011. Plaintiff contends that he was committed to the custody of the D.C. Jail on December 14, 2007, and that he remained in custody until August 14, 2008. Pl.'s Opp.  at 6. Plaintiff alleges that the D.C. Jail incorrectly calculated his jail credits, only crediting him for a total of 71 days. Id. He contends that the number should be substantially higher. Id. Plaintiff also maintains that when Judge Boasberg sentenced him on the three aforementioned charges on April 25, 2008, the Judge specifically indicated that he would receive credit for time served, meaning that his release date should have been June 14, 2008. Id. at 7. Upon receipt of plaintiff's complaint, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the D.C. Jail did not overdetain Rogers, citing a declaration of a D.C. Jail official and various exhibits for support and (2) that plaintiff improperly pleaded his negligent training and supervision claim by failing to comply with the requirements as set forth in D.C. Code §12-309.
Summary judgment should be granted when the "materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)--(c). This standard requires more than the mere existence of some factual dispute between the parties; "the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247--48 (1986) (emphasis in original). "A fact is 'material' if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under the governing law." Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). "An issue is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Doe v. IRS, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
In seeking summary judgment, the moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions [of the evidence in the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once this burden has been met, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [her] own affidavits, or by [the evidence in the record] designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324 (quotations omitted). In doing so, the non-moving party's opposition "must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits, declarations or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Doe v. Dep't of the Treasury, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Freedman v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff must have more than "a scintilla of evidence to support [her] claims"). In other words, the non-moving party is required to point to ...