The opinion of the court was delivered by: Robert L. Wilkins United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Lashan Daniels ("Daniels") and her minor son ("M.C.") bring this action against Defendants the District of Columbia and District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officers Napper, Alvarenga, and Salice in connection with the arrest of Daniels and the detention of M.C. Defendants have moved for partial dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
On May 18, 2010, Daniels and M.C. returned home to their condominium and saw Officer Napper speaking with a neighbor in one of the other units in the building. (Compl. ¶ 7). As Plaintiffs walked by, the neighbor yelled at Daniels and told her that she was going to "beat her ass!" (Id. ¶ 8). Daniels told Officer Napper she wished to file a complaint; however, Officer Napper declined Daniels' request and told her that the neighbor's statement was not a threat. (Id.). M.C., in attempting to defend his mother, became engaged in a shouting match with his neighbor. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiffs allege that Officer Napper chased M.C. up the nearby stairs toward his home, then placed M.C. in handcuffs and led him back down the stairs. (Id.). Officer Napper also placed Daniels in handcuffs at this time. (Id.).
Shortly thereafter, Officers Alvarenga and Salice arrived on the scene. (Id. at ¶ 10). Plaintiffs allege that Officers Alvarenga and Salice proceeded to "manhandle" Daniels, ignoring her protests that she was six-months pregnant and would go peacefully. (Id. ¶ 10). According to Plaintiffs, Officers Alvarenga and Salice "push[ed], shov[ed] and jerk[ed]" Daniels on their way down the stairs and out of the building. (Id.). M.C. was initially placed in Officer Napper's patrol car, but was later released at the scene. Daniels, however, was not released, and Officer Napper drove Daniels to Seventh District police precinct, subjecting Daniels to "an intentionally violent ride." (Id. ¶ 11). Daniels was released several hours later.
On May 18, 2011, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs' three-count complaint includes the following claims: "Assault & Battery" (against all defendants) (Count I); "Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress" (against all defendants) (Count II); and "Deprivation of Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983" (against the defendant officers) (Count III). (Compl. ¶¶ 14-22). On July 21, 2011, Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
Defendants have moved for partial dismissal of the claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, acceptable as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Anderson v. Holder, 691 F.Supp.2d 57, 61 (D.D.C.2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, (2007)) (internal quotes omitted)).
A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1994). However, where the well-pleaded facts do not permit a court, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the "mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
I.Count I (Assault & Battery) & Count III (Deprivation of Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Officers Alvarenga and Salice argue that M.C.'s assault and battery and excessive force claims asserted against them in Counts I and III should be dismissed because the complaint fails to allege that either officer used any force against M.C. (Defs.' Mot. at 4). The Court agrees that dismissal of these claims is proper because the facts alleged in the complaint suggest that Officer Napper alone had contact with M.C. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss M.C.'s claims against Officers Alvarenga and Salice in Counts I and III.*fn1
With respect to M.C.'s assault and battery claim against Officer Napper, Plaintiffs allege that Officer Napper chased M.C. up the stairs, placed him in handcuffs, and put him in the back of his patrol car. (Compl. ¶¶9-10). Defendants contend that Officer Napper's actions were justified because he was performing a Terrystop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (holding that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a ...